

Lincoln. p. 88. p. 118.

BROWNSON'S  
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

THIRD NEW YORK SERIES.—No. XIII.

JANUARY, 1863.

CONTENTS.

ART.	PAGE
I.—FAITH AND THEOLOGY . . . . .	1
1. Regula Fidei Catholicae et Collectio Dogmatum Credendorum a P. PHIL. NERIO CHRISMANN, O. S. F. Denuo revidit et edidit PHIL. JACOB SPINDLER. Editio nova Superiorum Permissu et Approbatione.	
2. Études de la Doctrine Catholique dans le Concile de Trente. Par le Rev. P. NAMPON de la Compagnie de Jésus.	
II.—THE ANTIQUITY OF THE EARTH . . . . .	29
1. Answer to Hugh Miller and Theoretic Geologists. By THOMAS A. DAVIES.	
2. Sacred Cosmogony. Translated from the French by L'ABBÉ A. SORIGNET.	
III.—CONSCRIPTS AND VOLUNTEERS . . . . .	55
Conscription and Volunteering as Methods of Recruiting National Armies.	
IV.—MRS. SADLIER'S OLD AND NEW . . . . .	77
Old and New; or, Taste <i>versus</i> Fashion. By MRS. J. SADLIER.	
V.—THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE . . . . .	88
Annual Message of the President to both Houses of Congress	
VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS . . . . .	116

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED BY D. & J. SADLIER & CO.,

NO. 31 BARCLAY STREET.

BOSTON: P. DONAHOE. BALTIMORE: KELLY, HEDIAN & PIET.



BROWNSON'S  
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

---

JANUARY, 1863.

---

- ART I.—1. *Regula Fidei Catholicæ et Collectio Dogmatum Credendorum* a P. PHIL. NERIO CHRISMANN, O. S. F. *Denuo revidit et edidit* PHIL. JACOB SPINDLER. *Editio nova Superiorum Permissu et Approbatione.* Wireceburgi. 1854. 8vo., pp. 316.
2. *Études de la Doctrine Catholique dans le Concile de Trente.* Par le REV. P. NAMPON de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris. 1852. 12mo., pp. 720.

A CHIEF reason why our religion encounters so much opposition among well disposed and comparatively well informed persons brought up outside of the Church, is simply in the fact that they do not understand it, and take it to be very much the reverse of what it is. They suppose we confound theology with faith, and claim for the opinions and speculations of theologians, however crude or imperfect, the same authority that we claim for the revealed word of God; and hence they suppose that we regard as faith, as matter not to be rejected without heresy, all the traditions, notions, speculations, opinions, or convictions to be found among Catholics in any age or country. Assuming that Catholics profess to act always from the promptings of divine grace, and under the authority of the Church held to be infallible, they hold our religion itself responsible for all that has been done in any age or nation, not only by the clergy, but by Catholic princes and people; and as there is undeniably much in the history of Catholic populations, governments, and nations, which no honest and enlightened man can approve, they conclude that our religion is an

imposition, our faith vain, and the claims of our Church to be the Church of God unfounded. Yet the whole of this non-Catholic reasoning rests on a false assumption, and proceeds on a total misapprehension of real Catholic doctrine. There are two sets of traditions amongst Catholics, as amongst non-Catholics; the one denominated by our Lord, "traditions of men," and the other held to be divine traditions, or traditions of the word of God revealed by Christ, the prophets, the apostles, and canonical authors. The latter traditions only are of faith, and it is only in regard to them that Catholics profess to have infallible authority in the Church. The former, the traditions of men, are not included in the traditions of faith, and we do not hold them, or profess to hold them, on divine authority, even though entertained and held as probable or as true by Churchmen. They fall into the category of all human beliefs and convictions, and are open to the free judgments of reason, to be held or rejected as reason judges them worthy or unworthy of belief.

Catholics, if at all instructed, always distinguish between faith and theology. Faith is the revealed word of God; theology is a human science, constructed by the human mind operating on divine things partly revealed, and partly evident from natural reason. In theology there may be more than in modern times is included under the term *philosophy*, but there is, at least, all that is included under that term. Theology includes as an integral part of itself, at least the whole of philosophy, and we find it difficult for ourselves to draw any valid line of distinction between them. Theology, it is said, takes its principles from both revelation and natural reason, and philosophy takes its principles from natural reason alone; but a philosophy which borrows nothing from the revelation of the superintelligible, or the super-rational, will never be able to explain even the intelligible, or be deserving of the name of philosophy. The natural is not complete in itself, and the intelligible has its origin and ground in the superintelligible, the rational in the super-rational, and, therefore, is not explicable by itself alone, as naturalists and rationalists pretend. The intelligible order, not being complete in itself, is not explicable without revelation. The natural and supernatural are distinguishable, no doubt, but not separable. Strictly speaking, the supernatural is that which is done immediately by God, while the natural is that which is done



by him mediately, through the agency of second or third causes; but what he does in either of these ways, forms only a part of one complete and indissoluble whole. The natural and supernatural are not two parallel orders, each sufficing for itself and complete in itself. What is called the supernatural order, the Christian order, the order of grace, and known to us only by supernatural and divine revelation, is not an order separate from the so-called order of nature, but is in the plan of the Creator related to it, as its complement or completion, and in that plan forms only one full and complete order with it. Neither part can be really known and understood without the other. They are two parts of one whole. We can have no real science of the supernatural without natural reason, or of the natural without supernatural revelation. To all science constructed without revealed principles, there must be always something wanting, as there is always something wanting to the natural man, that is, the cosmic man, remaining in the order of generation, and not elevated by grace to the order of regeneration, or created anew in Christ Jesus. For ourselves personally, we regard theology and philosophy, when rightly understood, as substantially identical, or at least, attach little value to a philosophy that can be separated from theology and constructed independently of principles derivable only from supernatural revelation.

Faith, we mean *Catholic* faith, is restricted to what we call the Catholic Idea, but what is more commonly, and more intelligibly to our readers, called the revealed word of God. Veronius in his *Regula Fidei*, as cited and approved by Chrismann in the first-named work before us, a work of high authority, says:—*Illud omne et solum est de fide catholica quod est revelatum in verba Dei, et propositum omnibus ab ecclesia catholica fide divina credendum.* All and only that is of catholic faith, which is revealed in the word of God, and proposed by the Church to all men to be believed with divine faith. To which, on the same authority, must be added, “*Ut doctrina aliqua sit fidei catholicæ dogma seu ARTICULUS necesse imprimis est, ut sit REVELATA a Deo per Christum, Prophetas, Apostolos seu auctores canonicos.*” For any doctrine to be an article or dogma of Catholic faith, it is necessary first of all that it should be revealed by God through Christ, the Prophets, the Apostles, or the canonical authors. Hence the Church can propose nothing to be believed with divine faith, or to be received as Catholic faith,

that is not contained in the revealed word of God, transmitted to us from Christ, through the Prophets, Apostles, or canonical authors. The Church can then by her own authority make or propose no new faith, and is restricted in her office of teaching to "the faith once delivered to the saints," or, as theologians say, to the *Depositum*, or faith deposited with her from the beginning, for the ultimate reason of catholic faith is not the authority of the Church proposing, but of God revealing. The Church is the witness to the fact that God reveals the article or dogma, but the article or dogma itself is believed on the veracity of God, who is the Truth itself, or because it is his word.

Catholic faith must be the whole faith, and be Catholic in time as well as in space. According to the *dictum* of St. Vincent of Lerins, only that which is always and everywhere believed, *quod SEMPER, quod ubique*, and by all, is catholic faith. If the faith in the beginning was catholic, the whole faith was then revealed, proposed, and believed, and no subsequent addition was possible. If the whole was not revealed, proposed and believed in the beginning, then the faith in the beginning was not catholic, and the primitive believers were not Catholics. If less than the whole is now proposed and believed, faith now is not catholic, and present believers are not Catholics. The faith must then, if catholic, have been complete in the beginning, and have been transmitted to us without addition or diminution. The Church has, therefore, no authority to alter or change the faith, to add any thing to it, or take any thing from it. If among Catholics any change, addition, or diminution has occurred, it has been without authority, and the result of ignorance or error.

The readers of our earlier volumes will recollect that this point was discussed at length in the controversy occasioned by Dr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. We did not then, and we do not now, object to development, but we found fault with the Theory of the learned author, because we understood him to maintain that there may be development in the faith itself, objectively considered,—development in the revealed truth, not simply in its explication, or in our understanding and appropriation of it. It is possible, however, that we misunderstood him, and that after all he really meant only what we ourselves held then and hold now. But be this as it may, we denied then and we deny now all development, growth,

or increase in the faith, or as the theologians say, the object (*objectum materiale*) of faith. Objectively considered the Catholic faith is Christ himself, and he reveals it in revealing or manifesting himself. He is "the way, the truth, and the life," and in revealing himself reveals the whole catholic faith. As he changes not, neither enlarges nor diminishes, but is invariable, immutable, "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever," the faith in itself must be invariable, always one and the same. Perhaps we should speak more truly if we said, not that he *revealed* himself, but that he *reveals* himself to the Church, as ever present to her and dwelling in her, as her continuous and unfailing light and life. Hence the revelation she receives is neither old nor new, but always present, and always equal to itself. In this view, again, there could be no change, variation, development, growth, or diminution of the faith in itself.

Now the authority and infallibility of the Church as teacher rest on the presence to and in her of Christ, the universal and living truth. When our Lord commanded his apostles to go and teach all nations, he added, "For I am with you all days unto the consummation of the world." The Church derives her authority not simply from an external appointment or commission, which, while it gave the legal right, could not give the internal ability to teach, but also and chiefly from the presence of Christ with her and in her, as her light and her life. The Church on her divine side lives the life of Christ, has her light in his light, and speaks externally the words he speaks internally to her. Here is the real ground of her authority. In divine things all is real, nothing merely putative, arbitrary, or forensic. A commission to the Church to teach, as a commission from a prince to one of his servants to command his army, would not be in itself a real power to teach, or a sufficient warrant for believing or obeying her, for she might, with her commission in her pocket, lack the ability to teach truly the word of God. The human mind is not and cannot be satisfied with the knowledge that she has a simple legal commission to teach, for it does not see how such a commission is or can be in itself a sufficient pledge of infallibility. The commission is intrinsic, not forensic simply, and is in the fact that He who is Truth itself is living in the Church, and living in her as her life and her light, so that in teaching she has only to speak the word which He who can neither deceive nor be deceived, speaks in her to her own consciousness.



He is, in some sense, her mind, her intellect, her intelligence. But the very ground of the infallibility and authority of the Church necessarily restricts both to what Christ reveals, and therefore to faith alone, or, to what is revealed in the word of God spoken or speaking to her. Hence all Catholics maintain that the Church in teaching is authoritative and infallible only in matters of faith. She has authority, but not infallibility, in discipline or administration, and the faithful must submit to her authority for the sake of order and a good conscience, since she is appointed to govern as well as to teach. But in matters of discipline and administration the Church is human, a human legislator and administrator, and whatever is human is imperfect, and may be mistaken. The administration of the Church, as the administration of the State, is intrusted to men,—for the most part, we believe, wise and good men, but still men, and men with the appetites, propensities, passions, and infirmities of men. But in matters of faith the Church, as the living body of our Lord, by virtue of her union with him, and the indwelling Holy Ghost, is not only authoritative but infallible, and authoritative because infallible. Beyond, however, what is of catholic faith, what her indwelling Lord in all times and places reveals to her of himself, she teaches neither infallibly nor authoritatively; and beyond, no Catholic is bound to believe what she teaches on pain of heresy, although always, and everywhere, and in all matters, she is to be respected.

From this we gather, first, that as a Catholic I am not bound to defend every act or measure of ecclesiastical administration during the centuries since St. Peter erected the papal throne in the city of the Cæsars, far less every act of the civil and political administration of Catholic states and nations. I have, without any impeachment of my orthodoxy or of my filial duty as a Catholic, the right to refuse to defend what I honestly believe indefensible, and to criticise what I honestly believe deserving of criticism in the history of the Church, and am no more bound to defend Catholic princes and governments in their civil and political administration than I am non-Catholic princes and governments. As a fact, I believe, the ecclesiastical administration has been by far freer from error and imperfection than any secular administration, and that the administration of Catholic states, on the whole, compares more than favorably with that of the best governed non-Catholic states. Yet I do not feel myself



bound to defend every act of the Popes, not even of those who have been canonized. I venerate the memory of St. Gregory VII. as that of a great man, a great Pope, and a great saint, and yet among the Popes he is the principal author of that system of centralism which I so dislike and deplore. He evidently adopted it as the only practicable remedy within his reach for the evils of his times; but he acted in view of the present and not of the future, as we should were we to abolish states' rights and install a military dictator as the condition of escaping from our present national embarrassments and evils. Far less do I feel myself bound to defend the policy of Cardinal Ximenes as Regent of Spain in destroying the estates and grasping all power for the crown; Philip II., in his conduct toward the Netherlands; James II., in following the advice of Father Petrie in dealing with the Church of England; Louis XIV., either in his attitude toward the Pope, or in his revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and dragooning the Huguenots into the Church; or the war of the Bourbons on the Jesuits, or the demand of the frightened princes and ultra-conservatives for their re-establishment in 1814. I have a right to judge of all these things in the light of history, experience, and sound reason. I may err in my judgment, egregiously err, and that may be much to my discredit as a wise statesman, a philosophical historian, or an author seeking to enlighten public opinion, but it is not necessarily any impeachment of my loyalty or my orthodoxy as a Catholic or member of the Catholic Church.

We gather, secondly, from the principles laid down, that, since I am bound only in matters of faith, in matters of theology, unless I contradict faith, I am free, and am not bound by the opinions of theologians. Theology is not faith, but is a human science, constructed by human reason operating on both rational and revealed principles. The faith regarded in itself is the same, whether revealed or unrevealed, and even as revealed it would be to us as if it were not, if we did not believe it, and if it did not become the object of our thoughts and to us a principle of intellectual life and activity. To have it avail us, we must ourselves receive it, appropriate, or assimilate it. We must seek to understand it, to grasp its relations with ourselves, with our reason, with the whole world of intellect, and with the universe of which we are a part. This gives rise to what is called Theology, which is not faith, but is the science of faith—the articles, dogmas, or propositions of faith, or the several truths

revealed, reproduced in our minds in their scientific form and relations, and brought into harmony with the whole body of truth, whether attainable by reason or revelation. It is the answer the mind gives to the question: What does the revelation or the faith mean? Now, in this the Church teaches the revealed principles on which the mind operates, and teaches them infallibly, and with divine authority; but the operations themselves are strictly human operations, the operations of our own understanding, reason, and judgment, and as free as any mental operations are or can be. What we are bound by faith to do, is to preserve intact the revealed principle, and all the Church does, or attempts to do in the case, is to intervene to define the principle, the article, dogma, or proposition of faith, whenever we deny, pervert, or mutilate it. She in her authoritative character intervenes only to preserve, in its purity and its integrity, the revealed word. Her definitions are designed to guard the word against suffering from human rashness, ignorance, or error. They do not deny the freedom of the mind, nor interfere with our free understanding, explication, and appropriation of the word, but simply define beyond what bounds we cannot go without departing from the truth or going against the word itself.

The definitions of the Church have something of the character of criminal jurisprudence. They are not a part of the revelation,—are not necessary to her positive enunciation of the word, or essential to its life and operation; but they are required to vindicate it from error, as criminal courts pass sentences to vindicate the law which has been violated. Nobody who comprehends any thing of the matter restricts the word to the definitions of the Church, or supposes that the definitions either make the faith or cover the whole of the revealed word. It is not to be supposed that nothing is believed or to be believed that is not formally defined by the Church, for her definitions touch only so much of the faith as has been controverted or denied. But all theological opinions, however unsound they may be, that have not been condemned or declared to be contrary to faith, may be held without incurring the note of heresy, and be freely discussed, *pro* and *con*, according to the judgment or prejudices of theologians. The faith in itself is one, a whole, a living whole, and its efficiency, in great measure at least, consists in its being received as such, or embraced in its real synthesis; and, hence, definitions

which break it into fragments, or present it in detached parts, are in some respects an evil. They are an evil, inasmuch as they tend to present the faith, not as a whole, but in distinct and isolated propositions, which the mind finds it difficult, often impossible, to reunite and integrate in the living unity of truth. But they are a necessary evil, for, without them the word, owing to the weakness and not unfrequent corruption of the human mind, would itself be corrupted and lost, as it was with the ancient Gentiles, and as it is with the modern sects. It is well that definitions should be authoritatively made when needed to save the integrity of the faith, but it were better, if possible, that none should ever be needed. It is better to err than never to think, but it is better to think without erring than it is to err, even though we be ultimately set right.

All the mysteries, such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, Grace, the Efficacy of the Sacraments, the Resurrection of the Dead, the Last Judgment, the Glorification of the Saints, and the Everlasting Punishment of the Wicked in Hell, are of faith, on which all believers do and must agree. As to these there is no controversy, or if any, it must be ended at once by authority. But the explication of these mysteries, so far as explicable they are, their scientific exposition, and their reduction to an intellectual system harmonizing with the whole body of revealed and rational truth, is not faith, but theology; not divine revelation, but the work of the human understanding, operating on revealed principles and principles supplied by natural reason itself. The mystery itself must be held as revealed by God, and declared by authority, but the scientific exposition, the appropriateness of the analogies by which we seek to explain or understand it, as well as the justness of the arguments by which we seek to defend or vindicate it to natural reason, are to be taken on their merits, are not of faith, are not authoritative any further than rationally convincing, even though used by a pope or council in defining the dogma, or condemning errors opposed to it. In all that comes within the intelligible order, in all that rests on the operations of the human understanding, or on the principles of natural reason, the mind is free, and it is and can be bound by no extrinsic authority any further than to leave the dogma or mystery in its purity and integrity. We gave, for example, in these pages for April last, a theological exposition of the Trinity, showing its necessity in the very con-



ception of God as real, living being, being in its plenitude, and finding in it the prototype of all creation. We may have been right, or we may have been wrong, but if we preserved the dogma unimpaired, left standing in all its integrity the ineffable mystery itself, our orthodoxy is unimpeachable, though our theory of the Trinity, our method of explaining or defining it, and the conclusions we drew from it are untenable. Authority does not interfere with us, and the Church leaves the error to be exposed and refuted by argument, that is, by theologians and philosophers.

The same is to be said of all the sacred mysteries, articles, or dogmas of faith. Authority guards the mystery, protects the dogma, the revealed word of God, but it does not undertake to protect theology from all error, or to indicate and condemn every false analogy, every unwarrantable deduction, every bad or inconclusive argument, to be found in the systems constructed by the human understanding, operating on principles revealed in the word of God. The Church gives free scope to the theologian so long as he does not contradict or impair faith,—but she commits herself to no theological theory; and no theory, however widely it may have been accepted, not even that of St. Augustine, or that of St. Thomas, in so far as it is purely theological and the work of the human understanding, that is, in so far as it is theology, not faith, can allege her authority in its favor, or profess to be taught by her divine and infallible authority. Either St. Augustine or St. Thomas is high authority for what either declares is or is not of faith, and the opinion of either on any question of pure reason deserves great weight, and may be cited as an argument, but never as an authority which must end controversy. Speculative theology is always more or less affected by the philosophical and psychological doctrine of the theologian, and often by that of the age or nation in which he is bred; and moral theology is often affected by the prevailing political doctrine, and by the theories of physiologists. The progress of physiological studies, every one knows, has greatly modified many of the decisions of our casuists. Things once allowed as innocent, are now prohibited as sinful; and things once prohibited as sinful, are now allowed as innocent. The Church does not profess to have received a revelation of the facts of history, of the science of chronology, astronomy, chemistry, electricity, physics, or geology. Churchmen and laymen, Christians and infidels, have all to learn these in the same way,



and by one and the same discipline; and yet all these sciences are laid more or less under contribution by the theologian, and affect, more or less, not his faith, but his theology. Many theological disputes would have been speedily ended, if the disputants had known more of physiology, history, chronology, or even of geography. Theology is, therefore, a human science, and has as a science only the authority of science in general. In it we have the simple authority of human reason, and can never claim or allege for it the divine infallible authority of the Church.

In examining the claims of the Church, or in judging of her character, we must always draw sharply the line of distinction between faith and theology, and remember that we are to hold the Church officially responsible, not for the speculations, theories, and opinions of theologians, but only for what she defines or declares to be of faith. Theological and philosophical, historical and scientific errors even in her clergy make nothing against her claims; and you must convict her of error in her faith before you can deny her infallibility in any matter or in any sense in which she claims to be, or we, her children, are bound to believe her infallible. She is infallible in the dogma, in whatever pertains to the Divine Idea, the revealed word, but not in what is human and depends on human reason and science. Let non-Catholics bear in mind that Catholics do not assert for the Church in matters of faith only a simple external authority or commission to teach,—authority in a simple legal, forensic sense,—but through her mystic yet real union with Christ her head, the internal and abiding ability to teach infallibly the revealed word of God, a word continuously revealed and ever present to her understanding by virtue of the indwelling Holy Ghost; and let them further bear in mind that this authority extends only to the dogma, and leaves the mind free in all else, so long as it leaves the dogma intact, and they will find nearly all their objections to the teachings of the Church removed. We do not say that their objections to all the theories, notions, and practices of Catholics would be removed; but their objections to all that is really catholic and enjoined by the Church, and that is obligatory on us as Catholics, would be obviated. Entertaining this view, many theologians have from time to time attempted to draw the line between what is strictly faith, and what is merely theology, and few, if any, have done it more satisfactorily, as far as they have attempted it,

than the authors cited at the head of this article, one a Franciscan and the other a Jesuit, and both men of undoubted learning and high theological attainments.

There are, undoubtedly, many things received among Catholics which the unlearned place on the same line with faith, that have at best only a theological authority, or are deductions of theologians from revealed principles, or the conclusions drawn by theologians by their own reason operating on divine things. Many of these are no doubt true, and could not be denied without what is technically called *erronea*, or at least *temeraria*, error or rashness; but even these are not of faith and withdrawn from free discussion. Others, again, though suffered to pass without any brand of public censure are unfounded, doubtful, or of superstitious tendency. Some of these things we have from time to time adverted to and pointed out, things which every Catholic theologian knows are not of faith nor exempt from criticism, but which the ignorant and unlearned confound with faith, and suppose cannot be questioned without questioning the faith itself.

Our readers will remember the outcry raised against us a year and a half since for some suggestions we threw out with regard to the future condition of the reprobate. We raise no question whether we were right or wrong, yet the views we seemed to question were only widely received theological opinions, or conclusions. They were not articles or dogmas of faith enjoined by authority, and their denial, even if an error, was no sin against faith. Besides, there were respectable theologians who held the views we suggested, and a writer in the *London Tablet*, who seems to have studied the subject, asserts that they were the views generally held by Catholic theologians prior to Peter Lombard, *Magister Sententiarum*, in the twelfth century. The questions we raised were simply theological questions, and as such free questions, that is, questions not to be decided by any appeal to authority, but by the evidence and reasons proper in the case. For if they were not always questions of faith, they could not be made so by any action of authority, since the Church has no authority to found or create new articles or dogmas of faith. Even a *consensus theologorum* that an opinion is sound, does not evidence it to be of Catholic faith. The *consensus* that it is *of faith* might be conclusive, but the *consensus* that it is the true opinion, only proves that such is and always has been the opinion of theologians, and by no means takes it out of the catego-

ry of opinion and places it in that of faith. To deny it, may or may not be rash, according to the reason one has for denying or not denying it, but it is not and cannot be heresy.

Theologians differ as to the authority and infallibility of the Pope, and have by their discussions so obscured the question that it is not easy for an unlearned man like ourselves to say precisely how much or how little on the subject is of faith, or pertains to the dogma. That the Pope, that is to say, the Archbishop of Rome, as successor of St. Peter, prince of the Apostles, chief of the Apostolic college, is the visible head, primate or supreme pastor of the whole Church, is evidently of faith, as is the assertion also, that his primacy is a primacy of authority or jurisdiction, not simply a primacy of honor. But that the Pope is superior to the General Council, that he is not bound by the canons, or that he is absolute lord, under Christ, of the whole Church, is not, we apprehend, contained in the Depositum, and is at best only a theological opinion or conclusion. In the primitive ages the Pope appears and is addressed by other bishops rather as *Primus inter pares* than as their sovereign lord, and there can be no doubt in the mind of the student of history that his relations to the other bishops were much modified by ideas borrowed from feudalism. That the Pope has authority to feed, rule, and govern the Church, both clergy and laity, as their chief pastor, is undoubtedly the law, and we hold it to be so by the institution of Christ, though the Council of Florence, while asserting his supremacy or defining his authority, does not define it to be of faith, and the Greeks, who deny his supremacy and refuse to submit to his authority, have never, as we are aware, been treated for that as heretics, but only as schismatics.

The more prevalent theological doctrine is, that *Papa loquens ex cathedra* is infallible, that is, as some interpret it, speaking officially to the whole Church, or as others interpret it, the Pope, with his auditory, or speaking with the whole Church. That the papal definitions are not irreformable, and therefore that the Pope in defining questions of faith and morals is not infallible, is maintained by the French clergy in the four articles, adopted by them in 1682, and those articles have never been condemned as heretical. They no doubt gave great offence at Rome, and they were instantly annulled, as to their legal effect upon the French clergy, by the reigning Pontiff, Innocent XI., but they have



never been declared contrary to dogma, and Gallicans, who adhere to them, receive absolution at the hands of the priest as orthodox Catholics. Evidently, then, it is not of faith that the Pope is infallible in defining questions of faith and morals. This Review has always maintained and maintains that; that he is infallible by virtue of divine assistance when solemnly deciding litigated points of faith or morals for the whole Church, is the sounder theological opinion, but it has never maintained and does not maintain that it is of Catholic faith. They who deny it may be as orthodox as they who affirm it, though, in our judgment, not so good logicians or so sound theologians.

The same distinction between faith and theology must be made when treating of the power which the Popes in the Middle Ages exercised over temporal princes. The right of the Pope as supreme pastor and highest court of conscience to take cognizance of the conduct of all the faithful under its relation to the law of God, is, if not of faith, so intimately connected with the dogma, as to be hardly separable from it. To us it seems to be the dogma itself, stated in its practical form. The Pope, then, representing the Church in her supreme spiritual authority, would have the same right to judge princes as subjects, and to pronounce sentence against them for their violation of the Christian law, to admonish; rebuke, reprove, interdict, and excommunicate them for their crimes, and for their crimes committed in their public as well as in their private capacity. So much we suppose to be really, if not formally, of faith. All beyond this is not faith, but theological conclusion, or theological opinion. It is, we suppose, of faith that the Pope represents Christ upon earth in his Pontificate. Christ unites in himself the office of Prophet, Priest, and King, but it is not of faith that the Pope is his vicar on earth in all three of these offices. The first, that of prophet or teacher, the Pope represents with the whole Church, and it is not of faith that it is filled by the Pope alone, although it is not unlawful to hold that it is. The office of Priest and King united in Christ are confessedly separated in his earthly representatives. The Sacerdocy or Pontificate is given in its plenitude to the Pope or supreme Pontiff, but it is not of faith that he has given him also the Kingship, and we think it is of faith that he has not. The Pope is *alter Christus* as Priest or Pontiff, but not as King. As Pope Gelasius says to the Emperor Anastatius, our Lord has established two powers



for the government of this world, the pontifical and the imperial, the spiritual and secular or temporal. The Pope, then, has the supreme pontifical powers, but as vicar of Jesus Christ, no kingly or temporal power, and therefore has no authority over temporal sovereigns, except what is inherent in the pontificate, or in the spiritual over the secular. God gave the pontificate and priestly power to the clergy, or the Pontifex Maximus, but he gave the temporal or secular sovereignty to the king, or rather to the people, and therefore the Pontiff has no right according to his own will and pleasure, by virtue of his pontificate, to bestow or take away crowns, to establish or subvert the constitutions of states and empires. He cannot depose sovereigns and absolve subjects; he can only judicially declare when, according to the law of God, the sovereign has forfeited his right to reign, and the oath of allegiance ceases to bind the subject. More than this, we are not aware any Pope has ever claimed, and this is all we understood ourselves to maintain in our essays on the papal power, some few years since, and which called forth against us the animadversions of several bishops, among others, the learned Bishop of Pittsburgh, now Father O'Connor, S. J., one of the ablest theologians Ireland ever gave to America. At least this is all we ever supposed we were maintaining as of Catholic faith. The French clergy, in the four articles already referred to, deny that the Pope receives in the power of the keys any power to dispose of the crowns of sovereigns; and although we do not accept those articles as good theology, we are obliged to confess that they contradict no article or dogma of Catholic faith.

The temporal power of the Pope, or his sovereignty of the Roman States, is a different question, and wholly outside of Catholic faith. The Pope is actually pontiff and prince, as were at one time nearly all the bishops of western, northern, and central Europe, and as very few of them now are. The union of the pontificate and principality in one and the same person, though not forbidden, is not by virtue of the institution of Christ. It is a union that grew up with the feudal Constitution of Europe, but never had any ground in the essential constitution of the Church. It is not of catholic faith that the supreme pontiff should be a secular prince, or that his temporal principality is essential, necessary, or even useful in the maintenance of his spiritual independence, or the discharge of his spiritual functions. The Pope, no doubt,

holds his temporal power by a good and valid title, and he cannot, more than any other sovereign, be deprived of it without crime. Yet he holds it by the same tenure and subject to the same conditions as any other secular sovereign holds his estates. The question is properly between him and his own subjects, with which foreigners have no right to intermeddle. In other words, so far as we can see, if, as we have maintained, the pontifical and secular powers are separated by Christ, the temporal sovereignty of the Pope stands on the same footing as all legitimate secular sovereignty, and is neither more nor less sacred. He can abdicate it if he and his subjects choose, and he can, if he judges best, insist upon retaining it, and maintaining it by force. In other words, as temporal sovereign, he has all the rights and duties of other sovereigns. The religious question is only accidentally associated with the temporal sovereignty question.

The government of the Church and the government of the Papal States, have to a great extent been mixed up together, and it is obvious that they cannot be separated now without great inconvenience to ecclesiastical administration. The Holy Father himself and the Bishops recently assembled at Rome, assert that the maintenance of the temporal sovereignty is, in the present state of the world, necessary to the interests of religion. This, though not a definition of doctrine, and not an assertion that binds the Catholic conscience or judgment as an article of faith, or as a formal judicial sentence of the supreme court, is yet not to be treated with levity, or set aside as of little account. It is an assertion deserving of grave consideration, and with us it is of controlling authority. We could not maintain the contrary without placing ourselves in opposition to the general opinion of Catholics, and that, too, when after all we cannot say absolutely that they are wrong, or that we are right, and when also our opposition can hardly do any good and might do some harm. We have never, as it has been calumniously alleged, attacked the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, and have never defended any of those who have attacked it. We believed two years ago, considering things as they then were, that the interests of religion and civilization could be better promoted by the Holy Father voluntarily ceasing, than by his continuing to be a temporal prince. The opinion we had a right to maintain and to express, for it was in violation of neither catholic faith, nor catholic

morals. But as the opinion was not approved by the Pontifical government, and as the Holy Father, with whom alone rests its adoption or rejection, has decided, with the approbation of a great majority of the Bishops of the Catholic world, to pursue a very different policy, it would be at best only a piece of impertinence for us to continue to urge it. Besides, many things have changed since we expressed the opinion, and the time when the policy we urged could effect the particular good we hoped from it, has gone by. The unity of Italy, which might have been secured then in spite of France, and as a counterpoise to France, and also without confirming the Italians in their hostility to the Holy See, is now apparently impracticable, or at least impracticable without forcing Italy into heresy and schism. Appearances indicate that Italian unity has failed, and that the Emperor of the French hopes yet to carry out the policy of a Confederated Italy, as indicated in the treaty of Villafranca. The Old World is not yet ripe for the policy we have recommended—the complete separation of Church and State, or for abandoning that admixture of civil and ecclesiastical administration, which grew up after the Roman Empire became Christian, and received its fullest development in feudal Europe.

It is of faith that in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, all things visible and invisible, but it is not of faith that this earth was created at first, and only about seven thousand years ago, precisely as we now find it; nor has the Church, by any act of authority, declared that the order of creation, given by Moses in the first chapter of Genesis, is to be understood in a literal and historical sense, or not as a philosophical and moral order, as St. Augustine explains it. The dogma that Moses wished expressly to impress upon the Hebrew people, in opposition to the prevailing errors of Gentile philosophy, is the grand fact, that God created the world, did not simply form, fashion, generate, or evolve it from himself, but actually created it from nothing, by his own word, his own power. This, we take it, is the essential dogma, and that the questions, whether the earth came forth from his hand, as geologists now find or think they find it; whether it was created in a rude and elementary state, and has come to its present state by the action of secondary causes; or, whether it subsisted a long time, and underwent numerous changes before man was created to till it, are questions, not of faith, but of science, and



must be determined according to the discoveries and inductions of scientific explorers. For ourselves personally, we think geological science is as yet too recent and too imperfect for full confidence to be placed in its inductions and theories, but we see no objection on the side of faith to giving the geologist as long a series of ages as he can ask for to explain the phenomena he discovers. We are not aware that the Usherian chronology is matter of faith, or as to that matter, even the chronology of our Hebrew Bible. The Greek fathers did not follow the Hebrew chronology, and that of the Septuagint differs from it not a little. We are not aware that the Church has ever decided that the exact age of the world is a matter of revelation, or decided authoritatively how many centuries have elapsed since the creation. We confess that if we do not demand so long a period to explain the changes and phenomena recorded in civil and political history, as the geologist does those imbedded in rocks, and indicated by the courses of rivers, positions of lakes and seas, &c., we should find it a great convenience in doing it, to be allowed some centuries more than four thousand years between the creation and the birth of our Saviour. The need of a wider margin, we apprehend, is felt by all who have devoted themselves with a little attention to the study of the rise, progress, and downfall of nations, the development, progress, decline, or loss of ancient civilizations. It may be that in historical and geological science our theologians have committed mistakes, as they did in condemning Galileo for rejecting the geocentric, and asserting the heliocentric theory, now universally, or all but universally received.

There are many things asserted by theologians, which, even though they be true, or at least probably true, are yet not of Catholic faith, or to be received on the authority of the Church, as contained in the revealed word of God. It is of faith, that among the most noble creatures of God are angels; but it is not of faith that the angels are incorporeal, or that they are divided into nine or ten choirs, as asserted by Dionysius the Areopagite, in his *Celestial Hierarchy*, or by some one who writes under his name. It is of Catholic faith that there is a Purgatory, but not that it is a place, that its punishment is by literal fire, or that such or such is the degree or duration of its suffering. It is of faith that souls suffering in purgatory are helped by the suffrages of the living, especially by the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, but not that the suffrages or the sacri-



fice actually obtain their release, or that the Church has any power, except *per modum suffragii*, to remit their guilt. The just may help others by their prayers, but it is not of faith that the penances they perform or submit to for them, benefit them, except as so many good and fervent prayers to God in their behalf. It is of faith that children, dying in infancy, without baptism, never see God in the beatific vision, but it is not of faith that they do or do not suffer the *tortures* of hell. It is of faith that the righteous enter into eternal life, and are forever blest in the vision of God, and that the wicked, dying in their sins, go into hell, and are forever tortured in the gehenna of fire, but it is not of faith that the fire is literal, material fire, or that, though their sufferings can never end, they receive no mitigation.

It is of faith that the Church has power to grant indulgences, and that indulgences are profitable, but it is not of faith that by them the Church remits the temporal guilt, or any portion of the temporal guilt, in either the living or the dead, that remains unexpiated or unremitted before God, except *per modum suffragii*. It is disputed among theologians, whether indulgences conceded by the Church are to be understood as simple relaxations of the canonical penances imposed by the early discipline of the Church, or whether they are to be understood as a relaxation of the temporal penalty remaining undischarged before God, and is due *ex natura rei* to sin even after the eternal guilt has been remitted. The latter opinion is commonly held, and currently insisted on; but as Holden, in his *Analysis of Faith*, says, "it is not of Catholic faith," and therefore we may maintain without heresy, the opinion that the Church, in granting indulgences, only relaxes her own canons. Veronius says it is not of faith, that in the use or concession of indulgences, are remitted the temporal penalties due after the sin has been forgiven *in foro Dei*, either in purgatory or in this life. Suarez says, "Some Catholics hold that indulgences do not remit the penalty due to God, but simply remove the obligation of performing the canonical penance or penances enjoined by the Church." But, however this may be, it is not of Catholic faith that the Church can, in conceding an indulgence, remit the penalty imposed by the divine law, immediately and by the simple force of the indulgence itself, or by simple condonation of the penalty to be atoned for, either in purgatory or this life. It is further yet from faith that the Church can concede a true indul-

gence, so that it is a remission of punishment to the dead, still less that she wills to do it, except *per modum suffragii*. Indulgences, whether conceded for the living or the dead, beyond the relaxation of canonical penances enjoined by the Church herself in her early discipline, are, so far as faith affirms, or the Church herself teaches, efficacious only as the prayers or suffrages of the Church, and according to the measure of the piety and sanctity of those who beseech or offer them. It may be that many people regard indulgences as something more, and suppose that when they have performed the conditions annexed to the concession, the remission follows as a matter of course, and we say not that it does not; we only say that it is not of faith that it does. The indulgence of beads, crucifixes, medals, pictures, and the like, only pledge the prayers or suffrages of the Church to those who use them according to her intent, and her prayers no doubt are always of value. But if any one supposes that his beads can be so indulged that it is certain that a soul will be released for every bead on which he says a prayer, he supposes what is not of Catholic faith, and what no principle of Catholic faith warrants. The indulgence may be obtained, the Church promises the help of her suffrages in obtaining it, but no remission of temporal any more than of eternal guilt is possible without intrinsic virtue, a virtue possible only by real union with Christ our Lord in the Regeneration. We can obtain real indulgences for others, whether in this life or in purgatory, but only so far as God in consideration of our suffrages bestows on them graces which unite them to him, or prepares them for entrance into his presence. Our suffrages may solace souls suffering in purgatory, but it is not of faith that they can obtain their release or shorten the time they must suffer. The true Catholic accepts with gratitude indulgences conceded by the Church, as the pledge of her suffrage, but he seeks rather the virtues which merit the indulgence than the indulgence itself. We may add in concluding this point, that nothing of what theologians say of the treasury of the Church, or the accumulation in her treasury of the merits of saints from their works of supererogation, which she can bestow in indulgences on others to make up for their own deficiency, as if the merits of one, save *per modum suffragii*, could be transferred to others on the principle of the Communion of Saints, is by no means of Catholic faith, and enters not into the official and authoritative teaching

of the Church. We can none of us atone for one another before God. Christ alone could atone for our sins, and his atonement actually frees us only as we become united to him by grace as our head, so that we merit in him as the member merits in the head.

It may be true, as the Molinists teach, that grace will be given to every man who makes a diligent use of his natural faculties and the light he has, but it is not of faith. It is of faith that no one can be saved out of the Church, but it is not of faith that none are in the Church who are not joined to her visible communion. It is not of faith that it is necessary, *necessitate media ad salutem*, that all should believe *explicitly* the doctrine of the Trinity, or that of the Incarnation, but we should suppose it necessary to believe them, at least implicitly. It is of faith that it is lawful to invoke or pray to the saints, and therefore no Catholic can say it is unlawful, but there is no precept that makes it obligatory upon any Catholic to do so. It is of faith that the saints may be honored, venerated, in the old sense of the word, worshipped, but it is not of faith that the worship it is lawful to pay the saints is a *religious* worship, or in its nature different from that which is paid by the true man to heroic worth wherever he finds it. It is of faith that images and pictures of holy persons may be kept and honored, but it is not of precept that they should be. The same may be said of relics. It is of faith that they may be kept and honored, as relics of worth, or persons deserving of honor, but it is not of faith that any of the relics placed in churches, carried in procession, or preserved by individuals, are genuine. I bear about with me what purports to be a relic of the true Cross, certified as such by the Congregation of Rites, but it is not of faith that it is such, or that it is genuine. It is not of faith that the Tunic preserved at Trèves, and recently visited by some two millions of pilgrims, is the veritable tunic worn by our Lord. It is not of faith that the Church is infallible in canonizing saints, or that those she points out to be revered by the faithful are actually saints in heaven, unless those who are said in Holy Scripture to have "fallen asleep in the Lord." It is of faith that miracles continue in the Church, but it is not of faith that Our Lady actually appeared to the shepherds of La Sallette, or that any particular event alleged to be a miracle, even though approved at Rome as such, is really a miracle. All these things as particular facts rest on human testimony,



and each man must judge for himself of the sufficiency of the testimony. Even were there a revelation unquestionably divine affirming or confirming any one of them, it would not, since subsequent to the apostles and canonical writers, make it of Catholic faith, or heresy to deny it. The denial might be *erronea* or *temeraria*, indicative of a skeptical disposition or of an unsound judgment, but it would not be heresy. For ourselves, we believe many things which seem to us sufficiently accredited, or which seem to us congruous to faith, or to be logical deductions from it, which we yet do not hold to be of Catholic faith, or believe with divine faith. We defend them earnestly with the best reasons at our command, but we do not assert and have no right to assert them as of faith, or as proposed on the authority of the Church. We cannot impose them, but as they do not contradict faith, we may, if in our power, convince by appropriate arguments the free reason of others of their truth.

In pointing out, mainly on the authority of the two works before us, certain things as not of faith, it does not enter into our head to maintain that nothing is to be contended for by theologians not strictly of faith, or that it is a mark of a generous catholic spirit to seek to reduce Catholic faith to its minimum. We do it for a very different reason. We wish, in the first place, to show our non-Catholic readers that many things peculiarly offensive to them, contended for by Catholic theologians, are not obligatory on the believer, because they are not of faith, and taught by the Church on her divine and infallible authority, and therefore may be received or rejected on their merits, freely examined and judged of by human reason. We say frankly to them that our heart's desire and prayer to God is that they should become Catholics, and we wish them to understand what they must accept, and what they are not obliged to accept as of Catholic faith, in becoming Catholics. We want them to understand the bounds of authority and the extent of freedom. Our own belief is, that very few would reject our religion, if they did not confound the notions and practices of Catholics outside of the faith and the commands of the Church with her real faith and precepts.

We have wished, moreover, to protest against the tendency always in the schools, even among ourselves, to confound theology and discipline with dogma. Dogma is irreformable, because infallible; discipline is always reformable by the proper authority, because it is founded on human

prudence and expediency, and to obtain its end must adapt itself to a state of things constantly changing. The Church is always free to reform her disciplinary canons, and the interests of religion require her to change them as the world itself changes around her, as much as do the interests of a state require it to change its legislation to meet a change of circumstances. All Catholics are bound to submit to discipline as long as it is in force, and to refrain from all attempts to reform or change it except in a legal way and by legal means; but we are not aware that it is or ever was a part of the discipline of the Church that the faithful must not express, in an honest and peaceful way, their opinion that certain reforms and changes have with the lapse of time and change of circumstances become necessary, providing they do not seek to effect them without or in spite of authority.

Theology being a human science, constructed by human reason operating on principles supplied partly by revelation and partly by the light of nature, can never have the invariability and fixedness of faith. The elements supplied by the human mind itself from sources independent of revelation are variable, and vary with human science itself. Our human science, whether of history or nature, of man or the earth, is constantly changing, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. It sometimes advances, it sometimes recedes, but so long as the human mind is active it does not and cannot stand still. The human mind is limited and infirm, and takes in things not in their wholeness, all at once; it studies and comprehends them under special aspects or in a succession of views. Even the faith, though all revealed at once, is not taken in and appropriated all at once. Our understanding of it grows with time and study, and it gains with process of time, as Vincent of Lerins teaches, light, distinctness, and evidence. The Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries modify, not the faith, but the theology of the Fathers of the second and third centuries. St. Thomas modifies the theology of St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great. He has a different philosophy, and in the human element follows almost servilely Aristotle, whereas St. Augustine inclines much more to the Platonic school. One's theology is intimately connected with one's philosophy, and Gassendi and Condillac could have made nothing of the theology of St. Anselm or St. Bonaventura. Des Cartes, in depressing philosophy, and rendering it light, frivolous, and superficial, inflicted on the-

ology, both with the orthodox and the heterodox, a blow from which it has not yet recovered. Theology can flourish only where thought is strong and masculine, and thought can be strong and masculine only where it is free.

To attempt to give to schools of theology the invariability and fixedness of faith, is to confound faith with theology; and to censure a man because he does not follow in his theology or philosophy whether the earlier or the later scholastics, is to forget the very nature of theology and the human mind. We find this forgetfulness in the order issued a few years ago by the General of the Jesuits, commanding the professors of philosophy in the colleges of the Society to teach the philosophy of Aristotle and Fonseca. Of Fonseca's works we know nothing by our own reading, but of Aristotle we do know at least a little, and we know no right that any one has to make him the philosopher of the Christian world, and to impose his system, even as modified by Fonseca, by authority on the intelligence of our sons. What we object to, however, is not the school or system, but the attempt to impose any system of human reason or science as authority which must be received without question, discussion, or rational conviction. In theology and philosophy, saving the faith, there is and should be no authority but that which is founded on human reason itself. When St. Thomas asserts that this or that is of faith, we take him, not as infallible indeed, but as very high authority, and we should hesitate long before daring to dissent from him; but when he simply puts forth a theological or philosophical doctrine, we treat it respectfully, as the opinion of a great man, but we accept or reject it according to our own free judgment of its soundness or unsoundness. It is not, however, St. Thomas that we dispute, but it is the freedom he exercised for himself that we claim the right to exercise for ourselves. Now, this freedom all schools tend in their practical development to deny, and they all seek to bind the student to the word of the master, not by virtue of his superior reason, but by virtue of his personal authority. They are not required to follow the founder because by their own reason and judgment they are convinced that he was right, but because he was their master. *Magister dixit*, the Master has said it, is the only reason that is to be asked or given; a good rule in faith where the *Magister* is God himself, but a bad rule in theology or philosophy, where the speaker is a man, and really, in the higher sense, no master at all.



The constitution of the illustrious Society of Jesus binds its professors to teach the theology, and if the theology, the philosophy, of St. Thomas, for no man's philosophy and theology are separable; and its present General, as we have said, issued his order prohibiting its professors from teaching any of the ontological philosophies, and commanding them to teach Aristotle and Fonseca, the latter a Portuguese Jesuit of the sixteenth century. How can the theological and philosophical professors of the Society under these obligations be free either to exercise their own reason and judgment, or to develop and exercise the reason and judgment of the youth committed to their care? These professors are not themselves free, for they have imposed on them a particular theological and philosophical system, which, whether sound or unsound, is not imposed by divine or infallible authority, and which is not of faith, but is simply a human system, the work of human reason operating on divine and natural things. What is this but an attempt to give to a society existing in the Church, and by human authority only, an authority greater than is ever exercised by the Church herself, and to theology the invariability and fixedness of faith? We are, as our pages abundantly prove, no enemies of the Society of Jesus. We love and honor the members of that Society as ranking among the most exemplary, learned, devoted, and heroic of the clergy, in any age of the Church, but we do not recognize the Society as the Church of God, or its peculiar theological and philosophical opinions as Catholic faith which cannot be questioned without impeachment of one's orthodoxy. Yet it is not the system they teach, but the teaching of it by authority, on the authority of great names, or of the Society itself, not on the authority of reason common to all men, that we object to, and which in our judgment does the harm. One thing is certain, that under the teaching by authority in matters not of authority, we have seen theology and philosophy decline, thought become superficial and commonplace, and the free and energetic thinkers of the age arrayed against the Church. The fact is unquestionable and deplorable. Whether between it and the method pursued by the Society there is any relation of cause and effect we pretend not to determine. Authoritative faith quickens, expands, and invigorates the intellect, for it supplies from God himself the super-rational principles essential to intellectual life; authoritative science, whether theological or philosophical, has necessarily, in our

judgment, an opposite tendency, because it suppresses instead of stimulating mental activity, save so far as it stimulates revolt, and drives the revolted to infidelity or skepticism.

The General of the Jesuits orders his professors to teach the philosophy of Aristotle. He might have done worse. What was studied in the schools in the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, as Aristotle's Philosophy, was, in our judgment, far superior to the Cartesianism that supplanted it, or to any philosophy that has been taught in them since. Des Cartes upset with his superficial speculations the old systems, and no better have taken their place. Aristotle was a great master of reason, but, as we judge, inferior to Plato, and both he and Plato were inferior to St. Augustine or to St. Thomas. We dare also to be known to hold that in intellectual power and philosophic genius and attainments, the Abbate Gioberti may rank as the peer of any one of the four. Yet not by the words of any one of the five in theological or philosophical science would we swear as by the word of a master who must not be disputed; and we object as strenuously to having the Giobertian system taught as authoritative in our schools, as to that of Aristotle as remodelled by Fonseca.

We have mentioned Gioberti, and his name inflames the passions of a thousand hearts; and a thousand angry voices loudly denounce us for presuming to mention him in respectable company. Why? Gioberti was a Catholic, even a priest, who, for aught we know, lived and died in the communion of the Church. "No; he was a bad Catholic, no Catholic at all." You say so, but we do not know it. You have said we are no Catholic, and represented us as having apostatized, or as being on the point of apostatizing from the Church, and how know we that you have not misrepresented him as much as you have misrepresented us? But Aristotle, was he a good Catholic? He was, as is well known, a Greek, a heathen, and no Catholic at all. And yet St. Thomas without blame derives nearly the whole of his philosophy from him, and the General of the Jesuits commands his professors to teach his philosophy to our generous and unsuspecting youth. "But Gioberti's works are on the Index." So we have heard it reported, and so have seen it stated in the newspapers, but we do not know it. We have had no official information of it. But suppose they are, what then? Unless we have been misinformed, the study of Aristotle's works in Catholic schools was prohibited by

the Pope in the twelfth century, and his works themselves were burnt at Paris by the common hangman. Yet you teach the philosophy of Aristotle. Has Gioberti ever been convicted of heresy, or of any offence against faith? If so, it is unknown to us. If his theology or his philosophy is at fault, refute it, prove it so. You need not calumniate the man, or seek to underrate his personal merits. "But he wrote the *Gesuita Moderno*, and attacked the theology and philosophy of the Jesuits." But Father Curci wrote his *Divinazione* against him, and attacked his theology and philosophy, and that is a fair offset. To attack the Jesuits may be a sin against charity, but it is not necessarily a sin against faith, or against the Church. If what Gioberti says against the Jesuits is true, it is idle to complain of it; if it is false, refute it. We have had many falsehoods told against us; some have been told even in the form of grave charges against us, at Rome, and we are suffering throughout the whole Catholic community, at home and abroad, from the false accusations and misrepresentations circulated against us. What then? Are we to believe that all who circulate them are bereft of sense and judgment,—are totally depraved, and to be looked upon as unworthy to be named in respectable society? By no means. We know something of human nature; we know that all men have passions, and that no man is infallible in his understanding. We may have been misunderstood sometimes through our own fault, sometimes without any moral fault on either side; we may at times have been too trenchant in our remarks, and been understood to be more so than we supposed, or than we really were. Add the usual quantity of exaggeration, imagination, zeal, and false inferences, and it is easy to explain the false representations so injurious to ourselves, or so prejudicial to our character and influence, without being angry with their authors. What has happened to an individual may happen to a religious community. The eminent Western Prelate said to have lodged with the Propaganda six charges against us, professing to be deduced from a single article of ours, every one of which was a false charge, intended, we presume, no injustice to us, and was moved only by his zeal for the service of religion. He doubtless read carelessly our article, with a prejudice against us, and substituted, unconsciously, his gloss for the text. The same may have been the case with Gioberti, in his *Gesuita Moderno*. Let the Society, then, do as we do, receive his false



accusations with equanimity, frankly concede to the author his incontestable merits in other respects, put the best construction possible upon his conduct, and leave it to time, or rather, to Providence, to bring out the truth and set all things right.

But all this by the way. We certainly hold Gioberti as a theologian and philosopher in high esteem, but we will receive, and wish others to receive, nothing on the authority of his name, or because he says it or defends it. We want freedom of mind in all things not of faith, and will no more consent to be deprived of it by an individual than by a community. Yet we understand well the tendency of schools to put themselves in the place of the Church, or to claim her authority for their teachings. The tendency is not peculiar to Catholic schools, and there is, as we know by experience, as well as from general principles, more theological and philosophical liberty practically as well as theoretically allowed in them than in non-Catholic schools that make any pretences to a positive faith. For the distinction which all Catholics recognize, in theory at least, between faith and theology, is unintelligible in the bosom of any Protestant sect. In the sect all is faith or all is theology, and the only distinction admissible is between fundamentals and non-fundamentals. But this distinction avails the sect little, for it recognizes no authority competent to make it, and is at best only a reminiscence and a misapprehension of the distinction made by the Catholic Church between faith and theology.

Though we protest against the tendency of schools to render their systems authoritative and fixed, we recognize as underlying it something good and desirable. There is under it something conservative and true. He is only half a man who would sever himself from all connection with the past, and who has no reverence for the great and noble, the wise and just, the learned and heroic of other ages. We reverence genius and worth wherever we find them, and accept truth wherever we meet it. Nothing great or good, true or desirable, can ever be introduced absolutely *de novo*. Our Lord proclaimed not a new law, but that which had been the law from the beginning. He came not to destroy the past, but to fulfil it. The germs of the future are always in the past, and all true progress and real reform consist in developing, not in destroying them. The real reformer never reproduces the past; he develops and ma-

tures the germs it contained. The condemnation of Luther and Calvin is not that they sought a reformation, either of theology or discipline, for that was needed, but that they sought it by severing themselves from the past life of humanity, and, therefore, by severing themselves from the future and from God. The life of humanity flows on in one continuous stream in the Church, for in her dwells the Word made flesh. They who, for the sake of reform, break from the Church, break from the life of the God-man, and necessarily lose both the good they have and the good they seek. All real reforms, all genuine progress must be of the Church, in the Church, and by the Church. Luther and Calvin saw not this; they, therefore, became schismatics and heretics, and their seed will not inherit the land.

---

ART. II.—1. *Answer to Hugh Miller and Theoretic Geologists.* By THOMAS A. DAVIES. New York: Rudd & Carleton. 1860.

2. *Sacred Cosmogony.* Translated from the French of L'ABBE A. SORIGNET. St. Louis: Patrick Fox. 1862.

No man of liberal mind and education can be indifferent to that new light which modern geology has thrown upon many long mooted questions, especially those which relate to the harmony between Revelation and Science. For that reason, it is our intention to take up some of these questions, and so far as in us lies, to examine these new discoveries of our age, and to place that sacred Book, which above all others we love and venerate, in its true position of defence. We begin with the antiquity of the earth. We believe that the earth is very old, far older than our forefathers ever suspected, far older than the Book of Genesis has hitherto been supposed to allow. Our studies in geology have convinced us of this. We will first give the reasons upon which our convictions are grounded, and in the next number, God willing, we propose to set forth what we deem to be a satisfactory, and the only satisfactory, method of harmonizing these convictions with Revelation.

The ancient Greeks, in their day, had very limited notions of the extent of the universe. The top of Mt. Olympus they thought could not be very far from the seat of the

celestial gods. Hesiod tells us so expressly ; and yet in another place his conceptions of space become somewhat grander, and he gives us the following as a measure of the distance from heaven to earth :

“ A brazen anvil rushing from the sky  
Through thrice three days would toss in airy whirl,  
Nor touch this earth till the tenth sun arose.”

Baron Humboldt, in the third volume of his *Cosmos*, has made a calculation upon this estimate of the poet's, and finds that Hesiod's heaven lies one and a half times the distance of the moon from the earth. What an inadequate notion this of the deep, deep firmament of heaven ! Astronomers, basing their statements on very close and accurate calculations, assure us that the light of the stars, which travels at a far greater speed than gravitation could give it, has a much longer and farther fall than the anvil. A ray from Sirius, one of the nearest, makes a passage of some fourteen years before it reaches us. But when our natural eyesight is aided by the telescope we can penetrate much further into the starry spaces. The great reflector of Sir William Herschel enabled him to extend his observations to nebulous clusters lying many thousand times the distance of Sirius. Rays from these, therefore, must have been long ages on their way before arriving at our earth. Sir William calculated this time by millions of years. And yet again since his day the still more powerful telescope of Lord Ross has so far extended our vision, that what appeared to Herschel like nebulae, or unformed clouds of star-dust, have been resolved into compact and perfect suns, while still farther away in the distance new clouds of worlds float in upon the scene. Who shall calculate the length of time elapsed since the far-travelled rays from these border stars first parted from their homes ? “ Such events in the universe,” Humboldt murmurs, “ belong to other periods of time—they reach us like voices of the past. It remains more than probable, from the knowledge we possess of the velocity of the transmission of luminous rays, that the light of remote heavenly bodies presents us with the most ancient perceptible evidence of the existence of matter.”

These results of astronomical observation and calculation are noticed, albeit very contemptuously, by the Abbé Soriguet, an author whose treatise on *Sacred Cosmogony* we have placed at the head of our article, and whom we shall say more of hereafter. It will not recommend the Abbé much



to the respect of astronomers to know that he denies to them any means of determining the real velocity of light, or the real position or motion of the heavenly bodies. All that we can know or need to know, he tells us, is the apparent, not the real state of the heavens. See pp. 222-4.

So far as we can tell, Geology points back to an antiquity as remote as any thing revealed by astronomy, and some of the older rocks of this our own earth, her long worn and wasted vestments, are left to us, it may be, as the forms and fashions of an epoch far earlier than the exodus of any starry ray that visits us. Geology is the younger science, but she has grown in our day like a young giantess, and the success of her votaries every year is commensurate with their wonderful activity. "Some run up hill and down dale," said the old landlady described by Scott in *St. Ronan's Well*, "knapping the chucey stanes to pieces wi' hammers, like sae mony road-makers run daft—they say it is to see how the world was made." They could not very well see how it was first made, but they have discovered something of the process of its growth, and unravelled not a little of its past history. Let us see what they say in regard to the point in hand.

It is a thing in which all geologists agree, that a careful examination of the earth's crust, that is to say, of those parts lying near its surface which are accessible to observation, leads irresistibly to the conclusion that it has existed during vast periods which cannot be expressed by any known method of computing time. Compared to this long-protracted existence, the six or seven thousand years commonly ascribed to human history is but a brief hour. But we will state the case as far as possible in their own language, and with so much of detail as may seem necessary to meet that portion of our readers who are not familiar with the main principles of geology.

"All are aware," says Sir Charles Lyell, "that the solid parts of the earth consist of distinct substances, such as clay, chalk, sand, limestone, coal, slate, granite, and the like; but previously to observation it is commonly imagined that all these had remained from the first in the state in which we now see them,—that they were created in their present form, and in their present position. The geologist soon comes to a different conclusion, discovering proofs that the external parts of the earth were not all produced in the beginning of things in the state in which we now behold them, nor in an instant of time. On the contrary, he can show that they

have acquired their actual configuration and condition gradually, under a great variety of circumstances, and at successive periods, during each of which distinct races of beings have flourished on the land, and in the waters, the remains of these creatures still lying buried in the crust of the earth.

“The materials of this crust are not thrown together confusedly; but distinct mineral masses, called rocks, are found to occupy definite spaces, and to exhibit a certain order of arrangement. The term rock is applied indifferently by geologists to all these substances, whether they be soft or stony, for sand and clay are included in the term.

“The aqueous rocks, sometimes called the sedimentary or fossiliferous, cover a larger part of the earth’s surface than any others. These rocks are *stratified*, or divided into distinct layers or strata. The term stratum means simply a bed, or any thing spread out or strewed over a given surface; and we infer that these strata have been generally spread out by the action of water, from what we daily see taking place near the mouth of rivers, or on the land during temporary inundations. For whenever a running stream, charged with mud or sand, has its velocity checked, as when it enters a lake or sea, or overflows a plain, the sediment previously held in suspension by the motion of the water sinks by its own gravity to the bottom. In this manner layers of mud and sand are thrown down one upon another.

“If we drain a lake which has been fed by a small stream, we presently find at the bottom a series of deposits disposed with considerable regularity one above the other; the uppermost perhaps may be a stratum of peat, next below a more dense and solid variety of the same material; still lower a bed of shell-marl alternating with peat or sand, and then other beds of marl divided by layers of clay. Now if a second pit be sunk through the same continuous lacustrine *formation*, at some distance from the first, nearly the same series of beds is commonly met with, yet with slight variations; some, for example, of the layers of sand, clay, or marl, may be wanting, one or more of them having thinned out and given place to others, or sometimes one of the masses first examined is observed to increase in thickness to the exclusion of other beds.

“Where beds of sand, clay, and marl, containing shells and vegetable matter, are found arranged in a similar manner in the interior of the earth, we ascribe to them a similar origin; and the more we examine their characters in detail, the more exact do we find the resemblance. Thus, for example, at various heights and depths in the earth, and often far from seas, lakes, and rivers, we meet with layers of rounded pebbles composed of flint, limestone, granite, or other rocks, resembling the shingles of a sea beach, or the gravel in a torrent’s bed. Each layer of pebbles frequently alternates with others formed of sand, or fine sediment, just as we may see in the

channel of a river descending from hills bordering a coast, where the current sweeps down at one season coarse sand and gravel, while at another, when the waters are low and less rapid, fine mud and sand alone are carried seaward.

“If a stratified arrangement, and the rounded form of pebbles, are alone sufficient to lead us to the conclusion that certain rocks originated under water, this opinion is further confirmed by the distinct and independent evidence of *fossils*, so abundantly included in the earth’s crust. By a fossil is meant any body, or the traces of the existence of any body, whether animal or vegetable, which has been buried in the earth by natural causes. Now the remains of animals, especially of aquatic species, are found almost everywhere imbedded in stratified rocks, and sometimes, in the case of limestone, they are in such abundance as to constitute the entire mass of the rock itself. Shells and corals are the most frequent, and with them are often associated the bones and teeth of fishes, fragments of wood, impressions of leaves and other organic substances. Fossil shells, of forms such as now abound in the sea, are met with far inland, both near the surface, and at great depths below it. They occur at all heights above the level of the ocean, having been observed at elevations of more than 8,000 feet in the Pyrenees, 10,000 in the Alps, 13,000 in the Andes, and about 18,000 feet in the Himalaya.

“These shells belong mostly to marine testacea, but in some places exclusively to forms characteristic of lakes and rivers. Hence it is concluded that some ancient strata were deposited at the bottom of the sea, and others in lakes and estuaries.

“When geology was first cultivated, it was a general belief that these marine shells and other fossils were the effects and proofs of the deluge of Noah; but all who have carefully investigated the phenomena have long rejected this doctrine; a transient flood might be supposed to leave behind it, here and there upon the surface, scattered heaps of mud, sand, and shingle, with shells confusedly intermixed; but the strata containing fossils are not superficial deposits, and do not simply cover the earth, but constitute the entire mass of mountains. Nor are the fossils mingled without reference to the original habits and natures of the creatures of which they are the memorials; those, for example, being found associated together which lived in deep or in shallow water, near the shore or far from it, in brackish or in salt water.

“It has, moreover, been a favorite notion of some modern writers, who were aware that fossil bodies could not at all be referred to the deluge, that they, and the strata in which they are entombed, might have been deposited in the bed of the ocean during the period which intervened between the creation of man and the deluge. They have imagined that the antediluvian bed of the ocean, after having been the receptacle of many stratified deposits, became con-



verted, at the time of the flood, into the lands which we inhabit, and that the ancient continents were at the same time submerged, and became the bed of the present seas. This hypothesis, although preferable to the diluvial theory before alluded to, since it admits that all fossiliferous strata were successively thrown down from water, is yet wholly inadequate to explain the repeated revolutions which the earth has undergone, and the signs which the continents exhibit, in most regions, of having emerged from the ocean at an era far more remote than four thousand years from the present time. Ample proofs of these reiterated revolutions will be given in the sequel, and it will be seen that many distinct sets of sedimentary strata, hundreds and sometimes thousands of feet thick, are piled one upon the other in the earth's crust, each containing peculiar fossil animals and plants of species distinguishable, for the most part, from all those now living. The mass of some of these strata consists almost entirely of corals, others are made up of shells, others of plants turned into coal, while some are without fossils. In one set of strata the species of fossils are marine; in another, lying immediately above or below, they as clearly prove that the deposit was formed in a lake or brackish estuary. When the student has more fully examined into these appearances, he will become convinced that the time required for the origin of the rocks composing the actual continents must have been far greater than that which is conceded by the theory above alluded to; and likewise that no one universal and sudden conversion of sea into land will account for geological appearances."—*Elem. Geol.*, chap. I. pp. 1–5.

It is of course impossible, by any known measure of duration, to estimate the length of time required for the deposition of such vast masses of sedimentary rock; but it is easy to show that the beginnings of this slow but unceasing process lie far behind all reach of human history.

It must be borne in mind that the sedimentary rocks, with of course a large exception for what in them is composed of coral, sea-shells, &c., have all been laid by water power at the direct expense of the land, and that the same power which has been so effective in filling up the beds of rivers, lakes, and seas, has been busy all the while in wearing down the hills and mountains. For it is evident that the supply of sand and other loose material so deposited by the waters, must be equal to the waste of the same material washed from the hills and shores; and the time required must be the same, as the two processes are carried on together. A carman would understand this at once, for it is only loading and dumping on a vast scale and a long contract. Now let us exert our imaginations to conceive how long a period

it would require for the showers and streams to wash away all the substance of our mountains and continents that lie above the sea level, all at least that is stratified, and deducting what is derived from animals and plants of the water, and deposit it smoothly, quietly, and gradually in thin sheets or laminæ in the lap of the ocean and the beds of the lakes. Yet this would only be a repetition of what has actually taken place, and affords us a rule by which we may arrive at some conception of the vast antiquity of our globe when compared with human history. For we know, that during some thousands of years, within the experience of man, the earth has been undergoing this same process of waste and reconstruction, and yet without any very great change in its configuration. At the mouths of rivers the currents have filled up the ocean bed in a very perceptible degree with their freight of sand, mud, and decayed vegetation; the mountain streams have spread new layers of alluvial soil over the valleys; by some secret power beneath, the land has risen in some places to a higher level, thrusting out their shores farther seaward, and the ocean waves in return have encroached in other quarters upon the dry land; but all the while the relative position of land and water throughout has undergone no essential change, the mountains stand in their old places, with their old features, and the earth is now very much the same as when the pyramids were built in Egypt and the walls of Nineveh were constructed. It is very evident, therefore, that neither six thousand years, nor a hundred thousand, would suffice to span the history of our planet.

Our conceptions of the high antiquity of our earth become still more enlarged, if we concentrate our attention upon some particular and familiar point upon its surface, and note some single instance of the operation of these laws of waste and reconstruction. We shall see thus more definitely how changes, which are still going on before our eyes, have been in operation during immense periods of time, that run back far beyond all reach of history. Take, for instance, that magnificent waterfall, the great wonder of our western world, where the river that empties Lake Erie descends one hundred and sixty-four feet at a single bound.

Few visitors to this country have used their eyes and ears so wisely as Sir Charles Lyell, whether in observing men and manners, or in studying nature. "The Falls of Niagara," he remarks, "teach us not merely to appreciate the power of

moving water, but furnish us at the same time with data for estimating the enormous lapse of ages during which that force has operated. A deep and long ravine has been excavated, and the river has required ages to accomplish the task, yet the same region affords evidence that the sum of these ages is as nothing, and as the work of yesterday, when compared to the antecedent periods of which there are monuments in the same district."—*Travels in North America in 1841-2*.

A description of this grand cataract, with a plate, was given by Father Hennepin, a French missionary, as early as 1678, and in 1751 another by Kalm, a Swedish botanist, also accompanied by a plate. These show that some waste had been going on in the intermediate seventy-three years, making a visible change in the scene, and it is well known that changes are still taking place in the configuration of the cataract by the occasional fall of stone from the top. That the Falls are gradually shifting their position, and receding backward toward Lake Erie, is therefore an ascertained fact, which confirms and illustrates the popular belief that they have, by a long process, been slowly eating their way backward through the woods, for the distance of seven miles, thus forming that deep and narrow chasm which extends from the foot of the cataract to Queenstown. If this chasm were closed up again, the Niagara would flow onward as far as Queenstown, over the solid platform of rock, without a fall, and the banks of that river would lie far above their present position, more nearly on a level with the surrounding country or the edge of the cliffs which bound the chasm. That this was once the case has been proved again and again by our American geologists. Abundant traces of the ancient banks of the river are found along the summit of the cliffs, consisting of deposits of sand, gravel, and fluvial shells; and these correspond in every respect with those found upon the present banks of the river above the Falls.

The small portion of this great ravine, which has been eaten away within the memory of man, affords a basis upon which can be formed a rough estimate of that lapse of time during which the Falls have receded to their present site. The present rate of retrogression was first calculated by Mr. Bakewell at three feet for every year, but Professor Hall and Sir Charles Lyell make it one foot in the year, which is generally considered to be the more correct estimate. Of course this movement cannot have been always uniform; but



if the average rate for the whole distance from Queenstown may be assumed as lying between these two computations, then a period of from eleven to thirty-five thousand years would be required to accomplish this immense work of excavation. This already carries us back far enough to upset all our old chronological systems, so far as they pretend to date from the creation, and yet compared to the whole period of the earth's existence, it is but the last hour of a long life-time. It leaves still untouched those countless ages wherein were formed in the lap of the ocean those different rocks of sandstone, shale, and limestone through which the Falls have since gnawed their way back from Queenstown to their present site, rocks which existed in hoary antiquity, before ever the Niagara river appeared upon the scene, or the great lakes which that river drains.

If, instead of dwelling upon the merely mechanical powers of nature, we turn our attention to those fossil forms of animal life entombed within the rocks, we arrive at the like results. We quote again from Sir Charles Lyell:

"However much we may enlarge our ideas of the time which has elapsed since the Niagara first began to drain the waters of the upper lakes, we have seen that this period was only one of a series all belonging to the present zoological epoch, or that in which the living testaceous fauna, whether fresh water or marine, had already come into being. If such events can take place while the zoology of the earth remains almost stationary and unaltered, what ages may not be comprehended in those successive tertiary periods, during which the flora and fauna of the globe have been almost entirely changed.\* Yet how subordinate a place in the long calendar of geological chronology do the successive tertiary periods occupy! How much more enormous a duration must we assign to many antecedent revolutions of the earth and its inhabitants! No analogy can be found in the natural world to the immense scale of these divisions of past time, unless we contemplate the celestial spaces which have been measured by the astronomer."—*Travels in North America*, vol. I., p. 43.

The geologist has no need to go far to awaken in his soul those deep and solemn emotions which others feel at the contemplation of ancient cities, or castles in ruins. Sublime ruins are under his feet wherever he treads. Not only every

\* The tertiary is the uppermost and latest of several systems into which geologists divide the strata or beds of rock. The character of the fossils contained in these strata corresponds with the relative order of superposition, and constitutes the principle of classification by which these systems are distinguished.

waterfall, but every quarry, bank, and coal-mine opens to his view the wreck of ancient worlds. Every mountain is to him a vast mausoleum, within whose compact masonry are stored away the dead of by-gone ages.

“Wondrous and awful are thy silent halls,  
O kingdom of the past!  
There lie the by-gone ages in their palls,  
Guarded by shadows vast—  
There all is hushed and breathless.”

There lie beings who lived and breathed on this earth of ours, thousands and thousands of years beyond the reach of our earliest annals; and, if we may judge by the failure hitherto of all search after their traces, before ever any species of beast, bird or fish that the living world now knows had come into existence,—creatures that crept on the land before our present continents were raised above the sea, creatures that swarmed in the water before the beds and shores of our lakes and oceans were formed. The same good God gladdened the creatures of those early days that gladdens our world now. For them the sun shone, the rain fell, and land and water were stored with food. They had each one his brief day, and then passed off from the scene; some mouldering away to dust upon the hard ground, some sinking to their sepulchres in the soft morass, the river bed or ocean bottom, where many were preserved from total decay until nature had time to form moulds around them, in which stony castings could be taken to perpetuate their likenesses to our day. How brief their little span of life compared to those countless ages during which they have reposed in their rocky sepulchres! Alas! our span of life is equally brief, our possession of the earth as frail; our title to it indeed less ancient than theirs:

“We have no title-deeds to house or lands;  
Owners and occupants of earlier dates,  
From graves forgotten stretch their dusty hands,  
And hold in mortmain still their old estates.”

But there is no time to moralize at present; we have other business on our hands. It could scarcely be expected that a science presenting principles so new, and results so startling, should not meet with much opposition. Geology has had to pass through that same fiery trial which almost stifled astronomy at an earlier period, and the opposition to it has been urged mainly upon the same grounds of religious

belief. This high antiquity of the earth especially is something which theologians have shown great repugnance to admit; and although many of the most gifted and most eminent divines have long since given in their adhesion, many others still deny it, very excellent minds too in their way, and of good judgment where they are well informed. The conclusion seems to be drawn very simply and directly from nature, but they manage to avoid it, and this in different ways, according to the genius of the parties. Some, like rough nurses, try to smother it up, or threaten to call in the "Black Man." They will not take the pains to study the question in the light of natural science, nor even consent to review the grounds upon which the opinion they hold to has been grafted into theological science. Ignoring the distinction so well known, among Catholics at least, between divine faith and theology, forgetting that the latter is but a human science, constructed by human reason, and equally subject with all sciences to the laws of reason, they treat their time-honored interpretation of Genesis as if it were therefore undoubtedly and unquestionably the word of God himself, and stake the whole of their faith upon it. Their whole argument is stated by Cowper in the following lines, which beg the question in the most approved style:

"Some drill and bore  
The solid earth, and from the strata there  
Extract a register, by which we learn  
That He who made it, *and revealed its date*  
*To Moses*, was mistaken in its age."

The question of what God revealed to Moses, and how far either are responsible for the opinion of these gentlemen, we leave to another article. Our object in the present is to show that natural science points clearly and unmistakably to the high antiquity of this earth.

There are some who oppose this conclusion upon geological grounds. The Abbé Sorignet is one of this class; or rather, if we may say it without breach of courtesy, a cross of this variety with that of Cowper. He is a theologian who has evidently made large studies in geology, and the principal part of his book is occupied with geological argument, or rather in manipulating geology to serve his hermeneutics. He treats the science, like a tailor, with chalk and shears, endeavoring to reduce it to a form and size which will suit a given planet of seven thousand years' growth. Many of its main principles he admits. He admits that



the fossils are representatives or relics of plants and animals that once really existed, and that the sedimentary rocks, so called, have been formed by that gradual process of waste and deposition which we have described; but he denies that the comparative ages of the rocks are indicated by the character of the fossils they contain, or can be determined at all except where they lie in juxtaposition and overlap each other. In one place we find human bones, with relics of other animals and of plants of species now living sunk in a bog; in another the bones of huge lizards that might measure themselves with whales are dug out of the heart of a mountain; in another region the roof or floor of a coal-mine presents us with impressions of leaves and bark, roots and stumps of trees unknown to the living world of our days. Where such fossil groups occur together in overlapping rocks they are always found in the same relative position, the older rocks of course lying undermost; but our Abbé denies the conclusion that when they are not found together, but in separate localities, the same relative ages are to be assigned to them, or that when either group is wanting in any locality, a commensurate lapse of time is to be accounted for in that locality. He maintains that all creatures, whether of living or extinct types, were created at the same time; that the difference of type in the different systems of rock, as classified by the geologists, is no greater than is actually found now amongst the living creatures of different quarters of the globe; and that the formation of any two systems of rock with the widest variation in the character of their fossil contents, may have taken place simultaneously in different localities. He finds thus an alternative between the common geological doctrine of successive creations, and Darwin's theory of the development of species, by throwing to the winds the entire system of classification which geologists have adopted. A few words more will supply a key to his whole theory, and as it is something novel we will give it in a few words. The creation recorded in Genesis was in six literal days. He conceives the primary rocks, so called, consisting of granite and crystalline schist, to have constituted the primitive land, upon whose chief continent, embracing the great central plateau of Asia, man, with the other animals and plants, was created. The outline of the original sea-bed, which constituted at first one single, grand basin, has often changed since this primary epoch. "The emerged surface has been

augmented by the lowering of the level of the sea. The sea, in retiring, has left, in the depressions of its ancient bed, enclosed lakes and seas which no longer communicated with their principal basin. New islands have appeared in the sea; the great primary basin has been changed into a large number of secondary basins, in consequence of partial fillings-up, and submarine depressions of the surface." Chap. xii. p. 348. Man, and the other living creatures, have kept pace with the increase and advance of the original land-surface, until, after the lapse of about seven thousand years, the earth has become, in its geological and geographical character, and in the distribution of its fauna and flora, what we find it now. The sedimentary rocks were formed gradually, albeit rapidly, by the same processes which are going on now, namely, by the wasting action of frost and water upon the older rocks, with the portage of materials by land-streams, tide-waves, ocean-currents, &c., imbedding in the manner already described the remains of animals and plants. Of these a large number of species have become extinct by natural causes, and that we do not find the remains of species now living more frequently, is attributable to the fact that our means of observation have hitherto been very limited, and that a very small proportion only of all the creatures that die are preserved to us in a fossil condition. In place of the received theory of the oscillation of the earth's crust, by which the sea and land are made frequently and proportionally to change place with each other, the sea retaining always the same level, the author substitutes another, which is, if we understand him aright, this: the sea, once far more extensive in point of surface, but shallower, has become lowered and contracted by a steady and long-continued depression of its bed, while only here and there, and as if exceptionally, the water has gained upon the land by local depressions of the land.

We shall not stop to argue against this new theory of Abbé Sorignet, although its weak points are apparent, especially his failure to account for the extinction of so many types of life in so short a time, as also for the absence of living types in the lower rocks, and the uniformity which prevails in the relative positions of the fossil groups wherever brought into juxtaposition. As a mere geological system, we find much in it that would be attractive, if fact and observation favored it. We confess to a certain repugnance for the notion of successive creations, whether effected grad-

ually or by the wholesale, and to still more decided objections to Darwin's theory of the origin of species; nor are we by any means convinced that geology limits our choice to these two. The fossil types seem really to fill up chasms in the living world, and we should welcome any well sustained theory to show that they all belong to one creation. Our chief quarrel at present with the Abbé is, that he fails to make out the earth as young as he would. Admitting all his premises as above given, so far as they are drawn from natural science, rejecting the classification of geologists, and reducing their epochs to such as are represented by rocks in actual superposition, our argument for the earth's antiquity, based upon the geological features of Niagara Falls, remains untouched. The water-worn ravine lies there, a palpable witness to many thousand years of erosion; and the Silurian rocks which have been cut through, and over which the mad cataract still leaps, lie piled there one upon another, and testify to so many still earlier epochs during which their materials were gathered and deposited upon that same spot, when that spot was an ocean bed. The same sort of argument can be multiplied indefinitely. The deltas of the Mississippi, of the Ganges, and of the Nile, the terraced shores of England, Ireland, and Scotland, the coral reefs of Florida, and the lava-crushed flanks of many a volcano have been made to tell the same story. The Abbé is reduced, as a *dernier ressort*, to dispute with the geologists upon the time it takes to form banks in the seas and lakes, to scoop out the rocks, to hollow out the river beds, &c.; and after allowing him far more than he can with decency claim, even from an unlearned reader, this simple argument still stands in his way. If the earth has changed its landscape, its fauna and its flora, so little during the two or three thousand years that human history knows it so well, can we believe that it has been so thoroughly revolutionized in seven thousand, and this by causes actually in operation now? With this much we dismiss the Abbé, and pass on to other objectors.

There are some that contest the extreme antiquity of the earth upon a different ground, where they have as much right to feel at home as the geologist, whatever may be the value of their arguments. These take their stand upon a point of religious philosophy. Granting all the data furnished by geology, admitting that according to all natural appearances the earth presents signs of extreme old age, they



deny that such appearances can be trusted in the present case, because, as they argue, all reasoning from apparent effects to secondary causes in nature must cease when we arrive at the point of creation, where God himself stands as the sole immediate cause of all. Mr. Davies, whose work stands at the head of this article, is a type of this class; a poor type, no doubt, but we have none other at hand, and he has nothing to do but stand there.

It is easy to see that, at the moment of creation, God stood alone, the immediate cause of all he created. At least, under the supposition that all things were simultaneously created, and that they were created also in their perfect state, it must be so. All organic creatures are constituted upon a plan which supposes development and growth, waste and decay, and they all bear these marks upon them. The first perfect creature of every kind must, even when just created, have exhibited the signs of an earlier and more imperfect state; in other words, the marks of age, although as yet it had no age. So it must have been with the first man, the first fish, the first tree. The first tree, before it ever grew, must have exhibited the rings of annual growth. The same apparent marks of increase would be found in the hair, the nails, the teeth, and other parts of the first man, in the feather of the parent bird of every species; in fine, in the organism of every creature at its first production; and these would be marks of an increase which had never taken place, and of an age which had no reality, except by plan or archetype in the mind of the Creator.

But why must we suppose these things, or any thing, to have been created in a state of maturity or perfection?—Because the world needed a start. The first colt and first calf, if so created without dams, would have perished for want of milk, and if they escaped that distress, would have famished while the grass was growing. The birds needed worms, and the worms needed leaves, and the leaves needed other things in full formation, and so on, *ad infinitum*. And even if we suppose the first creatures of each species not to have been produced in a state of maturity, such apparent signs of earlier life would not be wanting. Which was first in existence, the hen or the egg, the apple or the seed, the butterfly or the chrysalis, the fish or the spawn? Was the egg first? That first egg would have furnished the same indications as eggs do now, of having proceeded from some parent hen, while yet no hen existed. Was the hen first?

Then she must have manifested in a thousand ways, in the texture of every bone, muscle, and feather, the marks of a gradual growth terminating backward in the egg, while yet no such egg had been. Now what may be said of the creatures upon the earth, may be said of the earth herself, with her strata and fossils. All reasoning backward from apparent effects in nature to secondary causes must cease with the creative act. There the first great cause, God himself, stands in solitary and immediate relation to the effect. Believing therefore that we have sufficient grounds in Sacred History to place the creation of the world at a period not exceeding 7,000 years ago, the phenomena of geology cannot change the result. Creation must have begun at some point in the past. The same seeming difficulties will present themselves necessarily, however far we carry back the date of creation. We may therefore as well leave it where our fathers supposed it to be, and where the Scripture chronology appears to indicate.

Such is the argument, and at first sight it seems to be a very forcible one; but its fatal fault is that it does not fully and fairly present the phenomena upon which the geologist bases his conclusions. He finds in the rocks of the earth not merely certain indications of slow growth to maturity, *but also marks of decay and death, and the relics too of organic beings to which the living world affords no counterpart.* That the first trees, or such of them as were created in the advanced state, would bear the rings of apparent annual growth is reasonable enough; and the first man, if created the next Friday after, would not have been astonished to see them; but he would have been startled to see on those trees the remains of birds' nests which could never have been inhabited, or the marks of hatchets which could never have existed, or lying on the ground the bones of creatures that never could have lived. He would have been surprised to see any marks whatever of ruin and decay, knowing that the world was newly made. There could be as little reason to create withered leaves, and rotten stumps, and mouldered bones, as to create man himself with a bald head, decayed teeth, and a wooden leg.

But, above all, what reason could there be for creating the ruined resemblances of plants and animals which had no counterpart in the living creation? As far as history carries us back, from the earliest known ages of our race, we find that the animals inhabiting the earth have been mainly

the same in kind as those now living. The book of nature tells the same story. Here and there we find, bleaching on the hard ground, covered with the drifted sand, or imbedded in the soft alluvial soil, the remains of the same creatures that share life with us now. All the features of animated nature have remained the same as now for thousands of years. But it has not always been so. Searching below this surface soil we soon reach more ancient grave-yards, where the species contemporary with us are found no longer, and the remains of other creatures of different type appear. And so on, as we continue to descend through the various strata with which the earth is coated, each deeper sepulchre reveals the fossil remains of an older world of creatures, wrapped in their stony shrouds. But if, as our objectors insist, these strange things have originated under ground, and in their fossil state, for what end were they created? Was it only to cause wonder?

We have heard it suggested by pious persons that God may have made fossils in order to "confound the wisdom of the wise." We believe indeed that the wisdom of man is folly before God. Our highest science must seem to him like the prattling of children. Knowledge is a real good, and our minds were made for it, but we must search after it with humility, not presumptuously. What then! The very *order* of nature has deep mysteries enough to check the presumption of philosophers. Could it be necessary to introduce *disorder and deception* into nature for such a purpose? This is the language of ignorance. Religion would be badly provided for if left to such beetle-headed defenders.

The argument grows stronger if we take notice that the rocks contain not only the shapes and sizes of living creatures, but often *the monuments also of their lives and actions*. It might be inferred that they were given to eating, from the fact that they have stomachs. We have seen in Prof. Hall's cabinet at Albany, a section of the stomach of a fossil crinoid, showing perfectly the mechanical arrangements of the interior. A more beautiful thing we never saw in any collection. If a New York alderman were suddenly petrified in the height of the season, his stomach could not give more unequivocal proofs of having been made for use. But, it may be objected, the stomach of a fossil alderman would show signs of turtle! That would be nothing strange in paleontology. The remains of animals have been discovered with undigested food in the stomach, fragments



of other creatures, or grass rolled up into balls. That digestion was not always so rudely interrupted in the early world is demonstrated in the coprolites, which are found in great abundance. Now coprolites are nothing else than petrified dung. They too are sometimes found to contain minute fragmentary remains of animals of other species, just such species as must naturally have served for food to the first. Are all these semblances of life artificial? Such types of creatures that never existed, such traces of occurrences that never happened—are they necessary to carry out the hypothesis of a world created in maturity, or perfection?

If we could lay before our readers a fair picture of the underground world, as it is sometimes seen at great advantage, where the fossiliferous rocks crop out in a ravine, or on some mountain side, it would help much to a fair view of this question. In such places we may often find these depositories of the dead lying ranged above each other, with their fossil contents classified as neatly, and far more tastefully than on the shelves of a cabinet. We will try to give some idea of one of these localities; it requires illustrative plates, of course, but in the absence of these the reader must lean more heavily upon the plates of his cerebrum.

About a mile to the north of the village of Scoharie, all isolated and alone, a noble hill called Hanson's Mountain (so our village landlord named it) rears its lofty back above the plain, appearing in the dusk of evening like some gigantic sperm whale stranded there. The mountain constituted once a portion of a vast level platform extending far away, and connecting it with other high land which still lies skirting the plain, but broken up like itself into hills. Nature has formed it, not by any upheaving of the ground, but by scooping out the surrounding valleys. To the southward, and behind the village, you may ascend by easy steps the more gradual slope of the opposite hill, and you will find it composed of the same series of rocks as Hanson's Mountain, lying in horizontal strata upon the same level, and with the same fossil contents, thus proving their former connection. From this distance even, you may clearly trace, on the steep sides of the mountain, the lines which separate each rock from the underlying and overlying formations. The bare rock does not itself appear except where, about midway between the summit and the foot, one long line of precipice stretches across half the length of the hill, consisting of two ranges of

limestone mounted one upon the other, and broken each into pretty even joints which show like rows of teeth. The other lines of separation are nearly all equally distinct. The several strata being of different composition, some harder, some softer, have resisted with different degrees of force the wear of time, and always new angles in the slope, or changes in the vegetation, mark the mountain with distinct rings, by which, even in the distance, can be reckoned up its chief component formations, and their points of junction distinguished. Hanson's Mountain is a vast mausoleum, a thousand times older, larger by far, and every way more interesting than the great Pyramid. It is divided into eleven stories, or lofts of rock, all of them crowded receptacles of the dead.

At the base, and occupying the first or lowest quarter of the hill, lies the "Hudson River group," slates of great extent which skirt that river from the Highlands upwards, and reach along the same valley to the Canada line. They yield a fossil called Graptolite, a thing never found as yet above the Silurian system. It looks like a quill, or in some species more like a saw, stamped upon the leaves of the slates. Now and then also a Trilobite is found, a little monster crab-fish. Its body consists apparently of three distinct lobes, or divisions, contracting to a point behind where the tail fits on. The shell that encloses it is formed like a ribbed coat of mail, the pieces carefully fitted together, and riveted at the juncture of the lobes. Its head presents somewhat the appearance of a general's cocked hat; its eyes seem like two little round watch-towers or light-houses, and are set about with numerous facets or lenses, like those of a fly. Any one that can look at a good specimen of this fierce little pirate of the Silurian seas—such his appearance bespeaks him—and say he never lived, would certainly never be convinced by Paley's argument of the watch.

Next above the slates in this hill are found rocks belonging to the "Niagara" and "Onondaga salt" groups. The Niagara river falls over these same formations at the other extremity of the state. They also are the tombs of creatures of many generations, corals, trilobites, and mollusks of various forms that must have lived once in the sea. The fourth loft of this mausoleum is composed of a dark limestone, the laminae of which are completely besprinkled with little fossil annelids called Tentaculites; sea-worms are they, with shelly annulated tubes. Their forms are beautifully

defined, and fairly sparkle in the sun, as you draw the slabs fresh and damp from the quarry.

In the chamber above lie gathered, close and snug, shells of a kind called *Pentamerus*. They are divided each into five distinct cavities, and, in the species here abounding, have a remarkable beak on the upper valve, which hangs over the hinge like the crest of a fairy helmet. The limestone next overhead is a crowded repository of shell-fish and corals, so conspicuous and abundant that, where this rock is made up into fences, the road side becomes a cabinet of curiosities, which the traveller must be dull indeed to pass unnoticed. Above this again another limestone bed is almost entirely composed of *Encrinites*, a kind of lily or cup-shaped zoophyte which must, in its day, have lived anchored to the sea-bottom, and swayed back and forth upon its cable-like stem, as such creatures now do, waving its jointed arms and fingers about like a blind robber feeling for its prey. The separated tentacles and columns of these encrinites are not unlike rosaries, and so acquired in Scotland, as Sir Walter Scott tells us, the name of St. Cuthbert's beads.

"But fain St. Hilda's nuns would learn  
If, on a rock by Lindis farn,  
St. Cuthbert sits, and toils to frame  
The sea-born beads that bear his name;  
Such tales had Whitby's fishers told."

The scene changes wonderfully as you ascend into the next story, which is built of sandstone. It is the beginning of a new grand division in the rocks. You pass here from the grave-yards of the Silurian ages, and enter the Devonian, where new and widely different types of life are entombed. Here repose the petrified remains of shell-fish of various shapes, bivalved and spiral, and wherever the rock has become rotten by long exposure to the weather, the forms of these long-buried creatures stand out in bold relief like living things. We invite the reader to examine a few specimens of this sandstone, and for that purpose will suppose him to be sitting in the writer's study, with a small collection before us gathered from the locality in question. Honestly! my friend, have you ever seen a snail or any spiral shell, from land or sea, more perfect in shape than this little petrification? The paleontologists have named it *Acroculia* or *Platyceras*. It is nevertheless only a cast of the interior,



as you can easily perceive, and not so highly ornamental as the exterior would be. The casting was executed by the hand of nature, the original shell being the mould. The sea washed it full of sand, and the shell, as it decomposed, furnished the lime that cemented the sand together. That other long and graceful shell is the upper valve of a creature named, by Prof. Hall, *Rensselaeria*, in honor of the Albany Patroon. Mark well the parallel ridges that run along its back, converging as they approach the slender hinge, and diminishing in size until at last the eye can scarcely distinguish the delicate tracery. What think you? Is it a real shell, or a counterfeit?

Now see this other weathered and yellow fragment of sandstone! Holding it off at arm's length, does it not look like a crowded nest of little birds just fledged, and spreading their wings to fly? When you see such wing-like shells, with long, straight, elegant hinges, and depressed like these in the centre of the valve, you may thereby recognize the *Spirifer*. It is found in many other rocks, both older and later than this, but not of the same species,—not with such high, eagle-like beaks. There is much to be seen on this little three-inch fragment of stone. Here we have another with both valves united; and here is the interior cast of one with a part of the shell adhering, which makes it look like a gay cape hanging low upon naked shoulders. This fragment of a shell next to it shows us the groined ceiling on the inside of the spirifer's mansion; and see that little serpulæ clinging to it, which shows that, after the spirifer died, his shell must have lain exposed some while on the sea-bottom before it was covered by the sand, long enough at least for his body to decay, after which this little worm crawled in and lodged in the deserted hall. Such is the natural conclusion, unless we suppose both the serpulæ and the shell he clings to to be the simulated corpses of creatures that never lived.

The Candagalli grit-stone, next overhead, is a storehouse of fossil sea-weeds, which have received the undignified but not inappropriate name of "*cocktails*." Not far from Schoharie village to the southeastward, a cross road will lead you for a quarter-mile over this same rock, washed bare and smooth, on which these weeds lie impressed in red or buff-colored print, as thickly as the figures in a carpet or on the ornamental tiles of a church floor. Each cocktail has a stiff, defiant look, such as a real tail might be supposed to

have if cut off while the wearer was in full strut. The rock itself, by a happy coincidence, is real grit.

One story higher the Schoharie grit, so called, encloses other and peculiar types of life. Passing by the rest, it is enough to notice the fossil-fish *Asterolepis*. This is a gigantic fish, of the same order with the pike and the sturgeon, but in many respects unlike any creature in life, or any fossil found outside this Devonian system of formations. So perfectly the constituent parts of the animal have been preserved in stone, that the paleontologists give us not only plates and descriptions of its larger bones, its jaws, the plates of its head and scales of its body, but magnified delineations even of the tubercles on its bony skin, of the microscopic hollows in the texture of its teeth, and of its coprolites, that is to say, the refuse of its food, containing the broken scales of other fish on which it preyed. Here we have a relentless, murdering freebooter of the antique ocean, with the very *corpus delicti* in his belly. What say you, gentle reader? Did God construct and equip this creature in a state of death—the mere model of a thing that never was and was never to be?

The crest of this mountain is occupied by the “Corniferous Limestone,” so named because of the many courses of hornstone nodules which it contains. It has its fossils too. Coiled shells and huge trilobites respond to the knocks of the hammer.

The rocks already named are the only ones that constitute the mountain; but beneath the slates which lie at its base New York counts, cropping out at other points of her territory, seven formations more, loaded with the wreck of animal life. Of these we will only mention two, from which we have made collections. The Trenton limestone is charged full with shells of various shapes and sizes, bivalves, and spiral, and wreathed, and whorled. The many-chambered Nautilus is abundantly represented, but, being uncoiled, receives the name of *Orthoceras*. The trilobite appears here in his grandest proportions, and is therefore styled *Isobelus gigas*. The little giant is a foot long or more, and armed cap-à-pie, for even his rear is helmeted like his head, and could scarcely be distinguished from it, except for the absence of those tower-like eye-cones. He needed no eyes in the rear, it would seem, for he was a progressive fish, and, unlike the fossil generals of our army, was wont to push forward without looking always behind

for supplies. His heart, too, was loyal to the cause he fought in, and when making war he meant war.

Associated in position with the Trenton, and under it, lies the dark stone so magnificently developed in the bed and on the banks of the Black River at Watertown. The orthoceras of the rock above is here a monster in size. Specimens have been found not less than twenty feet in length. Look at this longitudinal section of one! You may see how the chambers are arranged one after the other, and apparently unconnected; but a transverse section will show you how the partition floors, or rather walls, are arranged with a round scuttle or gangway in the middle. But the animal only used this passage once in his life, and that on May-day when he moved, for he was always adding new chambers to his house, and only occupied the last one built. Such have always been the habits of these creatures of the cuttle-fish order, and the orthoceras is of the straightest of that sect.

Now we invite the reader to consider well this Schoharie mountain, which is only one of many like brethren among the Helderbergs, and ask himself the question: Was this hill, with its contents, created in just the state we have it now? To our mind, one might as well ask—Did God create the pyramids as we find them? He could, I suppose, could he not?

“He could. There is no absolute impossibility in it; but he did not.”

Why not?

“Because we find clear proofs in the structure of the pyramids that they were built by human hands, and by slow degrees.”

What proofs?

“We see how the stones have first been shaped, and then deposited one by one. The work is like the work of men; the marks of their tools are to be seen yet.”

We have the same proofs in the rocks. The geologist will show you triumphantly how one formation has been built up from the fragments and detritus of one older, all sorted, deposited and cemented by slow process. The workmen, water, frost, ice, fire, and other agents, are known by sure signs. The work is like the work of nature; the marks of her tools are to be seen.

“But we find mummies in the pyramids, embalmed bodies, which must have been deposited before the pyramids were closed up.”



Well, so we find mummies in the rocks, and better embalmed. They could never have got into the rocks after they were closed up. What mummies are better preserved than those of our Helderberg mountains?

"The Egyptian mummies must have lived once. We cannot suppose them to have been created in a state of death."

Why not? Some of our philosophers will find no difficulty in that supposition.

"Because they have all the signs of former life upon them. You can even tell by their teeth how long they lived. Some mummies have their full set, sharp and perfect as young teeth are. Others have only a few left, and those decayed. Why should God create such traces of growth and decay; such signs of an early but unreal history in Egypt? They would be useless except to deceive us."

We could show you plentiful instances of the same in any good geological cabinet. Fossils are young and old. Those that have teeth show them either perfect or more or less worn, according to their years of life. Those that are not entitled to distinct teeth have other marks to betray their age. You can be served, for instance, with trilobites of all ages, from half-formed babies to superannuated old crustacea. They have been traced through no less than twenty stages of development.\* Why should God create in the rocks such unreal signs of an early history, of slow growth to perfection, and even of ruin and decay?—Is not the parallel perfect? Which tombs give the clearest testimony, those of Egypt, or those of our mountain in the Helderbergs?

It is only fair to say, however, that the advocates of this theory do undertake, after a certain fashion, to assign reasons for the creation of the earth with signs upon it, albeit unreal, of ruin and decay. Chateaubriand's argument is the best we have seen, and our readers shall have it in his own words:

"We now come to the third objection, relative to the modern origin of the globe. 'The earth,' it is said, 'is an aged nurse who betrays her antiquity in every thing. Examine her fossils, her marbles, her granites, her lavas, and you will discover in them a series of innumerable years, marked by circles, strata, or branches, as the age of a serpent is determined by his rattles, that of a horse by his teeth, or that of a stag by his antlers.'

\* Lyell, *Elem. Geol.*, chap. xxvii., p. 451.

"This difficulty has been solved a hundred times by the following answer: *God might have created, and doubtless did create, the world with all the marks of antiquity and completeness which it now exhibits.*

"What, in fact, can be more probable than that the Author of nature originally produced both venerable forests and young plantations, and that the animals were created, some full of days, others adorned with the graces of infancy? The oaks, on springing from the fruitful soil, doubtless bore at once the aged crows, and the new progeny of doves. Worm, chrysalis, and butterfly, the insect crawled upon the grass, suspended its golden egg in the forest, or fluttered aloft in the air. The bee, though she had lived but a morning, already gathered her ambrosia from generations of flowers. We may imagine that the ewe was not without her lamb, nor the linnet without her young; and that the flowering shrubs concealed among their buds nightingales, astonished themselves at the warbling notes in which they expressed the tenderness of their first enjoyments.

"If the world had not been at the same time young and old, the grand, the serious, the moral would have been banished from the face of nature; for these are ideas essentially inherent in antique objects. Every scene would have lost its wonders. The rock in ruins would no longer have overhung the abyss with its pendent herbage. The forests, stripped of their accidents, would no longer have exhibited the pleasing irregularity of trees curved in every direction, and of trunks bending over the currents of rivers. The inspired thoughts, the venerable sounds, the magic voices, the sacred awe of the forests, would have been wanting, together with the darksome bowers which serve for their retreats; and the solitudes of earth and heaven would have remained bare and unattractive without those columns of oaks which join them together. We may well suppose that the very day the ocean poured its first waves upon the shores, they dashed against rocks already worn, over strands covered with fragments of shell-fish, and around barren capes which protected the sinking coasts against the ravages of the waters.

"Without this original antiquity, there would have been neither beauty nor magnificence in the work of the Almighty; and, what could not possibly be the case, nature in a state of innocence would have been less charming than she is in her present degenerate condition. A general infancy of plants, of animals, of elements, would have spread an air of dulness and languor throughout the world, and stripped it of all poetical inspiration. But God was not so unskilful a designer of the groves of Eden as infidels pretend. Man, the lord of the earth, was ushered into life with the maturity of thirty years, that the majesty of his being might accord with the antique grandeur of his new empire; and in like manner his part-

ner, doubtless, shone in all the blooming graces of female beauty when she was formed from Adam, that she might be in unison with the flowers and the birds, with innocence and love, and with all the youthful part of the universe."—*Genius of Christianity*. Part I., B. iv., ch. 5.

All this is exquisitely beautiful, but it is not good argument. M. Chateaubriand supposes in the construction of the world two necessities. The first is a necessity for the creation of the "old," that is, the perfect or mature, simultaneously with the young or undeveloped. This, under the supposition of a world suddenly and simultaneously created, and in respect to organic things, we might admit, for reasons already given; but we cannot see how this should account for the fossils. How, for instance, can a necessity to create the first lizards, or some of them, in a full-grown state, account for the enormous *Iguanodon*, a fossil which, according to this theory, never lived at all? But he attempts also to show that the world must needs have been created with marks of ruin upon it, in order to correspond to good taste and the poetic sentiment. We are no poet, but having some pretension to good taste, we beg leave to differ from him. Undoubtedly Adam and his blooming lady could have enjoyed the sight of water-worn rocks, beaches strewn with the wrecks of shells, and other antique ruins, under the same conditions that make up our enjoyment of them; but we cannot help thinking, that both the sentiment and the poetry of the thing would be lost upon them if they knew, as they must, that all this appearance of the antique was got up for the occasion. Besides, was not M. Chateaubriand aware that the solemn and reverential sentiment attached to ruins and things of great antiquity is derived from the association of ideas, and that there must be some experience, or knowledge of the past, of the changes and vicissitudes of time, to awaken it? Can any one conceive of Adam moralizing over a deserted crow's nest, when the first crows that nature ever knew had scarcely had time as yet to build a nest? Whatever force lies in this sentimental argument, goes rather to prove that the world had really grown old before our first parents were created.

But M. Chateaubriand argues that God would have been an "unskilful designer" had he not created the world in this way; that there would have been neither beauty nor magnificence in his work; that it would have been wanting in good taste. False decorations cannot be good taste, not



even in building worlds. God could, no doubt, have created at once, and by one word, a world perfect and habitable for man, full furnished with all that his necessities required, and beautified in a manner to please his eye and satisfy the most delicate sensibilities of his nature; but why should we make God so poor in the resources of his wisdom that he must needs create for that purpose a vast system of fictitious ruins? This argument of the accomplished Frenchman is, like a bit of gauze, exquisitely beautiful, but too delicate to bear handling. It would be sad to think that, in this instance, he represents the "genius of Christianity." In spite of his bewitching sophistry, we must still hold to the great antiquity of the earth.

---

ART. III.—*Conscription and Volunteering as Methods of Recruiting National Armies.*

WARS are inevitable, and must be expected as long as the world stands. The dreams of philanthropists, peace societies, and universal brotherhood associations, are very fascinating, but they are simply dreams that dissolve at the first breath of awakening passion, or the first clash of conflicting rights and interests. The Mediæval Arbitratorship of the Father of Christendom, the modern congresses of sovereigns, diplomacy, international trade and commerce, the combinations of bankers and brokers, philanthropy, progress of science and civilization, all fail to maintain universal and perpetual peace, or to render fleets and armies on the grandest scale superfluous. Wars would seem, moreover, to be not only inevitable, but even necessary to preserve society from internal decay, which always rots, and becomes, under a long peace, putrid as the ocean under a long calm.

Every nation must, whatever its efforts for peace, expect, soon or late, to be involved in war, and a war that will test all its manhood and strength. Every nation that means to exist and to be respected as a nation, must be a military nation, and have a military force sufficient to command respect for its character, rights, and interests. Some nations, owing to their more or less open frontier and exposed condition, may require larger, others smaller armies, but all must have an army, if possible, adequate to its external defence, and internal police. In all nations, therefore, the question of

the army, its constitution, its recruitment and maintenance in a manner that will render it the most efficient with the least possible burden and expense to the nation, is and must be a question of the first magnitude.

Our fathers had the full mediæval horror of standing armies, and indeed a horror of war itself. They hoped the Republic they were founding would never become a great military Republic, but would always direct its ambition from war and military glory to the arts of peace, agriculture, trade, commerce, manufactures, and the mechanic arts. They wished no army unless an army so small as never to tempt the nation to engage in a war more formidable than a brush with a savage tribe, and they relied for national defence and internal police almost solely on the militia of the several States. The militia were to be enrolled, organized, and disciplined under State authority, and the only army they contemplated was to be recruited by voluntary enlistments. On this military system we have hitherto mainly relied. Experience has proved that we cannot raise a regular army of any considerable force by voluntary enlistments: we tried it in the war against Great Britain in 1812-15, and found it impossible to raise the force required without a resort to conscription. In the war against Mexico we added a few regiments to the regular army, but relied mainly on volunteers, organized and officered according to the militia laws of the several States, and forming really only a militia force. In the present formidable civil war we have thus far repeated the experiment of the Mexican war. We have increased the regular army by six new regiments, which, except as to officers, are not yet, if we are rightly informed, half filled up, but if filled up would give us an effective force, officers and men, of only about forty-two thousand; and we have organized and have in the field, in garrison, in depots, and straggling, we know not how many hundred regiments of volunteers and drafted militia. It has been found nearly impossible by voluntary enlistments to fill up the regular regiments, and men for the volunteer regiments have been obtained only by immense labor, by offering most liberal wages, and ruinously high bounties. The drafted men are few, for the people and the State governors have generally regarded the draft with disfavor, and done what they could to escape it. Though we have with incredible efforts, and at a cost which would soon bankrupt the richest nation on earth,

raised a large, an enormously large volunteer force, we think it is already evident that we can no longer trust to the volunteer method of recruiting the army. Not many, if any, more volunteers can be obtained; and the large bounties paid to the later volunteers have not unreasonably disaffected the earlier volunteers, who enlisted with very small bounties, or without any bounties at all. Moreover, without the slightest disparagement to our brave volunteers, it may be said, after all, that the volunteers are militia, and that no militia in the world are equal to regular troops. They may be as brave, even more patriotic and enthusiastic, but they are rarely, if ever, so well officered, so thoroughly disciplined, and have never the same confidence in themselves or in one another. They do not acquire the spirit of regular soldiers, and always lack something of the military *estro*, without which no army ever accomplishes great things. There are few experienced commanders who would not feel more confident of victory with regular troops than with double their number of militia, whether volunteer or drafted.

The magnitude of the present war has called forth armies which rank among the largest the world has ever seen, and our battles, in proportion to their results, have been attended by an unusual waste of life. Though we are simple civilians, with no pretensions at all to military science, we think the armies on both sides have been unnecessarily large, larger than has been of any use. We think our government has rather listened to the clamor of the mercantile and business community for a short war, than followed the dictates of its own military judgment. Armies may be too large as well as too small. We doubt if there is a general, on either side, who can manoeuvre advantageously on the battlefield an army of fifty thousand men, and sure we are that no one has yet done it. McClellan did not succeed in bringing into his battles before Richmond, at any one time, more than twenty-five thousand of his army of ninety-five thousand men. Lee defeated Pope in the Virginia campaign with thirty-five thousand men, and fought the battle of Antietam with less than fifty thousand, while McClellan with nearly double the number failed to inflict on him a decisive defeat. An army of fifty thousand, well officered, well disciplined, ably and skilfully led, would, in our judgment, be more than a match for the largest force that either side has brought into any single action that has yet taken



place. But our merchants were going to do up the war in six weeks, as Napoleon III. did up the Italian campaign, and send out their orders for the fall, certainly for the spring trade, as usual. They supposed that by sheer force of numbers we could walk over the rebels and trample out the rebellion. So Congress voted half a million of men, and three-fourths of a million were reported, in a few months, to have volunteered. Though the government may have had the latter number on its pay-rolls, it is not probable that it has ever had, prior to the new levies, more than two-thirds of that number actually in its service. Still, enormously large armies have been raised, and the rebellion, on the mercantile theory, ought to have been extinguished more than twelve months ago. An army half as large, more compact, and more manageable by such military talent as we have, we believe would have been far more effective. Great armies demand great generals, and great generals we have not had, though if the war continues we may yet have them. We have been in too great a hurry, and have made the less speed for it. We Americans can never spare time to do a thing well and thoroughly.

The difficulty we have found in filling by volunteers the last calls of the government, satisfies us that volunteering is, if we may use the expression, "played out," and no more calls can be so filled; yet new calls will be made, and more men than have yet been raised will be needed, before the war is ended by the suppression of the rebellion. The calls for volunteers in no instance have been filled without great difficulty and the most persevering efforts. The government in its first call offered higher pay than was ever given by any other government, and higher than any government can afford, when it needs a million or more of men. In the case of later volunteers, in addition to the liberal pay offered at first, the most exorbitant bounties, by the government, the State, municipal authorities, towns, villages, and associations, have been offered and paid, amounting in some cases to five hundred dollars or more, for a single nine month's man, besides the monthly sum paid by some of the States to its troops, and the allowance for the support of the volunteers' family, if he have one. The expense alone would be an insuperable objection to the volunteer system, if there were no other. No government can be justified in incurring it, save in the last extremity, and no people can be expected to endure it for any great length of time. But even this expense,

as enormous as it is, does not cover the whole expense of the *personnel* of our volunteer army. The volunteer regiments are not regiments in the regular army. They are regiments of State militia, organized and officered according to the militia laws of the State in which they are raised. When mustered into the service of the United States, they must retain the regimental organization they receive from their respective States. The companies have, under State law, the right of choosing their line officers, and the commanders of companies their field officers. The new levies, therefore, cannot, without their consent, be used to fill up old regiments reduced by the casualties of war or the fatalities of the march and the camp, but must be organized into new regiments, with new sets of officers, while the old regiments, reduced to mere skeletons, must be kept up with their full complement of line and field officers, thus vastly increasing the expense, and at the same time diminishing the efficiency of the force. An old regiment that has seen service, and lost a portion of its men in action, filled up with new recruits, is worth two new regiments that have seen no service.

Then in volunteer regiments the officers are selected not precisely for their military qualities, or fitness to command. They must be selected not for their efficiency as officers, but for their ability to obtain recruits. This depends on their personal, local, or political popularity, and it not seldom happens that men get the command of companies or of regiments, out of whom you can no more make competent and efficient officers, than you can make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. The grand complaint of our army is of the incompetency, often worthlessness, of the regimental officers, on whom so much depends for the health, morality, discipline, and efficiency of an army. We have blamed our generals for their slowness, their over-caution, and their ill success, and with reason, but perhaps theirs is not the principal fault. It was not their fault that fifteen thousand volunteers skulked at the battle of Pittsburg Landing, or as many more at the battle of Antietam; nor is it altogether their fault that one thousand officers of volunteer regiments are reported absent, and that one-third or two-fifths of the men the government is paying have to be reported not present. The report, not long since, of one of our armies, read one morning, we have been told: "present, 120,000; absent, 196,000;" the absent being for the most part

deserters or stragglers. The fault lies chiefly with the regimental officers, including perhaps a few commanders of brigades. These facts explain the little military success achieved by our generals, and the fault must be charged to the volunteer system, that places in the army men that the government lacks the courage to subject to the rigid discipline of military law. Were it to enforce strict military law on volunteers, it very likely fears no more volunteers could be obtained. Moreover, it could hardly do it if it would, for the lack of submission on the part of those whose duty it is to see discipline carried out. Volunteers cannot be made to feel that they are regular soldiers, and the government does not treat them as such.

But the volunteer system is not only ruinously expensive and comparatively inefficient, but it is unequal and unjust. There is no justice in placing the whole duty of bearing arms for the country on the free and willing. The duty of bearing arms, when called upon in defence of the government and laws, the national life and the integrity of the national territory, whether against a foreign or a domestic enemy, is obligatory alike upon all able-bodied citizens not for wise public reasons exempted. There is gross wrong in devolving the whole burden of bearing arms for the country on those whose patriotism and sense of public duty lead them to volunteer, while we leave the unpatriotic, the indifferent, the ill-disposed, the sluggish, at home to fatten on their blood and sufferings,—to plot mischief against the state, or to join in conspiracies for defrauding the government. These are as much bound to expose their lives in defence of the country as those, and have as great a stake in its defence. Justice demands that these men who say to others, go, but go not themselves, should be compelled to take their turn and bear their share. The volunteers are defending the country as much for them as for themselves.

The moral effect of the volunteer system on the country is not good. It does not bring home to every citizen the sense of the right of the government to demand, and the duty of every citizen to give, his services in the army to the country when she requires it. It leaves it to be inferred, that the defence of the country is not the duty of the citizen which he is bound to perform, but a voluntary service he may or may not render, according to his own choice. The volunteer system makes hardly any appeal to patriotism or public virtue. The non-volunteering portion do not look



upon the volunteers as men fighting for their country, but as mercenaries hired to fight its battles. The volunteers themselves do not volunteer from love of country alone. Some of them, no doubt, do, but with a great proportion of them the chief inducement is the pay, together with the bounty. The appeals we have made, and which have proved the most effective, have been made not to patriotic motives, but to low and sordid motives, motives from which a high-minded, generous, and patriotic soul scorns to act. It is the wages and the bounties we offer that obtain us recruits. We get men to fight our battles and save our country by hiring them, and as much so as if we hired foreign mercenaries. We follow the rule of every mercantile people, and defend our country on mercantile principles. All mercantile nations carry on their wars and defend themselves by mercenaries, and with armies expected to be moved by the mercenary spirit. Your rich merchants of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and other towns and cities, who have so deep an interest in suppressing this rebellion, may pay liberally for the support of the volunteers and their families; but do they volunteer themselves, or look upon volunteers in any other light than as men hired to do their fighting?

We cast no reproach upon men for not volunteering without liberal pay and high bounties. Our working men, our laboring men, the men expected to volunteer, whether home or foreign born, are under no more obligation to bear arms for the country than are our rich bankers, manufacturers, merchants, brokers, lawyers, shop-keepers. The poor man has a right to refuse to volunteer unless he is liberally remunerated, and to refuse to volunteer at any price, if he chooses. The country has the right to the best blood in it, and the richer and more prosperous the citizen, the greater his obligation to arm in her defence. But under the volunteer system all considerations of duty and patriotism are omitted, and the raising and recruiting of our armies is made a simple business transaction, to be arranged and settled on simple mercantile principles. So completely has the mercantile spirit taken possession of the country, that we have no doubt that not a few of our readers will wonder how we can see any thing objectionable in it. The great body of our people see and appreciate no higher principle of action than the mercantile principle, and the highest praise they think of awarding a man is, that he is one who pays "twenty shillings in the pound," that is, fulfils his bu-

siness contracts. Disinterestedness, devotion, self-sacrifice, are terms which have for them no practical meaning, and which belong to an obsolete vocabulary. Why should we expect these virtues in the poor rather than in the rich? "But the rich will pay their money." Be it so; all a man hath will he give for his life; and yet you ask this poor American, this poor German, this poor Irishman, to give his life for the country, and therefore for you. Can you expect him to do it from patriotism? Why should he be more patriotic than you? Then he must be hired, and your army be made up of mercenaries; and the reliance of the government must be on its ability to pay—not on the loyalty, spirit, patriotism, and public virtue of the people. The whole population becomes thus, by a natural and inevitable law, mercenary, and the war, carried on for the very life of the nation, is made only the occasion for every individual, from the heaviest contractor down to the lowest camp-follower, to get all he can from the public.

We need not dwell on this last point. The whole country sees and knows it, and far more goes to feed the cupidity of the people and enrich individuals, than is required to support our armies, and to conduct the war to a successful issue. The whole comes from the mercantile spirit, which has pervaded the whole country, and the attempt to raise armies and conduct war on mercantile principles. The country cannot stand it, and could not were it a thousand times richer than it is. The government, if it is to continue the prosecution of the war on mercantile principles throughout, will ere long find itself bankrupt in purse and character, if it be not so already. Prices for men and supplies of all kinds will continue to rise in proportion to the demand, till the government is no longer able to pay, and then its armies and supplies fail, and it is at the mercy of the enemy. Something toward a remedy, or the beginning of a remedy, may be found in abandoning the VOLUNTEERING system for that of CONSCRIPTION. We have evidently, as we have said, raised all the men we can by liberal pay and high bounties, and some other method than volunteering must be adopted, or no more troops can be raised and sent into the field. So much is certain; and it is equally certain, if the war is to be continued till the rebellion is suppressed, and the Federal authority is firmly re-established over the whole territory of the United States, more men, and large numbers more, will have to be raised and sent into the field. The war is not

yet ended. The Rebels have not exhausted all their resources, and, as we have been going on, we shall exhaust our resources before they will theirs. We have never, for ourselves, counted on a short war. You cannot overrun and subdue such a country as that which acknowledges the Confederate flag, nearly as large as one half of Europe, and admirably adapted to the strategy of defence, in three months, six months, one year, or three years. We have not yet been able to defeat a large Rebel army, or essentially to weaken the Rebel forces. We have gained some points of more political and commercial than military importance, but the Rebel armies hold their own, and are as defiant as ever. We have come nearer losing Washington than we have to taking Richmond, and we shall be agreeably disappointed if, before we issue from the press, General Burnside is able to establish his headquarters in the Rebel Capital. Military operations on so large a scale as ours are necessarily slow, and, with our lack of military organization and experience, constantly liable to unforeseen and disastrous delays. But even the taking of Richmond will not end the war, nor complete the conquest even of Virginia.

But even when the present war is over, however it terminates, we shall be obliged to keep on foot a large military force. If it terminates in a division of the Union, and the formation of two independent nations, each will be obliged to keep its army very nearly on a war footing, for a solid and durable peace between them can be maintained only by each being constantly prepared for war. If it terminates in the submission of the Rebels, the Federal government will still be obliged to keep up a large army. It will be obliged to keep heavy garrisons in every State in the Union, have everywhere present a sufficient force to guard against or to suppress in the beginning new outbreaks, as likely to occur East, West, North, as South. A large army, at least two-thirds as large as the effective force now on foot, will be necessary as an internal police, to maintain internal order and tranquillity. Moreover, this Rebellion has sown the seeds of future foreign wars, and we shall be obliged to be constantly prepared for defence. The Rebellion has wrought almost a total change in our national character and condition, and henceforth, if we exist at all as a nation, we must exist as a great military nation. We cannot, if we would, be again what we were. The military spirit has arisen to be a rival to the mercantile spirit, and the love of glory will to some ex-



tent, it is to be hoped, neutralize the love of gain. No nation without a high-toned military spirit, and a large and effective army, ever takes rank as a great and commanding nation; and the decline of every nation may be dated from the decline of its military spirit, the neglect of its military defences, and the absorption of its energies in the production and accumulation of material goods, wealth and luxury. We do not regret the change that has or must come over us. We were lost without it. Without the virtues stimulated by war, its hardships, its sufferings, its devotion, its sacrifices, we could never have been or remained the great people we have thought and called ourselves. We were, humiliating as it may be to our pride to confess it, becoming a low-minded, sordid, and grovelling people, worshippers of mammon, weak, effeminate, and servile. If the war does not regenerate us, restore the spirit of independence, elevate our views, ennoble our sentiments, and raise us to a higher and purer worship than that of the god of gain or the goddess of display, we are past being cured, and it matters little how the civil war terminates.

Taking it for granted that the war has yet some years to continue, and that we are likely for a long time to come, to say the least, to be obliged to keep up a large military force, Congress should, it seems to us, lose no time in maturing and adopting a permanent military system, capable of expansion or contraction, according to the exigencies of the country. The continental nations of Europe, whose military experience is worth a hundred-fold that of England, except on the sea,—and she has never wholly relied on voluntary enlistments for manning her navy,—have universally adopted conscription as the method of recruiting their armies, and they have found it to be the most effective, the most economical, and the least burdensome to the nation. In matters outside of our common faith we have not always been able to agree with our Most Reverend Archbishop, but we are deeply grateful to him for throwing the whole weight of his character and position in favor of conscription. He has spoken of the draft as a statesman and a patriot. The Rebels, from whom it is not unlawful to take lessons, since it is always lawful to learn from an enemy, have abandoned the volunteer system and adopted a most stringent conscription,—much more stringent than would be necessary for the United States, except in a case of extreme national peril,—and they owe to it much of their power of resist-

ance. France is unquestionably the first military power in the world, and the country in which the army is raised and supported, in proportion to its numbers and effectiveness, with the least burden to the population; and France relies solely on the conscription. We would recommend her example to the consideration of the Administration and of Congress. Her conscription, though we profess not to be familiar with its details, strikes us as the most perfect and the least oppressive that can be devised. It secures her a really national and patriotic army. It fills its ranks with young unmarried men, keeps them in it long enough to make them good soldiers, and for them to do good service to the country, and yet not so long as to be fit for soldiers and for nothing else. It returns them discharged to civil life while they are still young enough for its various duties and avocations. It takes them at that period of life when the population and industry of the country can best spare them, and returns them still young enough to marry, settle in life, and form an integral part of the civil population of the country; and so excellent is the organization of the French army, so strict its discipline, so admirable its *morale*, that the soldiers discharged at the term of their service are almost universally found to be superior in morals, in intelligence, and capacity, to those of their class who have remained at home. The French army, as represented to us, instead of being a school of vice, drunkenness, and debauchery, is a school of intelligence and virtue, as should and might be every army, not raised, pervaded, and governed by the mercantile spirit.

It is no part of our purpose to enter into the details of a system of conscription: we are now contending only for the *principle* of conscription. It will be for Congress, in adopting a conscription law, to determine and arrange its details. It should, and undoubtedly would, divide the conscriptible population into several classes, according to their respective ages, and provide for calling out the elder only after the younger classes have been exhausted. In all ordinary times, the armies could be amply recruited from the class of young unmarried men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, and the other classes could be held as a reserve, to be called out only in the case of great wars imperilling the very existence of the nation. Let the term of service be five or seven years,—in France it is seven years,—and the soldier would be still young enough to settle and gain a

position in civil life after his discharge. Such a law, in its gradual operations, would subject a very large portion of the male population of the country to military training, without abstracting permanently any considerable number from the agriculture and industry of the nation. The agriculture, industry, and trade of the nation would hardly feel, in ordinary times, the draft for the army, and would suffer no interruption.

We speak of conscription by the law of Congress, as a method of raising and recruiting the army of the nation, not of the draft, as now legally authorized. The draft as now authorized is far preferable to the system of volunteering, but the law authorizes only the draft of the State militia, and of State militia for only nine months. The drafted men are a portion of the militia, and must be organized into regiments according to the militia laws of the State from which they are drafted. They have, as have the volunteers, the right to choose their own officers, who must be commissioned by the governor of the State, and can, no more than volunteers, be used against their consent to fill up the vacancies in regiments already in the service. The Administration possibly overlooked this fact when it ordered the draft from the militia of the several States of three hundred thousand men to serve for nine months. It has not been able to fill up with them the reduced regiments, except by their consent; or, if it has done so, it has been, we must believe, without warrant of law. We would have the militia to remain as a sort of State guard, to be called into the active service of the United States only in the case of a sudden, temporary emergency, and carry on war, domestic or foreign, with the regular army alone.

The conscription may be made through the agency of the State governments, but it should be made by authority of the national government, and the conscripts drawn should be aggregated to the regular army of the United States. They may, if thought desirable, be aggregated to regiments raised in their own State, or even in their own section of the State, as far as practicable, so as to gratify State pride, and to stimulate a wholesome spirit of State emulation; but they should be regarded as soldiers of the United States, aggregated to regiments in the regular army, under officers appointed and commissioned by the national authority. We want in the army no militia, no State troops, drafted or volunteers, and least of all do we want the elective principle



recognized in any portion of the active army. The army must be governed from high to low, not from low to high; and if State jealousy will not trust the organization and command throughout of the national army to the national authority, the sooner we abandon all national pretensions the better. We cannot be a nation unless we have a national army. The Federal Government is a sham, and no government at all, if it have not the command of the whole military force of the nation, and that too without State intervention. The States may act as its agents or instruments, but the army must be the army of the nation, officered by men of its appointment, holding their commissions directly from it, and be at its sovereign disposal, if it is to be a government, or any thing more than a mere agency of the States, as the Nullifiers pretend. Undoubtedly, this would require a permanent enlargement of the regular army; but that is one of the ends we aim at. We contend that every nation should have an army adequate to its wants, and that it is wisdom and economy to carry on its wars with regular rather than with irregular troops. The military is as essential to the existence, strength, and prosperity of the country, in its place, and to the extent necessary, as merchants and manufacturers, agriculturists and mechanics, lawyers and doctors. A true political economy,—not the false political economy which views man only as a producing or consuming animal,—as well as a wise and liberal statesmanship, regards the army, a large and effective army, as one of the chief elements of the strength, stability, and even wealth of a nation. What is expended for an army of proper proportions is, in the point of view of political economy even, a profitable investment, and adds to instead of detracting from the productive capital of a nation. Armies may, no doubt, be too large, and overtax a nation for their support; they may also be too small, as ours have been, and be equally ruinous. We have had, in the war the Rebellion has forced upon us, to suffer and expend far more than it would have cost us to keep up an army and navy from the very existence of the government, of a force and efficiency that would have rendered such a rebellion impracticable, and have prevented it from ever having been attempted. The expense of creating an army is infinitely greater than that of keeping up an army. The mercantile spirit is seldom far-sighted, and usually overreaches itself.

We urge conscription as the most economical, efficient,

equitable, and moral method of raising and recruiting the army. It saves the expense of bounties and exorbitant pay to volunteers. It is fair to all, and calls equally upon the willing and unwilling, the patriotic and the unpatriotic, the rich and the poor, the educated and the uneducated; and it draws the *personnel* of the army, the rank and file, from that portion of the population which can be abstracted with the least interruption and derangement to the agriculture, industry, and business of the nation. It makes the army an army of citizens, not of mercenaries; for it takes the soldiers from, and returns the greater part of them, while still young men, to civil life. The army remains identified with the nation, an integral part of the national population. It is so in fact, it is so in sentiment. It is never severed in its interests or its affections from the country. We see this in all the national armies of Europe. The conscripts are called into the army to serve their country, and always with the hope, when their term of service is over, of returning to the homes they may have left, perhaps with tears, and of being citizens and fathers of families, and of families that they will not be obliged to leave till death summons them. The army thus becomes a school of patriotism, and men learn to love their country by having served it, suffered for it, made sacrifices for it. The soldiers would have nothing of the mercenary spirit, for they would not serve for pay, but to pay their tax as loyal citizens to the country. Their pay would be light in comparison with what we are obliged to offer in order to induce men to enlist or volunteer, for it would not be given as a reward for their services. Their services the country would count above all pecuniary reward. Their pay would be simply to enable them to live while in the service of the country. Their service would be looked upon as the discharge of a debt which every citizen owes to his government, and they would have the ennobling sentiment of having served their country from love and duty, not for hire. They would thus have at once the spirit of the soldier and the citizen.

We urge conscription also because it asserts the right and majesty of the state,—its right and its authority to command the citizen to defend it, and the correlative duty of the citizen to obey the command, and expose, if need be, his life for his country. Volunteering asserts neither the right of the state, nor the duty of the citizen. It makes it a voluntary thing on the part of the citizen

to defend his country or not. It denies all solidarity of the citizen with the government, and recognizes and inspires in the people no public virtue. With individual exceptions, volunteers enlist for the pay, and the pay, unhappily, is considered by the country an equivalent for the service they render. Poor, maimed, discharged volunteers return home, crippled for life, and find no resource but the poor-house. We have known instances of this sort in our own town. The wages paid, the country regards her debt to the volunteer discharged, and so no love springs up in the volunteer toward the country, and none in the country to the volunteer no longer able or needed to serve her. He served her not as a citizen, and she treats him not as a citizen. The relation has been a mercantile relation on both sides. The debt is discharged over the counter. The conscription takes the relation between the country and the soldier out of the mercantile order, and places it in the order of right and duty, and therefore of affection and honor.

Conscription, therefore, will have a tendency to recall the American people to a sense of what they have well nigh forgotten. In their reaction against the old order, which merged the citizen in the state, and the state in the king or emperor, they have almost run to the opposite extreme, that of merging the prince in the state, and the state in the individual citizen. In our excessive individualism the state loses its sacredness, and the nation exists only for the individual, and has no rights of its own; each individual feels that he is the state, the nation, and that government is instituted only for his individual benefit, and may rightfully be used to promote, to the greatest extent possible, his private interests. He owes it nothing, is bound to give it nothing, and has the perfect right to get all from it that he can. Hence the terrible lack of conscience in all our dealings with the government, frauds of contractors, "pickings and stealings" of men in office, and shameful betrayal or neglect of the public interests by the employés of the government. The sense of duty to the public seems to have vanished, and the nearest approach we make to loyalty is fidelity to party, which is often disloyalty to the public, and treason to the state. The conscription, if adopted as a permanent policy, would have a strong tendency, becoming stronger and stronger with time, to correct this terrible evil, which has already brought the republic to the verge of destruction, as all must see and deplore.



We urge the conscription, also, for filling up the regular army of the United States, for we want, as we have said, and continue to repeat, the battles of the nation fought by the army of the nation. We say not one word in disparagement of the army of volunteers now in the field, or in their various dépôts in the States, nor do we offer any unfriendly criticisms on any of the State governors, the most of whom have rendered most efficient service to the nation by their untiring and almost superhuman efforts in raising, arming, equipping, and sending to the field the respective quotas of their States. Without their co-operation and their unremitted exertions, the Federal government could never, in so short a time, or in any time, have placed such an army of volunteers as it now has in the field. We are willing, also, to say, that we see no way in which the Government, placed as it was at the breaking out of the civil war, could possibly have raised a sufficient military force, except by calling out by voluntary enlistment or drafting the militia of the several States. The States have saved the United States, and enabled the nation to maintain the contest with its enemies. In fact, the State governments have had the sentiment of nationality in far greater strength than has the national government itself. It is to the national spirit manifested by the State governments, headed by such men as Andrew, Sprague, Yates, Morton, and others, that we owe it that the Administration has been provided with the means and inspired with the courage to resist the Rebellion, and to make a stand for the Union. History will record that the loyal States have been in advance rather than behind the United States. We do not complain that the Government, in the beginning, called for volunteers, and organized them as militia, and not as troops of the regular army. It could, under the circumstances, hardly have done otherwise; but we are anxious that the United States should be regarded as a nation, one and indivisible, as much so as France, Russia, or Prussia; that the Federal government should be held to be a true national government, and therefore that it should take upon itself to perform the functions of a national government. We would have it carry on its wars with its own regular army, and do itself its own work.

The real issue in this civil war is not Free Trade or a Protective Tariff, Negro Slavery or Negro Emancipation, but National Sovereignty or State Sovereignty. The war must settle, if it settles any thing, the question, whether the United

States is a nation, a state, a sovereignty, or whether it is only a confederacy of sovereigns ; whether the Federal government is a government proper, or only an agency of the States, deriving its powers from them, and bound to obey their instructions. The seceded States have proposed the issue fairly and squarely, while the United States and its statesmen, after the manner of our northern politicians, have studied to avoid it, get round it, and carry on the war on some collateral issue. In fact, the war has been thus far waged on State sovereignty principles, by the one side as much as by the other. The war has been spoken of and conducted, not as a war between the United States and its rebellious subjects, but as a war between the North and the South,—between the adhering and the seceding States—a purely sectional war which nothing can justify. It is time for this to stop. If there be no such entity, as the political people of the United States, represented by the Federal government ; if the United States be not a sovereign nation, and its government the supreme national government ; if the Federal government is simply a congress of sovereign states, the seceding States may have been unjustifiable in their action, they may have been guilty of a breach of faith toward their sister States, but they cannot be charged with treason or rebellion against their legitimate sovereign, and the Federal government has no right to make war upon them as rebels. The people of those States in arms against the Federal government are not fighting, in such case, against, but in obedience to, the command of their legitimate sovereign. You may make war on them for justifiable causes, for their aggressive acts, as upon other foreign powers, but not as rebellious subjects, to be coerced back to their allegiance. What is the fact ?

We hold there is a political people, one and indivisible, blunderingly, or at least awkwardly, called *the United States*,—one sovereign people, who, acting through subordinate or State organizations, have formed and ordained the government commonly called the Federal Government, which, within the limits of its constitutional powers, is a supreme national government. This government derives its powers not from the States, but from the one indivisible political people of the United States, acting through their several State organizations. The people are one political people, divided for certain purposes into States, and for other purposes undivided, and acting under one national govern-

ment. It is only on this ground that there is or can be *treason* against the United States, for treason is an offence which can be committed only against the sovereign. If the sovereignty were in the States severally, and not in the United States, levying war against the United States, giving aid and comfort to their enemies, might be treason against the State whose citizens were guilty of it, because she had ratified the Federal Constitution and commanded her citizens to obey it, but not treason against the United States, as the Constitution declares it to be. The very fact, then, that the Constitution does recognize and define treason against the United States, proves that the Federal Government represents the national sovereignty, and therefore that the United States is a sovereign nation, a sovereign state, and not a mere confederacy of sovereigns. Holding this, we want it clearly and distinctly asserted, so that the issue proposed by secession shall be fairly and distinctly met. Ambiguity in such matters, or efforts to avoid the real issue, are always bad policy. They can at least only postpone for a time a contest which is sure to return, and with redoubled force. Had the Convention that framed the Constitution been more explicit, there would have been no rebellion. For ourselves, we can take no part in a war which is only a war between the Southern States and Northern States. On many of the questions which have heretofore been debated between the North and the South, our sympathies and convictions have been and are with the South. Were it simply a question between Northern States and Southern States, we could as easily take part with the Southern as with the Northern, for we have as little sympathy with the centralized democracy predominating in all the Northern States, as with negro slavery existing at the South. It is not with the North against the South that we do or can take part; we take part with the United States against her rebellious subjects, whether North or South; and this we can do only on the ground that there can be rebellious subjects; and there can be rebellious subjects only on the ground that the United States is a sovereign nation, a sovereign state, whose sovereignty is represented by the Federal Government. We oppose secession not because it is unwise, impolitic, and likely to be attended with fatal consequences, although such may be the fact, but because *it is an attack on the national sovereignty, on national right, national law, and national existence,—because it is REBELLION.* We oppose



neatly and distinctly national sovereignty to State sovereignty, and we venture to say, till the United States do the same, nothing will be decided in favor of the Federal arms, and the war will be a useless or criminal waste of life and treasure.

We demand, therefore, the conscription, as the assertion of the authority of the United States as a sovereign state; and the aggregation of the conscripts to the regular army, under United States officers, appointed and commissioned by Federal authority alone, as a protest against State sovereignty, and as likely to have a powerful tendency to develop and strengthen, in the minds of the American people, the sentiment of nationality. We want the Federal Government to assume the attitude and perform the duties of a national government, and not to leave to the States, save as its agents, any part of the work of national defence. We do not want the Government to exceed in any respect its constitutional powers, but we want it and the people to understand that those powers are national powers, delegated to it not by the States, nor by the people of the several States, but by the one sovereign political people of the United States. There is no way in which the Government can more effectually manifest its national authority and character than by raising and recruiting, by direct conscription, a regular national army.

It may not be either practicable or desirable to aggregate our present volunteer army to the regular army, but it is possible, by law of Congress, to provide for an increase of the regular army by conscription, and for adding to it all new levies that may be authorized. One half the men that have been called out for a longer or shorter time, raised by conscription, and aggregated to the regular army, would have been more effective than the whole number has been as a volunteer militia. A change from our present mixed system cannot be effected at once, for we could hardly settle the question of rank between the regular officers and volunteer officers, without mortal offence to the one or the other class. As a rule, civilians, though admitted into the army, should never rank the regular officers. Exceptions to the rule, in the present state of our military organization, perhaps, are admissible in rare instances, but when once the army is placed on a permanent footing, there should be no exception to the rule. Volunteer officers may have great merit, but they could not prudently be admitted to enter the

regular army so as to interfere with the rank or promotion of the officers already in it. Much injustice has already been done the regular army by the neglect of this rule. We cannot, then, aggregate the volunteer regiments in the service to the regular army, and to disband them now, while the war is raging, and supply their places with new recruits, would be unwise and ruinous, as it would deprive the service of its best troops. What, however, seems to us practicable, is to induce the States to fill or consolidate the regiments of volunteers now in the service, and make each regiment consist of three battalions instead of two, and then for the Government to refuse to accept any additional regiments of State troops, volunteer or drafted. Let the new levies be raised by conscription, and aggregated to regiments in the regular army, under officers belonging to the regular service. Gradually, in this way, the change may be introduced without any violent shock or grave offence to any one, and ultimately the nation be able to rely on its own army.

We are well aware that the general military policy we recommend will encounter strong opposition from the prejudices of our countrymen. It involves a great, though not a violent, change in our notions, habits, and manners; but this civil war is itself a revolution, and, however it terminates, cannot leave us the people we were before it broke out; and it is not desirable that it should. It will have been of no use, if it does not correct many of our notions, and teach us that government is a serious and sacred thing, instituted to govern the nation for the public good, fully as much as to be the agent for elevating individuals and building up individual fortunes. The end of government is not the greatest good to the greatest number, but the greatest common good of the whole. We must learn from it that government is authority and not merely an agency, and that it cannot subsist and perform its legitimate functions where there is no spirit and no habit of obedience in the people. It ought to teach us that a plurality of votes is no substitute for brains or for experience. Finally, it must teach us that no nation can be safe that neglects to cultivate the military spirit, to honor the soldier, and to provide an armed force to defend the public authority, rights, and interests.

There is a strong prejudice against conscription, partly, as his Grace of New York suggests, because people con-

found it with the English pressgang, with which it has nothing in common, and partly because we have sought to manage all public as well as private affairs on the mercantile principle. We understand buying and selling, hiring and paying, but we do not understand commanding and obeying. There is no solid objection to the conscription, if it includes all able-bodied citizens of the proper age. Every citizen is bound, if able, to bear arms for his country at her call. All, however, are seldom if ever needed, and no fairer or more equitable rule of selection than the lot can be adopted. The rule is Scriptural, and even Evangelical. There is no partiality, no favoritism in it; every one stands on a footing of equality, and has an equal chance to be taken or left with every other one. No doubt many may get the number who would rather not go, and when the conscript departs he may shed tears, and mother, and sister, and sweetheart may also shed tears; but he goes to do his duty to his country, and he and they soon find consolation. We have seen equal distress when the volunteer departed, or when a beloved member of the family started on a distant and peaceful voyage. The country calls for sacrifices at the commands of duty, and a people that refuses to make them has ceased to be worthy of liberty or nationality. A nation is defended and advanced only by the heroic virtues. Do we not believe in a crucified Redeemer—in a religion of sacrifice, whose first admonition is, Deny thyself? These young men depart sorrowing, but to a glorious field of service. We should honor them with our envy rather than soften them with our compassion. Have we yet to learn that it is sweet to die for our country?—for to die for our country is not seldom to die for our God.

The plan we suggest proposes to do away in the army with the elective principle, and to make the army national. This is supposed to be on the one hand anti-democratic, and on the other anti-State Sovereignty. Anti-State Sovereignty! Why, what are we fighting against, and for what have we called out and armed more than a million of men? Is it not for national against State sovereignty that we are now fighting? If not, we should disband our armies. If it is, pray tell us how you expect to put down State sovereignty by asserting and acting on it? We like the elective principle in its place, as well as any of our countrymen, and have no objection to it even in the militia, regarded as a State guard; but it is in our judgment out of place in the army. No nation that



carries out universally the democratic principle can be anything more than a huge mob. In every nation, if it is to exist, and be stable and well governed, there must be three institutions not subject to the caprice and fluctuations of popular election,—the Church, the judiciary, and the army. These are three grand conservative institutions that should temper and restrain the democratic element, which, when universal and exclusive, is destructive of the state and the welfare of the nation. Where the congregation elect and remove their pastor at will, he is tempted to become a time-server, and to resort to the arts of the demagogue to keep his place. The impartial administration of justice, one of the chief elements of national life, can never be counted on where judges are removable at pleasure, or where they are elected by the people for a brief term and made re-eligible. The nation can never count on its army, if officered and governed democratically. It is the right arm of the government, and the government must have the full and absolute command of it.

But it may be objected, that with a large army at its command, the power of the Federal Government would become too great, and dangerous to our liberties. If an army of mercenaries, or of men who have nothing but the soldier in them, and calculate on remaining soldiers as long as they live, perhaps so; but not with an army of citizens, as would be, as we have shown, an army raised and recruited by conscription, taken from civil life, and, after their not long term of service, expecting to return to it. The government, to be of any utility, must have power, and power may always be abused. But the risk of abuse must be run. It is as dangerous to clothe the government with too little as with too much power. The government should always have power enough to provide for the wants and defence of the nation, and to secure its own existence according to its constitution. For this it must have at its command an army, and, if a maritime nation, a navy, and both large enough to force respect to its rights and interests, whether assailed from within or from without. With us the military is and must always remain subordinate to the civil power, and Congress has always the power to vote the number and supplies, so that the Executive can neither keep up nor move an army except according to law.

We have simply broached without exhausting a great subject. Personally we have never adopted the notions of

our peace societies, or had much faith in the mercantile principle, or principle of buying and selling, applied to national affairs. We believe the best way to preserve peace is to be always prepared for war; and we believe the money expended for the support of a respectable and efficient army and navy is profitably expended, even under the point of view of political economy. There is something else needed for a great people than the mere love of gain, or mere material prosperity. We place honor above money, and the love of glory above the love of wealth. Bred to a profession of peace, we love peace and follow after it; but we have always honored the military spirit, placed the soldier next to the priest, the hero next to the saint, and the soldier falling on the battle-field, bravely fighting for his country, next to the martyr burning at the stake for his faith, for his God.

---

ART. IV.—*Old and New: or, Taste versus Fashion.* By  
MRS. J. SADLIER. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co.  
1862. 16mo., pp. 486.

MRS. SADLIER does not write novels, properly so called, though she writes fiction and gives us love-stories; for she has always a purpose beyond that of simple art. She writes with a moral and religious aim rather than with a purely artistic aim, and her writings are to be judged by a moral and religious rather than by an artistic standard. Art deals only with the beautiful; morals and religion deal with the true and the good, of which the beautiful is simply the splendor. Art, since it realizes the beautiful, or embodies it in its creations,—since the beautiful is the splendor of the true and the good,—is, indeed, always, if genuine, more or less moral and religious in its effects; but it is so only indirectly, not by the direct aim or intent of the artist. He aims only at seizing and embodying the ideal beauty he sees before him, and which entrances his soul. When his direct aim is to inculcate a moral lesson, to illustrate a moral precept, to rebuke a vice, or to set forth and defend the truth, he leaves the field of art and becomes the preacher, the theologian, the moralist, or the philosopher, and his productions are to be judged by a moral and religious, a theological or philosophical, rather than by an artistic standard. We therefore

class Mrs. Sadlier's works as moral and religious works, not as works of pure art.

Among Mrs. Sadlier's numerous productions we are disposed to give the highest rank to the one before us, her latest publication that we have seen. It is not perfect under the relation of art, nor in grace and delicacy of style equal to some of her earlier works; and the author sometimes allows herself the use of colloquial, we were about to write *slang* phrases, which a more correct taste would have rejected. But in its aim, its design, its admirable moral lessons, and its just and noble sentiments, we think it can only add to her already enviable reputation. Its tone is elevated and healthy, and it cannot fail to do great good wherever it is read and heeded. It is the outburst of the indignation of an intelligent, sensible, and devout woman against the follies, foibles, absurdities, and extravagances of our modern fashionable, or would-be fashionable world. The author is an Irish woman, and writes chiefly for her own countrymen settled in America, especially in this great city of New York; but what she writes is no more applicable to them than to any other portion of our population, whatever its national origin. The feminine Gallaghers, Hackets, and Fogartys, described in the volume, may be found with good American and Anglo-Saxon names anywhere in New York, or in any other of our large towns and cities, and even in our villages and country neighborhoods. They are of no particular nationality, and are the natural production of every society made up in great part of *roturiers* and *parvenus*. The character of American society, especially in the Northern States; the general prosperity of the country; the rapidity with which private fortunes are made, and the ease with which persons born and bred in poverty and ignorance become rich, and gain consideration by their wealth and display, necessarily produce the evils of which Mrs. Sadlier complains, and the follies which she so keenly satirizes. They who have little education or breeding, and who have recently acquired wealth, or have not possessed it long enough to become accustomed to it, cannot be expected to have the grace, the ease, the high tone and polished manners of those who have always possessed wealth, been familiar with good society, and recognized as belonging to the gentry of a country. Wealth does not relieve the ignorant of their ignorance, nor the vulgar of their vulgarity; it only tempts them, and gives them the opportunity to



display both, on a wider theatre, and in a more offensive manner, than they could have done had they remained in the class in which they were bred and born.

American fashionable society is made up in great part of those, or the sons and daughters of those, who began life with little or no means, little schooling, and less acquaintance with high-bred society. They were low in their culture, in their tastes, and in their aims. The parents thought only of acquiring money, and of raising themselves and their families to a higher external position than that in which they themselves began life. They cannot train their children for that higher position, for they are themselves ignorant of what belongs to it; and they send them, at the earliest moment they are able, the daughters to some fashionable boarding-school, to acquire accomplishments and to be fitted for fashionable society; and the boys to some superficial college, where they learn little except to play tricks on the Faculty, and to despise their parents. They come home educated and accomplished, in their own estimation and that of their silly parents, and fitted for the highest social position. They know more, and suppose they have far juster notions of what belongs to conventional life than father or mother; and father and mother both concede it, and in reality go to school to their children. The government passes from the father, engrossed in his business, to Tom; and from the mother, conscious of her own lack of accomplishments, to Miss Fanny. Tom must smoke, drink, have fast horses and fast women; and Miss Fanny must have rich dresses, gorgeous furniture, splendid horses and carriage, with a liveried coachman, and brilliant parties, jams, balls, and routes, where may figure the Browns, the Greens, the Frosts and Winters, till the "Speculator's Bank," or the father's speculations, have failed, and there comes a crash, a break-down and a break-up, an auction, and—the scene closes.

Now that all this is vulgar, bad taste as well as bad morals,—fatal to all genuine society, as well as ruinous to the country itself,—no man of good sense and right feeling can doubt; but the remedy is hard to suggest, and still harder to be applied. The evil belongs in part to the newness, and in part to the politics of the country. America herself is a *parvenue*, and, to old civilized nations, what the greater part of American children are to their parents. We Americans are intoxicated with our sudden material prosperity, and we fancy ourselves wiser than all the world before us, and we

count as nothing worth the experience of the rest of mankind. We are sure we can manage things better than our fathers managed them. We do not believe in the necessity of the distinction of ranks, of an hierarchical organization of society; we will have all equal, and society organized on a dead level. When we commenced we were all comparatively equal, for we were nearly all equally poor, and we have dreamed that we might maintain our equality by providing facilities for all to become equally rich. It seems never to have occurred to us that if all are rich, all are poor. A man is rich, not by virtue of his possessions, but by virtue of his ability to buy labor. Give a man the estate of a Girard or a John Jacob Astor, and he would be a poor man if all others were too rich to sell their labor. Where there is no labor to be bought, every man must cultivate by his own labor his own field, gather his own harvest, cook his own dinner, groom his own horse, and black his own boots, and thus be no better off than the poor man. But having indulged our dream of equality, and having, when we were all equally poor, adopted it as the basis of our political order, we have endeavored to maintain it in society, at least to keep up the appearance of it.

The real wealth and culture of the country have come to be nearly as unequally distributed among us as in other countries; but we have steadily persisted in denying it. We have aimed, by a dishonest and ruinous credit system, to keep up the appearance of equality of wealth, as we had at first equality of poverty; by lowering the standard of education we have persuaded ourselves that all are educated; and by dispensing with good manners we conclude that we are all well bred, and fit to adorn the highest society. The whole system is based on a sham, and adds to the discomfort and misery of all classes. By the effort to keep up appearances, whether of wealth or fashion, the larger number fail to enjoy the competence they have, and the goods within their reach; become discontented with their lot, go beyond their capital, expend more than their income, and are dishonestly living on the means of others. By admitting into society all who can pay, out of their own or other people's pockets, the expense of social entertainments, these entertainments themselves are rendered unnecessarily showy and expensive, as well as deprived of their principal charm, arising from high social culture and refinement. We find there no polished ease, no repose or grace of manner. Good

taste loses itself in gorgeous display, good sense is inadmissible, effrontery takes the place of modesty, and vulgarity that of gentle breeding. In point of fact, American society has greatly deteriorated since the old colonial times, and it would be difficult to find in New York to-day the refined, polished, and really well bred society that could be easily met with before the Revolution. The Jason Newcomes have carried it over the Littlepages, the Mordaunts, the Morrisises, the Van Courtlandts, the Schuylers, and the Van Rensselaers, and Danbury has triumphed over New York and Albany. Relics of ante-revolutionary times, of the colonial gentry, may, no doubt, be found here and there; but they are comparatively few, and at each generation become more and more merged in the new society founded by democracy and the Newcomes.\*

In the Free States—we say nothing now of the other States—we have done our best to get rid of families, or to guard against their perpetuation. We have abolished entails and primogeniture, and passed statutes for the equal distribution of estates. We have reduced the nation to a nation of individuals, without homesteads or local attachments. Families become extinct with the third, usually with the second generation. The founder, a poor, low-minded, low-bred, industrious, hard-working, hard-hearted, scheming man, by fair means or foul, usually by foul means, amasses a fortune; his son, at farthest his grandson, squanders it, and the family is extinct. Exceptions, no doubt, there are, but this is the rule. Hence no families survive long enough to pass from the *nouveaux riches* to real gentry. The country thus lacks a model class, and therefore the school of high-breeding and simple, graceful, easy, and natural manners. Miss Fanny does the best she can with her boarding-school accomplishments, but she has no opportunity to overcome her inherent vulgarity, rendered only the more conspicuous by the wealth at her command.

We Americans console ourselves with the persuasion that this depression of the few is compensated by the elevation of the many, and the general diffusion of education and well-being. But it may be doubted if this supposed compensation be not as unreal as many other things on which

\**Vide* the Littlepage MSS., edited by James Fenimore Cooper. Cooper's later novels, though not wholly free from prejudice, should not only be read but studied by all our countrymen and countrywomen.



we pride ourselves. We do not believe that any thing can compensate for the loss of a real gentry, or, if you will, a permanent aristocratic class, based on family, wealth, education, and manners. An aristocracy of some sort there always will be in every country, however democratic may be its laws and institutions; and the most corrupt and corrupting of all possible aristocracies is that composed of bankers, brokers, and successful business men—in other words, the aristocracy founded on money alone, such as we have, and such as in England tries to rival the old hereditary aristocracy itself. France loses her chivalric sentiments, her elevated character, her fine social qualities, and her graceful and polished manners in proportion as her old nobility disappears, and the *bourgeoisie* take their place. In the absence of the Von Wiegels, the Montagues, and the Bellews, we must have the Gallaghers, the Hackets, and the Fogartys, successful butchers and grocers, and their vain, ignorant, heartless, and vulgar daughters. Moreover, as for the mass of our people, we doubt whether they have as much real enjoyment and well-being as the peasantry of Spain, France, Italy, or Austria. The rapidity and ease with which fortunes are acquired, or seemingly acquired, and the display which the poor become rich, or apparently rich, are able to make, spreads a general discontent through all classes, and causes every one to turn away with disgust from what he is or has, and to sigh and struggle for what he is not or has not. Wealth is the road to distinction, and all render themselves wretched either in trying to become or to appear rich.

The American idea, what our fathers sought to embody in our political and civil institutions, is grand, noble, eminently moral, eminently Christian; but our practical explication and application of it have been for the most part low, mean, contemptible, false, and mischievous. Our institutions, in themselves, are good enough, but the notions and theories under which we develop them, are false and erroneous. We have forgotten that all real progress is subject to the law of continuity,—develops and completes the past, but never breaks with it. The good the future realizes existed in germ in the past, and the progress consists in developing and maturing the germs the past deposited in society. We have forgotten that neither man nor society has any proper creative power, and have sought to create an absolutely new world for ourselves. Instead of laboring to develop and complete the past, we have done our best to

get rid of it. We would be a new people, marching in our own strength and by our own guidance. We have been ultra-Protestants, carrying out the error of the Protestant reformers to its last consequence. That error, as we never cease to repeat, was not in demanding or in laboring for reform, but in seeking reform by breaking the law of continuity, and severing themselves, as far as possible, from the past life of humanity. We reject the experience of past ages, which might and should serve us as a capital on which to commence business for ourselves, and insist on starting from nothing, without any capital at all. Our funds are all in the future, and we meet the demands of the present by discounting the future. We neglect the lights of experience, and grope our way in our own darkness. We are froward children, who will not submit to parental authority, and despise the good sense and experience of their parents.

The evils Mrs. Sadlier so clearly sees, so vividly portrays, and so justly deplores, are only the natural offspring of the false spirit of the country, of that almost universal contempt for experience and the wisdom of other nations of past ages. The whole spirit and tone of our people is wrong; and nearly all our peculiar notions of society, of politics, of what is the end of society and the means of securing them, are as erroneous and foolish as are those of Mr. Tom just home from college, or Miss Fanny just from the boarding school, concerning domestic government and the ends and objects for which rational existences have been created. As neither Mr. Tom nor Miss Fanny will be corrected by any parental admonition or advice, or by anything but the adversity which their folly is sure to bring, so we as a people can be corrected only by deep national sufferings, and the downfall of our false and hollow prosperity. This is wherefore we hope so much from the present troubles of our country, and regret so little the present civil war. All we fear is, that it will end too soon, and leave us uncorrected. Our present national life is a sham; we want it supplanted by real life, and our showy but false prosperity substituted by real prosperity, which, having its basis in the truth of things, may have some prospect of being permanent.

Mrs. Sadlier's plan did not require her to enter into a philosophical investigation of the evils she deplores, and to trace them to their causes, either in our country or in the modern world itself. She aimed only at indicating them as seen on the surface, and pointing her satire against them.

She gives us in Mrs. Tom Gallagher and her six daughters the picture of a vulgar family become rich, and seeking to lead the fashion; in William H. Fogarty, grocer, his wife Ellen, and their sons, she gives us the picture of a family become equally rich, but, except the daughter Julia, remaining plain and simple, without ostentation, or ambition to be prominent in fashionable society; and, finally, in Madam Von Wiegel and her daughter Bertha, Robert Murray and son and daughter, in Captain Bellew and Major Montague, she gives us a picture of what she regards as really well-bred people—people of good sense and good taste, well born and well educated, modest, simple, unassuming and unostentatious, because always accustomed to wealth and good society. These she sets off against the others, as Taste against Fashion. The best, most genial, and most interesting part of her book is that devoted to the Gallagher family. The father is a very worthy, honest butcher, who attends to his business and becomes rich. The mother is a quick, active, scheming, but withal a vain and silly woman, and a vain and silly mother. Her six daughters are home from the Convent, where they have been *finished*. The girls are good-looking and not naturally bad girls; but without any solid education, empty-headed, with a certain superficial polish, which is nearly all the good ladies of the Convent are required or permitted to give their pupils, especially from the families of butchers and grocers. Vain, silly, idle, and ambitious, they must have a brown-stone house in Fifth Avenue, or near it, carriage and horses, a liveried coachman, a box at the opera, and an infinity of fine dresses—parties, balls, and dapper beaux just from the band-box. The mother manages to get all these precious things for them, and for a time the aforesaid daughters and their silly mother are in the height of fashion, and would be happy, only there are others who can expend more and make a greater display, and the beaux are of the Brown and Green sort, mere waiters in Taylor's saloon, after all, or Frosts and Winters, mere rakes and gamblers. The catastrophe comes, is heart-rending, and the city mansion, horses and carriage, &c., have to be exchanged for a country cottage. Miss Fanny is glad to marry her father's clerk, and Mag and Ellie wear out a useless and weary life as grass-widows, with the vanity of dress clinging to them, and remaining the "ruling passion strong in death." The Fogartys, and the Hackets, a poorer family, but respecta-



ble, continued to remain plain people; and, not aspiring to rise above their sphere, continue to prosper, to be respected, and the parents are blessed in their children.

The Von Wiegels and their friends, the real gentry of the story, do well of course. Some of them are crossed in love, but the rest of the young people, after proper trials and misunderstandings and explanations, all come out right, marry to their liking, and return to Ireland, where all goes well with them. The part of the work devoted to these very worthy and agreeable people is not the part best done, and is, moreover, marred in its artistic beauty by a side design of the author. Bertha Von Wiegel, the daughter of a German father and an Irish mother, is a very good girl, an excellent daughter, and no doubt an accomplished lady, though rather stiff and prim; but we grow tired of her descriptions of old castles and Irish scenery, and her poetical quotations,—though all of rare merit in their way—when telling her mother the secret that weighs upon her heart and clouds her life with sorrow; for with all these, so admirably and poetically described, her mother, as an Irish lady, and as having resided with her husband in an old castle on the Rhine, was familiar before the innocent Bertha was born. Mrs. Sadlier knew all this; but besides the direct object of her work, she had another, and one which lies very near her heart,—that of winning love and respect for Ireland.

Mrs. Sadlier is an Irish lady residing in this city, and she has addressed her book, as we have said, chiefly to her countrymen and their children settled in America. She sees, or fancies she sees, in the Irish settled here, and in persons of Irish descent, a disposition to conceal their Irish nationality, as if it were something to be ashamed of. At this she justly takes fire, and wishes to show them, and force them to confess, that Ireland is a country of which they have every reason to be proud. The Scotsman, the Frenchman, the Englishman, the Italian, the Spaniard, the German, the Pole, the Swede, the Norwegian, settled here, never thinks of concealing his national origin, and always speaks of his mother country with love and respect. Why should it not be the same with the Irishman? Why should it be thought low and vulgar to be Irish, any more than to be English or French, Italian or Spanish, German or Swedish? She wishes her countrymen to love and honor their mother country, and to account it an honor to themselves to be of Irish origin; in other words, she wishes her

countrymen to cultivate a deeper, truer, and more genuine Irish patriotism. To this end she takes her real gentlemen and ladies, whom she contrasts with vulgar pretenders to fashion and elegance, from Ireland. She would show that not all that is Irish is low and vulgar; and she goes out of her way to sketch Irish castles, lakes, rivers, and mountains, in order to show that Ireland is a country, in its physical as well as in its moral features, of which her children may well be proud.

We applaud Mrs. Sadlier's motive, but she will pardon us if we intimate that we think her labor was quite unnecessary. We do not think the Irish generally are deficient in love and respect for their mother country, or are especially careful to conceal their national origin. One of the Bulwers says, the Englishman is proud of England because it belongs to him; the Frenchman is proud of himself because he belongs to France, *la grande nation*. The Irishman cannot be proud of Ireland in the Englishman's sense, for he is more disposed to seek the esteem of others than he is to be satisfied with simply esteeming himself; and he cannot be proud of himself because he belongs to Ireland, for, unhappily, Ireland does not belong to herself, but in great part to the stranger. He knows that were he to put on airs because he is an Irishman, and to boast of Ireland as *la grande nation*, he would be laughed at, and he can bear any thing better than that. Ireland, we all know, is a rich and noble island, deserving of all that her poets and orators have said of her; but does Ireland belong to the Irish? Alas! the Irish have a race, but it can hardly be said that they have a country. As a race they are distinct from the English, as a country they are merged in England, and they share renown as Englishmen, or subjects of England's Queen, rather than as Irishmen. Ireland has not her centre of life now in herself, and her real capital is London, not Dublin. Think you this has no effect on the life and spirit of the Irish people, especially when it has continued for generations? Grant that Ireland has had her glories; that her history is rich in heroes and heroic deeds; they are either so far back in the past that the world has forgotten them, or they are so mixed up with those of England that the world does not distinguish them, and regard them as distinctly Irish.

Ireland is now under a cloud, for she is in the process of transition from an independent nation to a nation united to another, and recovering her own national

life in union with a national life not her own. Scotland has become reconciled to the Union, and has recovered her nationality in, not out of the Union. Ireland has not yet done it. She still protests against the Union, and is able to live her true national life neither in the Union nor out of it. This transition state suffices to explain many of the anomalies noted in the Irish character, both at home and abroad. These anomalies do not belong to the Irish race, and spring only from their anomalous national condition, and must disappear with that condition itself. Yet we have never found the Irish wanting in love to their country, though we think their attachment is to the race rather than to the country. We think the Irish are generally proud of being Irish, though they may not always be proud of the position of Ireland among the nations of the earth. They would not willingly, if they could, be of another stock, but they would willingly see Ireland a real nation. We do not think it necessary to prove to the humblest Irishman that there are Irish gentlemen and ladies of wealth and breeding, of high birth and noble and refined manners, for all the world knows it; and an Irish gentleman or an Irish lady suffers by comparison with the gentleman or lady of no other nation, any more than the Irish peasantry suffer by a comparison with the peasantry of other lands. The Irish laborers and mechanics in this country suffer, if compared with the high-born and high-bred class, if such a class we have, but not when compared with American laborers and mechanics. So compared, and that is the only just comparison, they are neither low nor vulgar, ignorant nor stupid.

But even if the fact be as Mrs. Sadlier assumes, reasoning will not alter it. People are never reasoned into love and respect. The effort we make to convince others by argument that they ought to love and respect us generally tends to defeat itself. We should never have gained the reputation of being anti-Irish, had we never read any of the books, essays, and articles intended by their authors to make us love and respect Ireland and the Irish. There is in most of us an element of contradiction. The best way to secure love and respect is to let our character and our deeds speak for us; yet Mrs. Sadlier is right in saying, that the Irishman who shows that he loves and respects his mother country, gains instead of losing respect among Americans. We do not especially admire the Irishman who *guesses* with the Yankee or *reckons* with the Southron. He who loves not



the mother who bore him is not likely to be an affectionate son to the mother that adopts him.

We have given but a slight notice, after all, of Mrs. Sadlier's book, but we can assure her that we have read it with much pleasure and satisfaction, and commend it with a good conscience to the public, and hope her next work will be one we can commend with equal heartiness. American society is now in the furnace of affliction, and we hope it will come out purified, chastened, and ennobled. Generous natures are benefited by adversity; weak and pusillanimous natures are made worse by it, and we hope we are not of the latter. The American people, no matter of what national origin, we believe have generous and noble elements in their composition, but we have as yet made but slow progress in developing them; and we may now see, in the manner in which foreigners regard us in our afflictions, that we have hitherto exhibited our bad rather than our good qualities. Let us hope that we shall do better for the future.

---

ART. V.—*Annual Message of the President to both Houses of Congress.* Washington, December 1, 1862.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN's Message to the two Houses of Congress, at the opening of their present session, is a plain, straight-forward, dignified and important document, and in tone, spirit, and style, is decidedly superior to any of his previous Messages. In it, for the first time since his inauguration, he adopts and defines a policy, or proves that his government has a policy, whether a policy the country will approve or not. The great complaint has been that he has had no decided policy, and that he has appeared to be carried along by the course of events, without attempting to control them, and shape them to his purpose. This complaint can hardly hereafter be repeated.

Mr. Lincoln, in our judgment, committed a great mistake in the outset, in supposing that the American people believe practically in the democratic theory, and that he must administer the government on democratic principles—and that he must follow the people instead of leading them—obey the people instead of governing them. All government, in so far as government it is, is imperative, and no people look more to their Administration to shape a policy for them than the American. No matter how they talk through the jour-

nals, they expect the Administration to take the initiative. The present Administration erred from the first, in regarding itself as weak and without support in the affections and confidence of the people, and in fearing to adopt the bold and decisive measures the national crisis demanded, lest they should refuse to sustain it. It thought it must temporize, wait for the manifestation of public opinion, and labor to conciliate parties. The consequence has been that by its delays, its indecision, its half-way measures, now doing a little to gratify this party, and now a little to appease that party, it has lost the confidence of all parties, and found its friends and supporters almost everywhere beaten, and badly beaten in the late elections. Its supporters,—and its supporters are the supporters of the national cause,—are likely to be in the minority in the next Congress, and the national legislation will pass into the hands of the sympathizers with the authors of the Rebellion, on whose loyalty we fear we cannot count.

What the Administration has regarded as prudence, and what would have been prudence in ordinary times, when there are only the ordinary struggles of political parties for power or patronage to meet, we have regarded from the first as the greatest imprudence, in fact, a blunder. The question the Administration had to meet was not a political question, not a question as to what party should govern the country, distribute or share its patronage, but a question far above all party,—a question as to whether we are to have a country for any party to govern,—a question of national existence, in regard to which all loyal men, all men not traitors and rebels, were to be presumed to be of one mind. Whether they were so or not, the Administration should have assumed that they were, and boldly adopted and vigorously prosecuted the measures necessary to suppress the Rebellion and save the nation. Had it done so, it would have made them all of one mind, or at least have given their differences of opinion no opportunity to embarrass its action. Fear, doubt, hesitation, half-way measures,—now an advance, now a retreat, here a little and there a little,—cannot fail, in times of danger, to be most disheartening and disastrous. The wise administration adopts bold and vigorous measures, measures which confirm its friends and overawe its enemies. The people demand a bold, resolute, and confident leader, who acts as if he regarded himself as invincible, and when they find such a leader, they follow him without much thought as to whither he is likely to lead them. They follow him

who proves to them that he is likely to win. Mr. Lincoln had every advantage, if he had comprehended and been equal to his position. With a just cause, with men and money without stint at his command, and a power, derived from the immense patronage he had at his disposal, greater than any king, kaiser, or dictator ever wielded, he might have safely disregarded all party divisions and all differences of opinion, and could easily have carried with him the whole population of the country not in open rebellion to the government. He had no occasion to conciliate conflicting parties and to balance conflicting interests. He should by his boldness, promptness, and vigor have left no time for debate, no time for adverse parties to organize, and taken all minds and hearts by storm, not by the slow and zigzag approaches of a regular siege.

Unhappily, the spirit, or want of spirit, which has characterized the Administration, has affected the military operations of the country. Our generals have shown the same lack of enterprise, boldness, and vigor, the same timidity, over-caution, hesitation, indecision, and delays, that have marked the civil administration itself. We blame not our generals, for we had no right to ask or expect them to be superior to the administration they serve. If an administration wants its generals to be bold, prompt, and energetic, it must be so itself. The army will always partake of the feebleness and indecision, or of the boldness and vigor of the Administration; and the Administration may always have brave, enterprising, and successful generals at the head of its army, if it proves itself worthy of them. Our generals, in their lack of enterprise, in their failure to attack or to follow up their attacks, in uniformly giving the enemy time and opportunity, after a defeat, to recover and more than recover from its effects before renewing the attack, have only followed the example of the Administration itself, and Mr. Lincoln, as the Administration, is, and will be held, responsible for all our military blunders and failures, for our military inefficiency, and the rapid frittering away of our armies.

But it is of little use to dwell on these things now. If Mr. Lincoln had been a genius or a hero, or if he had listened to the men really in earnest to put down the rebellion and save the nation, and had appealed by his vigorous measures to the living, patriotic, loyal sentiment of the country, and given no heed to the advice or opinions of those whose sympathies were with the Rebels, or whose disloyal conduct had



involved the country in its troubles, he would have preserved the enthusiasm which broke out all over the loyal States immediately after the attack on Sumter, and restored peace to the country before this. But he let the golden opportunity pass by, and the measures which would have been effectual, if adopted in season, can now do us little good. "It is not true," said Napoleon, *à propos* of the 18th Brumaire, "that the troops fired blank cartridges on the people. It would have been inhuman to have done so." The instant and complete emancipation of all the slaves in the whole United States, as a war measure, immediately after the first battle of Bull Run, with the assurance of reasonable compensation to loyal owners, would have been effectual, and speedily ended the war. The proclamation of the President on the 22d of last September, threatening to emancipate the slaves in such States and parts of States as should be in rebellion on the first day of the present month, coming when and in the form it did, was fitted only to exasperate the South, and to give strength and expression to the pro-slavery feeling at the North. The friends of the Administration could not defend it. The President could not proclaim the emancipation of the slaves except under the pressure of military necessity; and what sort of military necessity is that, it may be asked, which admits a delay of a hundred days? If Congress, or even the President, had proclaimed their freedom when General Fremont issued his modest proclamation, the whole population of the non-slaveholding States would have acquiesced, offered no opposition, and perhaps have really approved it. Political leaders, unless in the Border States, could have made no capital out of it against the Administration. The hesitation and delay of the Administration, its backing and filling, gave time for discussion, for parties to form, opposition to organize, so that the proclamation, threatening a partial emancipation, when it came, created no enthusiasm among the friends of the Administration, and gave new strength to its enemies; nobody was pleased with it but those few who wish the war to be prosecuted primarily for the abolition of slavery, and, if the slaves are liberated, care for little beyond. These found in it ground to hope that slavery would finally be abolished, but scarcely a man saw in it any military advantage sufficient to justify the extraordinary exercise of executive power. So it has been with nearly all the measures of the Administration. They have either been half-way measures, sufficient

to embolden enemies without winning friends, or they have been delayed and discussed till the time when they would amount to something had passed by.

The slavery question, just as it ceases to be the most pressing question, is apparently made the most prominent question by the Administration. It is the leading topic of the President's Message. We have no intention of reviving the discussion of the question in these pages. We have discussed it at full length under its political, military, social, moral, and theological aspects, and may for the present leave it where we left it in our article last October on *Slavery and the Church*. Whether the President will issue another proclamation, giving effect to his proclamation of the 22d of last September, we have no means of knowing at the time we are writing, but the chances are that he will. But, if he does, we doubt whether the courts will sustain the freedom of the slaves he thus declares to be emancipated. We doubt not the power of the President to emancipate the slaves under the rights of war, as a measure necessary to the military operations of the government; but we do doubt if the courts will recognize this proclamation as having been issued under the rights of war, from the pressure of military necessity. Its being issued as a *threat* only, and allowing a delay of a hundred days before any emancipation can follow, looks to us more like a measure intended to *punish* the Rebels, should they not lay down their arms and return to their allegiance before a given time, than as a measure prompted by military necessity, especially as the Proclamation was issued on the heels of what was declared to be a decisive victory over the Rebel army at Antietam. We are disposed to think the courts will declare it unconstitutional and void. We thought so when it was first issued, and the more we have reflected on it since, the more have we been confirmed in this opinion. We see not how its constitutionality can be sustained.

The President seems himself, if we may judge from his Message, to attach no importance to his proclamation, and to regard it as a sort of *fulmen brutum*, issued to appease the anti-slavery party. He lays little or no stress on it, and urges three Amendments to the Constitution, authorizing the government to give compensation to the States that will free their slaves on or before the first day of January, 1900, as, in his judgment, the great and decisive measure that is to end the war. To giving a reasonable compensation to loyal

slaveholders for the loss of the property which the law gives them in slaves, we have no objection; nay, it is only just and right, and we are quite willing that the nation should buy up and set free all the slaves in the country; and if that would end the war and restore the Union, we would hold up both hands to have it done. But we hold that Congress can, without any amendment of the Constitution, do it as a war measure, if it judges proper; and with emancipation as a peace measure, we desire to have nothing to do till peace is restored. If, in its judgment, the emancipation of the slaves, with compensation to loyal owners, is necessary as a war measure, either for prosecuting or ending the war, Congress has ample power, under the rights of war, to adopt it, and bind the nation to it, and the proposed amendments to the Constitution are unnecessary.

The President assures Congress that the measure, if adopted, will put an end to the war, and restore union, peace, and harmony to the country. He speaks as if he regarded this as beyond question. Does he merely echo the opinion of Border State politicians, or does he speak from some information on the subject not accessible to the public? Has the Administration a new policy? or is it merely reviving the policy of securing the Border States, and letting the extreme Southern States remain out of the Union till they see proper to ask to be readmitted? Is there any connection between the measure proposed by the President, and the offer of mediation by the Emperor of the French? Is there an understanding between the two governments, that, if Congress will take the necessary steps to alter the Constitution, so as to secure gradual emancipation, the Emperor will use his good offices with the Confederacy, to induce them to lay down their arms? Or is it a measure intended to ward off intervention, and to gain time for fighting out between ourselves alone our own quarrel? We confess that we do not quite understand the confidence of the President in the efficiency of his proposed policy. We suspect he counts by it on securing the Border States, and, having secured them, he can afford to wait for the gradual acquiescence of the other States; or, perhaps, that they of their own accord will accept the proffered compensation, lay down their arms, and return to their allegiance!

For our part, we place little reliance on the proposed policy, because we do not believe that slavery is the sole matter of difference between the United States and the rebels.



We believe the Southern States, at least the Southern statesmen and politicians, have seceded because they want no union with the Free States, unless on such conditions that the ruling power shall be in the States which are now Slave States. They have not rebelled because they have apprehended danger to their slave property from Northern abolitionists, but because they would not belong to a country ruled by the Northern democracy, Northern "mudsills," as they have called them. The protection of slave property and the prevention of the negro citizenship, or negro equality, were pretexts used to secure the co-operation of the Southern democracy, or non-slaveholding whites, the real people of the South, and in whom lies the real strength of the Southern Confederacy. We believe, therefore, that the men who have made the Rebellion would be as averse to union with us after as before emancipation and compensation. We do not believe the Rebellion can be put down and the Union restored by any measures short of the decided military success of the national arms. Both parties have appealed to arms, and it is only by arms the differences between them can be settled. The Rebellion must conquer the Government, or the Government must conquer the Rebellion. We see no alternative; and we regard the slavery question or the negro question of importance now, only in its bearing on our military operations. The parties are on the ground; each has taken its position; and the duel must be fought out, till one or the other party falls. We think, therefore, the Administration would do well to confine itself more exclusively to the work of securing a military triumph over the rebels, and trouble itself less about the means of making them friends after it has beaten and dispersed their armies. "To cook a hare, first catch a hare," says the immortal Mrs. Glass.

But aside from this, how does the President expect to secure for his proposed amendments to the Constitution the ratification of the constitutional number of States? For their adoption it is necessary that they should pass Congress by a two-thirds vote of each House, and be subsequently ratified by the legislatures or by conventions of three-fourths of all the States. It may be doubted whether they can secure the requisite congressional vote; but supposing they do, they must still have the ratification of twenty-five States, if we accept the theory of the Government, that no State has seceded from the Union, and that the whole thirty-four,

with all their rights as States, are still in the Union. To secure twenty-five States, seven Slave States, at least, must be obtained. The President probably counts on Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia; but even if he obtains these, and all the Free States, then he will lack two States to make up the constitutional three-fourths. Now, where are there two additional Slave States to be found that will or can vote on the question? Besides these, all the Slave States are in rebellion, and their legislatures as much in rebellion as any other portion of the population. Does the President expect his amendments to be approved by the rebellious legislature of a single Slave State, or by a convention called by a rebel legislature? If not, how is he to get for his amendments the ratification of three-fourths of all the States? Save the five Slave States, there is no Slave State not in rebellion, and we are far from conceding that the Wheeling government is constitutionally the State of Virginia. The real State government, elected by the political people known as Virginia, is as much in rebellion as the State government of South Carolina. There is, then, while the Rebellion lasts, and till the rebellious State governments return to their allegiance, no way, on the Government theory, of getting any amendments to the Constitution constitutionally adopted, unless five or six new States can be manufactured out of the Territories and admitted into the Union.

We hope the President does not intend to recognize as the State of Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, or Louisiana, the military government he has himself constituted or proposes constituting in each of the several territories so named. That military government is not the State, is no State at all, and has no power to bind the State, and certainly none to give, directly or indirectly, the assent of the State to amendments of the Federal Constitution. Whatever authority it has is by virtue of military law, and it can have none when the civil authority resumes its sway, or is re-established. The amendments may be ratified by conventions of the people of the several States, instead of the legislatures, if Congress so prescribes; but the convention, to be legal and binding on the people of the State, must be called by the State authority, and cannot be called by the President, or even by Congress. It was never the intention of the Convention that framed the Constitution, that amendments to that instrument might be adopted by

the people, irrespective of State organization or State authority. There is, we hold, one political people of the United States, in whom inheres the national sovereignty; but this one people expresses its will through State organizations, and cannot, as the Constitution now stands, express it otherwise. Representatives are representatives of *States*, as the Senators, or of certain congressional districts of *States*, as in the case of Representatives in Congress, and not representatives of a certain population, irrespective of State organization and State authority. Now, the military government established by the President in a State, does not hold from the State, and in no sense represents it; it holds directly from the President, and therefore has no State authority, and can neither itself give the assent of the State, or call a convention competent to give it, to any amendments of the Federal Constitution.

We repudiate the doctrine that maintains that the powers of the Federal Government are derived by delegation from the States, as free, sovereign, independent States; and hold that they are derived by delegation from the one political people called the United States. But at the same time we hold, while the sovereignty is in the one political people of the United States, that it delegates the powers it wills the Federal Government should exercise only through State organizations, and, without altering the constitution this people has ordained, it cannot do otherwise. It is in this way we justify the term *federal*, applied to the General Government, and reconcile States' rights with full, indefeasible, national sovereignty. To take the assent of the people of a State, not convened by State authority, as the assent of the State itself, is to supersede the State, and is not only unconstitutional, but revolutionary. To take as the State a government established by the United States, is a direct violation of our Federal system, would annihilate the very idea of State rights, and convert our political system into that of complete and undisguised democratic centralism, to be followed at no distant day by a monarchical centralism or monarchical absolutism. We assert most vehemently that the United States, though unhappily lacking a proper name, is, in the strictest sense of the word, a free, sovereign, independent nation; but we assert, with equal vehemence, the Federal character of the government, which does not create, but is created by the United States, and the constitutional rights of the several States. We oppose secession, because,



it strikes at the unity and indivisibility of the nation, and places the sovereignty in the State, not in the nation. We therefore call secession rebellion, and make war on it as such. But we are not willing, for the sake of putting down the rebellion, to sacrifice the rights of the States or our Federal system. The States hold their rights from the sovereign political people of the United States, but not from the Federal Government,—a real government indeed, but a limited government, having only the express powers delegated in the Constitution. The Federal Government has received no power to improvise or impose a State government. The most it can do is to institute a Territorial government, to govern a certain territory as territory under the Union, not as a State in the Union. The action of the people of the territory of Tennessee, Louisiana, Florida, North Carolina, or Virginia, under a military government established by the Federal Executive or by Congress, may be lawful, but it is not and cannot be the action of the State, or of the people as the State. Any assent given by them to the amendments proposed to the Constitution, would be worth no more than the assent given, say, by New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Nebraska, or Dakota.

We dwell the longer on this, for we see, or think we see, in the policy of the government in regard to Virginia, and the orders issued, or said to be issued by certain military governors, acting by its authority alone, for the election of members of Congress, the germs of a most dangerous and deplorable revolution, almost as much so as that of secession itself. A State is one and indivisible. The State is either in rebellion or it is not; if in rebellion, it is the whole State, not a part of it, and the doctrine of the President in his proclamation, that a part of the State may be in rebellion and part not, is inadmissible. If the State is not in rebellion, then the President has no right to supersede it, or set at naught its authority, by intruding a government of his own creation, instead of the regularly elected State government. The administration has officially declared that no State has seceded, that no State is out of the Union, that no State, as a State, is in rebellion, but all are in the Union and entitled to be treated as States, not simply as territories. By what authority then does it appoint Andrew Johnson Governor of Tennessee, Colonel Hamilton Governor of Texas, Mr. Phelps Governor of Arkansas, Eli Thayer Governor of Florida, Edward Stan-

ley Governor of North Carolina, and Colonel Shepley of Louisiana? The population and territories designated by these names are either States in the Union or they are not. If they are, these so-called governors are intruders, without legal or constitutional authority; for it is essential that the State should choose its own officers, and there is no authority in the President or in Congress to appoint a single State officer, not even a constable. If they are not States in the Union, then they have neither the right to ratify amendments to the Constitution, nor to elect members of Congress. If the theory of the government, that no State has seceded or is out of the Union, be true, the President, in appointing these governors, is guilty of a flagrant usurpation of power, and a gross revolutionary measure, for which he should be impeached; if not true, then to admit persons elected by the people of those territories to seats in Congress, would be illegal and unconstitutional, for only States or the people of States in the Union can be represented in Congress.

The administration proceeds, apparently, on the assumption that it has the right to treat the loyal people of a territory in the Union as the State. Its assumption is, undoubtedly, correct, if a State they are. But population and territory do not constitute a State, otherwise all our territorial governments would be States in the Union. Population and territory are conditions *sine qua non* of a State, but do not of themselves constitute a State, and by no means a State in the Union. There is no State without a political and civil organization of some sort. Take that away and you take away the State. All under our system the government can do, when rebellion has carried away the political and civil organization, is to recognize in the loyal population of the territory the capacity to reorganize or reconstitute the State, and, when so reorganized or reconstituted, to admit them as a State into the Union. This is the most it can do, and it may be doubted if it can do as much as this. But while this loyal population remains without State organization, the government cannot treat it as the State, nor can it organize it and make it a State by officers appointed by itself, for officers of its appointment represent no State authority, and can perform no State function; and it is essential to our State system that the people of the given territory should form and adopt their own constitution and elect their own officers.

It is because the State is essentially in its organization, its constitution, by which it is made a political and civil entity, and because the population and territory belong to the United States, and to the State only while it is in the Union, that we have maintained, after Senator Sumner, that State rebellion is State suicide, in opposition to the theory of the administration. The loyal portion of a State, if they retain the State organization, are the State, though the greater part of the population are in insurrection or armed rebellion; but not otherwise. The State follows the organization. The population and territory called Virginia are not population and territory in the Union, for the *State* of Virginia has gone out of the Union, and carried them out of the Union with her. The State of Virginia could go out of the Union, or withdraw from the Union, because it was she herself, not the Union, that made her a State, and the State was *in* not *under* the Union. So far the secessionists are right, and secession is only the assertion of a State's independence. Hence, too, in a certain sense, they are right who deny to the Union the right to coerce a State. You cannot coerce a seceding State back into the Union. That is clear enough. The mistake is in supposing that the State can take the population and territory, not out of the Union, for that it can do, but out of the dominion or jurisdiction of the United States. The *State* of Virginia could take the State out of the Union, but she could not take the population and territory out of the dominion of the United States, because they belonged to her only while she remained a State in the Union. The population and territory are in the Union only after their organization and admission as a State, but before that they belonged as population and territory to the United States, and were under its jurisdiction. They belong to the State only while the State is in the Union, and revert to the United States the moment the State goes out of the Union, for in the United States is the national sovereignty. But as there is no State without population and territory, the moment the State goes out of the Union she ceases to exist, and therefore her act of secession is simply her suicide as a State. The State having by her own act ceased to exist, cannot be coerced any more than a dead man, and the purpose of coercion is not to force the seceded State back into the Union, but to reduce the rebellious population inhabiting territory belonging to the United States to their allegiance.

The error of the government is in denying that a State



can secede, and assuming that the States are all still living in the Union, and that only the population has seceded; the error of the secessionists is not in maintaining that the State can secede, and, in seceding, carry both her population and territory out of the Union, for that it may do; but in asserting that in carrying them out *of the Union*, it carries them *out of the dominion, or beyond the jurisdiction of the United States*. This error arises from the assumption for the State of absolute sovereignty, and therefore that the population and territory belong to the State absolutely, and not simply on condition that it remains a State in the Union. It is the error of a logical, that of the government is the error of an illogical mind. Grant the United States are not a nation, that the people of the United States are not one sovereign political people, and grant further that the sovereignty vests in the State, and that the Union has been formed by the States, each acting in its sovereign capacity, and the doctrine of the secessionists is strictly logical and true, and we are as wrong as they allege us to be in the war we are carrying on against them. But we deny their premises. We maintain that the United States are a nation, and that the sovereignty vests in the one political people, called, for the want of a proper name, THE UNITED STATES; and therefore the State is not a sovereign state, and possesses dominion over population and territory only as one of the United States, and not at all as a seceded, separated, or disunited State. The population and territory are integral in the population and territory of the nation, and inseparable from the national population and domain, save by violence or national consent. The secession of the State places the population and territory out of the Union indeed, but in precisely the same position, save their rebellion, they would have been in, had they never been organized as a State and existed in the Union. They are foreign to the Union, but not foreign to the nation, or withdrawn from its authority. They remain as population and territory, under, not in, the Union, as do the population and territory of the United States never yet erected into States and admitted into the Union.

We make a distinction between the sovereign people and the government, and between the *Union* and the *nation*. The one sovereign political people is not created by the Federal Constitution, but precedes it, and frames, ordains, and establishes it. The government has only delegated

powers, it is true, but those powers are delegated by the sovereign people of the United States, not by the States, or the people of the States severally. The sovereign political people and the Union are practically identical. The Constitution does not make the Union, but the Union makes the Constitution. Yet the Union is not commensurate with the population and territory of the nation, or the United States. The Union is restricted to the population and territory organized into States; the nation embraces the whole population and territory of the United States. The political power of the Union extends over the whole, but is possessed and can be exercised only by the States or people in the Union; and the power is restricted to the population and territory included in the States united, as political power in ancient Rome was restricted to the possessors of the sacred territory marked and bounded by the god Terminus. It is possible, then, to belong to the Union without being in the Union, and to get out of the Union without getting out of the jurisdiction of the United States. Those who get out of the Union cease to have any political power or rights in or out of the Union, for they no longer make a part of the sovereign political people of the United States; but though they lose their rights, the United States or the Union does not lose its right to reduce them to obedience to its authority, by force of arms even, if necessary, as it may do with the population of any organized or unorganized territory within its geographical boundaries.

The government has not distinctly asserted this doctrine, and seems even to deny it. It seems to suppose a *tertium quid* between it and that of the secessionists is possible; or perhaps it persuades itself that no uniform and consistent doctrine on the subject is necessary, and that it may take, now the doctrine of national sovereignty, and now that of State sovereignty, as best suits its immediate purpose; in which it, very likely, conforms to the confused notions of a large number of our politicians, who are not unaccustomed to speak with stammering lips and a double tongue, contradicting in one breath what they assert in the next. But, as far as we can judge, the doctrine we attempt to set forth is the only one on which the administration can justify the war it is waging, or defend its institution of military governments in the territories of the seceded States. If the States were still in the Union as States, these governments, we have said, would be illegal and revolution-

ary. If they are not, the institution of these governments does not bring them back and reconstitute them *States* in the Union, or clothe them with any of the rights or powers of States. Consequently, they have no power to assent to the proposed amendments to the Constitution, and no right to be represented in Congress. The persons sent from so-called Districts in Virginia, Tennessee, Louisiana, Florida, or North Carolina, may be good men and true, but they can have no legal right to sit and vote in Congress.

The fact that each House is made by the Constitution the judge of the election and qualifications of its members, does not affect this question; for what the House judges, is, whether the postulant for a seat has the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, and has been elected in accordance with and under the laws of the State and of the United States. The postulant may have received the requisite number of votes, but that does not entitle him to a seat, unless he has received them at an election legally held and legally conducted: and in no seceded State is a legal election now possible. The Congressional district must be established and the qualification of voters must be determined by State authority, and cannot be by Federal authority; and Federal authority is the only authority in the territory. Federal authority cannot, under our Constitution, create a State. That must be done by the people themselves of the territory, under an enabling act; and the State is inchoate, and without any authority or political right, till it is admitted by vote of Congress into the Union. Till the people become a State, they can elect no representatives; and, till the State is admitted into the Union, and made one of the United States, the members elect cannot take their seats. What we want understood, is, that the whole political power of the nation is in the United States, and in the State as one of the *United States*. The people outside of the State have no political power,—are under, not a part of, the sovereign people; and, therefore, if the House finds that the applicant has not been elected by the people of a State, under the laws and authority thereof, they cannot admit him to a seat.

We dwell upon this, because we regard it of vital importance to our Federal system, and to the legality of the acts of Congress. Congress has been greatly to blame in this matter, in not resisting the policy of the administration when it first developed itself in the case of Western Virgi-



nia. It should never have recognized, even for an instant, the revolutionary government at Wheeling as the State of Virginia. It is notoriously not Virginia. There has long been manifested by the American people a great indifference to legal methods of doing things. If the thing they want done is but done, they care little whether it is done according to law or in violation of law. It need surprise no one that we have a civil war,—that even the loyal States are overrun with traitors, and even *loyal* men have no scruples in preying on the government to the extent of their ability. The government is not true to itself, and how can it expect the people to be true to it? We acquit the President and Congress of all revolutionary intentions, or design of usurping unconstitutional power for the Federal Government; we believe the acts we complain of grow out of the general misapprehension of popular sovereignty, or the confounding of the people as population with the people as the State, and the general disregard of law when it would restrain us from carrying our ends. If we mean to remain a nation, a well-ordered, civilized nation, we must clear up our ideas, and learn to respect law when it restrains as well as when it authorizes. When the nation is in danger, we cannot indeed be over-scrupulous as to the means to be adopted to save it, but in the hour of extremest peril, it is just as easy to save it in a legal and constitutional as in an illegal and unconstitutional way. There has been, since the commencement of our troubles, no occasion for the government to transcend its constitutional powers, or to adopt or sanction any irregular proceedings. It would have saved it infinite trouble if it had adopted in the beginning the true doctrine, and conformed to it in its treatment of the population and territory of the seceded States; and Congress ought to have adopted General Ashley's Bill for declaring the seceded States to have lapsed, and erecting the population and territory into territories under governments established by Federal authority. But, unhappily, the government flattered itself with the hope that by blockading the ports, raising a large army, and pressing the rebels a little and threatening them much, it could induce the seceded States themselves to resume their attitude as loyal States in the Union, and all would go on again as if nothing had happened. It deceived itself; its hopes have not been realized.

The government, in both the executive and legislative departments, ought to have looked the question at first

directly in the face, and met it fairly and squarely, by declaring the lapse of every seceding State government, and establishing for its territory a territorial government, under, not in, the Union; it could then have proceeded regularly and legally, both in appointing military governors under its own authority, and in reducing the rebellious population to their allegiance to the United States. As it is, all is irregular, unconstitutional, and revolutionary—in direct opposition to our whole system of government. The military governors would then have been governors of territories, and bound only to carry out the laws enacted or recognized by Federal authority. Now they are neither governors of territories nor of States, and are in a position legally and politically anomalous. It is, perhaps, not too late for the government to retrace its steps, and do what it should have done in the beginning, that is, recognize and act according to the law and the facts of the case;—in other words, simply own and tell the truth, and place no longer any reliance on falsehoods or shams. The seceded States exist neither *de jure* nor *de facto* as States in the Union, and it is simply a falsehood to assert that they are. If as States they are out of the Union, their population and territory are out of the jurisdiction of the Union, or they are not. If they are, that ends the question, and you have no right to make war on them as rebels, and, perhaps, are yourselves the aggressors; if they are not, and you have the right to use force to reduce them to submission to your authority, then treat them as population and territory belonging to the United States and not erected into States; provide Territorial governments for them, and govern them as you do Nebraska, Dakota, Colorado, or New Mexico. Be truthful, and deal with things as they are, and rely on truth to sustain you. Truth is never made stronger by a modicum of falsehood, any more than honesty is strengthened by dishonesty.

The President would find this straight-forward and truthful proceeding greatly facilitating the adoption of his emancipation policy. According to our doctrine eleven States have committed suicide, or lapsed, and the whole number of the United States is now twenty-three, and, counting Western Virginia, admitted by Congress while we write, twenty-four, and the number necessary to ratify a constitutional amendment is eighteen, and it is possible that the President might obtain that number for his proposed amendments; but twenty-five States, the number he supposes to be necessary,

he can never obtain, for there are not that number of United States now in existence,—since, we repeat, the military governments he has established, or the population acting under them, are not *States*, and are, if any thing, *Territories*, and in the present case Territories organized by the executive without the authority of Congress. The amendments ratified by eighteen States would be constitutionally adopted, for the whole political power of the nation vests in the United States, or people as States in the Union. They would bind the people of the seceded States when restored to the Union, as a new State admitted into the Union is bound by the Constitution adopted and in force prior to its admission; and they would be subject to the amended Constitution before such restoration, in like manner as the Territories are subject to the Union.

Of course it is not as a punishment upon the seceders that we insist on treating the seceded States as having lapsed, but for the simple purpose of treating things as they really are. The Union has no power to expel or extinguish a State, and the lapse is not by virtue of its act, but by virtue of the suicidal act of the State itself. By ceasing to be a State in the Union, it ceases to be a State at all. We regret, we deplore its lapse; but it, not the Union, is responsible for it. Nor do we contemplate the perpetual existence of the people, who have been so misguided as to declare themselves out of the Union, as Territories under the Union, or as the population of a State excluded from the elective franchise. We hope at an early day to see them re-established under their old names, and with their old boundaries as States in the Union, on a footing of perfect equality with the States that have remained loyal. Eleven stars have fallen from our political firmament, as the angels fell from heaven; but, unlike Lucifer and his rebel hosts, they may be restored, and we look to see them restored, and to shine anew with all their pristine brightness and glory. They must, however, undergo the purgation of territorial governments first, and it will depend almost entirely on themselves, whether it shall be of longer or shorter duration. We are moved by no hostile feelings toward the people of the lapsed States; we are moved only by our love of the nation, devotion to our country, and respect for the Constitution and laws.

But to return to the President's Emancipation policy. We repeat, that in itself we are not opposed to it, and even like it; but we do not see how, if adopted, it is to give us



military success or put an end to the war. We are as earnest for the emancipation of the slaves as any man is or can be, but we seek it only as subsidiary to the military operations of the country. We say frankly, that with our military success hanging doubtful, the treasury well nigh bankrupt, the people taxed to the full point of public endurance, and the expenses of the nation running up at the rate of a thousand millions of dollars a year, we are not in favor of imposing on the treasury any additional burdens not absolutely necessary. Not believing the President's policy would have the slightest influence in shortening the war, we are not in favor of adopting it. It is simply a policy of the border States, to sell their slaves before they run away, or to get pay for them after they have emancipated themselves. If the rebels will signify to us, say through the British minister, that in case the government will adopt the policy proposed, they will lay down their arms, restore to the United States its forts and arsenals, which they still hold, make restitution for the property they have taken from the Union, pay the legitimate expenses of the war, and return to their allegiance, we will entertain the project, and recommend the government to buy up and liberate, at a fair valuation, in the way and manner proposed by the President, all the slaves, if any such there are, within the geographical limits of the United States. But without such assurance, or at least the assurance that they will accept the proposition and return to their allegiance, it seems to us the project should not be entertained for a moment. The border States men may accept the proposition, and honestly believe that the rebels will; but they have, as has been sufficiently proved, no authority to speak for the rebel leaders, and we have already suffered enough from their policy.

If the doctrine we maintain, and on which the government acts, even while denying it, be sound, there are, except in the non-seceding slave States, no slaves within the geographical limits of the United States to be bought up and emancipated. Except as to the border non-seceding slave States, the President's policy is a pro-slavery rather than an anti-slavery policy. Its adoption would re-establish and prolong negro slavery where it has already ceased to have any legal existence. The eleven seceded States having lapsed as States, and being no longer States in the Union, but territorial possessions of the Union, slavery, which existed in them solely by virtue of State authority, has neces-

sarily lapsed with them. The lapse of a State carries with it whatever depended on the State for its life and vigor. In these eleven States the slaves are emancipated by the voluntary death of the State; and as the act by which they were emancipated was an act of hostility to the Union, the United States is under no obligation to indemnify their former owners for their loss of property in them.

But it is said that the territorial law, after a change of sovereignty, remains in force till altered or repealed by the new sovereign. Thus the territory we acquired from France and Spain was held to be governed by the civil law of those countries till we enacted new laws for its government. The rule is unquestionable, but does not apply in the case of a Federal State lapsed by its own act; because, though a change of status, it involves no change of sovereignty. The States in our system are, severally, autonomous, but not sovereign. The true territorial law which survives the State is not, and never was, the law of the State, but the law of the United States; and as that law never authorized or sanctioned slavery, save as an institution deriving all its force from the enactments or usages of the State, there can be no territorial law, or law of the land, surviving the lapse of the State to authorize or to render licit the holding of slaves. But, even conceding that the principle that the territorial law survives the sovereign, and remains in force till the new sovereign ordains to the contrary, applies in the present case, as in that of the lapse of originally sovereign States, these eleven States having lapsed and fallen into the condition of Territories of the United States, their slaves are free by virtue of the act of Congress at its last session, prohibiting forever slavery in any of the Territories of the United States, thus making liberty, not slavery, the territorial law of the United States, or law of the land. Does the President propose to remand the freedmen to slavery, and then tax the Federal treasury to buy them up and emancipate them over again? That these States have fallen into the condition of Territories we have proved, and the government, even if it denies it, assumes it to be a fact, by establishing governments for them, for these so-called military governments are simply territorial governments, if they are any thing.

Then, again, what becomes of the President's proclamation of the 22d of last September? Is that to be recalled, and no slave to be freed under it? Or is it proposed

to pay for the slaves liberated under it? or are those liberated under it to be remanded to slavery, and held in bondage till the restored States are willing to emancipate them, on receiving compensation twenty or thirty years in advance from the Union? Out of the slave States remaining in the Union, there is no slavery by virtue of any law now in force, State or national; and the President's policy, if it means any thing beyond the loyal border States, is simply a policy to remand the freed persons to slavery, with a view of having the States emancipate them gradually with compensation from the Federal treasury. It may be good policy to offer compensation to loyal men in the seceded States for the loss of slaves by the acts of the Rebels, but certainly there is no obligation in justice to do it. The United States are no more bound to compensate the loyal men for their loss of property in slaves, than they are for their loss in horses and mules, hogs and turkeys, by the action of the Rebels. Does the government propose to indemnify the loyal men in the Rebel States for all the losses of property they have sustained by the action of the Rebels and their government?

But passing over this, there is one feature in the President's policy that should not be overlooked. His amendments, if adopted, will not authorize the Federal Government to free a single slave, nor will they render certain emancipation in a single State. They only authorize Congress to provide and determine the mode for compensating a State for its slaves in case it chooses to emancipate them. The power to emancipate the slaves will remain, as now, with the State, and it will continue to be, as now, optional with the State, whether it will emancipate them or not. We commend this fact to the consideration of anti-slavery men. The President's policy contemplates issuing bonds, with interest, to the State before a single slave is actually emancipated. A State may pass a law emancipating all the slaves within its limits, and obtain its compensation bonds for ten, twenty, thirty, a hundred, five hundred, or ten hundred millions of dollars, according to the number and valuation of the slaves, and on the last day of 1899, the State may pass another law making slavery perpetual, and the expenditure of the Union goes for nothing. But in that case the State must return the bonds and pay back the interest received. All very well, to tax the people some three, four, or five millions annually



for the benefit of Kentucky or Missouri, and not get the liberation even of a single slave. But suppose the State says it can't or it won't pay back the interest received. What will you do then? Compel it? But suppose the State answers, If you attempt compulsion we will secede; and suppose you have the whole fifteen slave States in the same condition; what would you have, but the present rebellion over again? We wish to think well of the President, and we do believe in his integrity and patriotism; but we fear he has been duped, and induced to lend his support, without understanding it, to one of the most stupendous swindles on the government ever contemplated in this or any other country. We honestly believe it nothing but a scheme for depleting our already over-depleted Federal treasury,—for mortgaging the whole income of the free States to the slave States. We commend this feature of the policy to the tax-paying portion of the community.

We did not intend to enter thus far into the merits of the particular scheme; but we could not forbear calling attention to this feature of it, and showing that the scheme bears on its face the evidence of being a scheme for sacrificing the entire Union to Kentucky and other slave States. Has the President not yet learned, that however powerful and respectable may be Kentucky, it is not the whole United States? and not for her alone, nor all the slave States included, does the Union exist? The attempt to buy their support, if carried out and persisted in, will prove as fatal in the end as the practice of the old Roman emperors, when the Romans had become too effeminate or too cowardly to defend the Empire, of buying the support of the border Barbarians. The resources of the Union are large, but not unbounded; and those of the Federal treasury are great, but not exhaustless, as Mr. Chase has already ascertained. The administration seems to think the contrary, or to hold that the way to render a nation great and prosperous, is to overload it with debt. We begrudge no expenditure necessary for prosecuting the war and saving the life of the nation, but in all other respects we demand, as one of the people, the most rigid economy.

The expenditure the President's scheme demands is, in no way visible to us, necessary for carrying on the war, and bringing it to a successful issue. If necessary for freeing the slaves in the loyal slave States, it will be time enough to incur it when the war is over and peace restored. In the seceded

States, where is the great mass of the slave population, the slaves are now legally free by the lapse of those States, and their conversion by the executive into Territories under military governors. It needs only military success to make them practically free. The slave question is now in the way of settling itself, if the government will do nothing to re-establish slavery, and if it will turn all its energy to gaining complete military success. With the success of the Federal arms slavery disappears from all except the loyal border States; if the Federal arms fail, and separation or reconstruction follows, slavery is re-established, and probably will be more flourishing and vigorous than ever. As one who wishes to see slavery ended, we wish the government to leave the question where it now stands, and exert all its energies to crush by military rather than by political means the Rebellion.

We think, however, on further reflection, we catch a glimpse of the real policy of the administration, and of the reason why it so doggedly insists that the seceded States are still in the Union, though its military governments prove that, when it suits its purpose, it can treat them as out of it. It hopes, probably, by means of these governments to form in each of the seceded States, where it gets a foothold, the nucleus of a Union party, which, though small in the beginning, may gradually, with a little Federal nursing, gain to it the majority of the population. So far all is well, and shows statesmanship. But this party can be more effectually and rapidly formed if the military government be treated as the State, and the population adhering to it be allowed the representation of the State in Congress. We do not doubt it, and would approve it, if it were constitutional, and not an attempt to put down one revolution by another. If, again, the Federal government be allowed to treat the military government as the State, and to issue United States bonds of untold millions to it, ostensibly as compensation for the gradual emancipation of the slaves, which need never take place, the party may grow still more rapidly, and the majority of the population be much more quickly and effectually Unionized. That is to say, the President proposes to suppress the Rebellion, to end war and restore peace, by buying up with United States bonds the rebel population; and this, the President calculates, would cost less than to do it by means of the military; so the suppression of the Rebellion is to be effected by politicians, on mercantile instead of military principles. Surely this is a mercantile age. But

the Constitution and laws, what is to become of them? No matter for them. If the war is ended, rebellion over, and peace restored, the people, in their joy at the end, will overlook the means by which it has been obtained. The merchants and manufacturers will readily condone the violation of the Constitution, for trade and business may be resumed; and the Radicals or Abolitionists will not complain, if the ultimate extinction of slavery is provided or apparently provided for. We certainly do not charge our worthy President with originating this policy, or of adopting it with a full knowledge and understanding of its character. It smacks of the astute Secretary of State. The policy could be effectual only on the supposition that the mass of the people, North and South, are venal, and have no regard for constitutions and laws; and to adopt and act on it would serve only to corrupt them still more.

But, setting aside the outrage to public virtue and morality, to the Constitution and laws, to fact and truth, the policy implies, we do not believe it would even be successful. We believe, as we have said from the first, that the controversy can be settled only by arms on the battle-field. There is, in our judgment, no road to peace but through victory,—victory either for the government or for the Rebellion. We have as little confidence in, as we have taste for, the corrupt ways and corrupt intrigues of politicians. The Federal treasury is not rich enough, the Federal credit is not high enough to buy off the Southern Rebels, and thus end the war. The government is strong in the Constitution and laws, so long as it observes them, and is invincible so long as it relies on the justice of its cause and its army; but if it resorts to other supports it will, in our judgment, fail, and deservedly fail. It will never do to corrupt patriotism in order to intensify it, or to render a people utterly venal in order to render them the better able to appreciate and assert public right and national integrity. The Democratic leaders, who have gained some successes in the recent elections, will find themselves mistaken in their calculations, unless they are prepared to offer either separation, or reconstruction under the Confederate government. No: war is our reliance; and our hope is in the God of battles; and if our voice is still for war, it is not that we are Belial, or that we do not love peace. We have no aversion to reconciliation with our Southern countrymen; we have no animosities to gratify, no revenges to seek, no vengeance to inflict.



We dislike war, as we dislike disagreeable medicines ; but it must sometimes be resorted to, as a heroic remedy for diseases which nothing else will cure.

The President seems to us to lack confidence in his military operations, and we doubt if he has ever relied on military success to secure peace and union. In his Message, he hardly alludes to the army, and says not a word to encourage it and reward it for its deeds and sacrifices. We regret this, for the army deserves well of the country ; and, if it has not as yet accomplished all that was expected of it, it is by no means certain that the fault is not the fault of the administration rather than of its generals. For our part, we stand by the army, and have no fears of its failure, if the administration gives it a fair chance, and does not thwart the plans of its generals by panics for the safety of the Capital. We regard the General-in-Chief as an able military administrator, whose efforts at the organization, distribution, and combination of the forces of the government are already beginning to produce a marked effect. In General Burnside the army of the Potomac may be compensated for the loss of General McClellan ; and the army of the Cumberland has an honest, conscientious, and intrepid man, a true soldier and an able, skilful, and prudent commander in General Rosecrans ; while at the head of the armies of Tennessee, Mississippi, and the frontiers, are well tried and veteran generals in whom the country confides, and whose deeds speak for them. If these generals fail, we shall hold the administration, not them, responsible for the failure.

Some portions of the policy of the administration which we cannot approve, and against which, as a free and loyal citizen, we have spoken, are, no doubt, intended to thwart the calculations of the Democratic leaders, now so jubilant over their successes in the late elections. We are not, and would not be if we could, in the confidence of these leaders. We have no association with them, for we associate, if we can help it, only with loyal men and true patriots. Yet we cannot be very wrong in believing that these leaders,—not all who follow them,—with or without concert with their former political friends now in open rebellion, entertained the design of a reconstruction of the Union under the Confederate Government. General Lee, on invading Maryland and taking Baltimore or Washington, was expected to drop the stars and bars, raise the stars and stripes, and proclaim Jefferson Davis president of the United States ; and Gen-

eral McClellan was expected to co-operate with him in ousting Mr. Lincoln's administration, and suppressing any armed resistance that might be attempted in the Middle and Northern States. The design failed: Lee did not take Baltimore or Washington, and General McClellan, instead of co-operating with him, compelled him to retire to Virginia. Perhaps the Democrats counted without any reason on the sympathy of General McClellan, and too much on the supposed disaffection of the army of the Potomac to the administration; and perhaps the readiness with which the citizens of Pennsylvania and Ohio turned out to repel the invaders, satisfied the wire-pullers that "the pear was not ripe," and that the experiment would be too hazardous. The reconstruction under the Confederate government, to be called the United States, was, doubtless, still the programme up to the removal of General McClellan, and most likely is yet, though we are far from asserting or implying any complicity of General McClellan with them. The scheme is plausible and dangerous, and it is the duty of the administration to do all in its power to defeat it; but it can defeat it easily by giving the country a few military successes of a decisive character, and much more easily without than by resorting to any unconstitutional measures.

But we have said more than we intended, and must bring our remarks to a close. We have criticised freely, perhaps severely, what we regard as grave faults in the administration,—faults which we deeply regret; but we have done it not to oppose the administration, or in any way to embarrass its military operations. We have done it solely to urge upon it the necessity of correcting them. We have no faith in the Democratic leaders, and we can defend the national cause only by supporting the administration,—not, indeed, in all its measures, but in its policy of suppressing the rebellion by force. What is strictly its war policy we heartily approve and earnestly support; but its political measures for regaining the people of the seceded States and reconciling them to the Union, are, in our judgment, to a great extent illegal, unconstitutional, immoral, revolutionary, and unnecessary. The President, as the executive chief of the nation, has, we hold, in time of insurrection or invasion, the right to suspend the writ of *Habeas Corpus*, and therefore we do not complain of what are called "arbitrary arrests." We do not say that all those who have been arrested deserved to be, but we are confident that very few of those

who really deserve to be have been arrested. Justice has not always, and injustice sometimes may have been done ; but the Constitution has not been violated by the arrests complained of. The violation of the Constitution we complain of, is in the manner in which the President is reorganizing State authority in the seceded States. This he is doing by means of a few friends of the government, principled or unprincipled, got together in a seceded State under a military governor appointed by the executive, and authorized to wield the whole representative and electoral power the State was entitled to as a State in the Union. Already the President has *created* two senators for Virginia, and we hear it rumored that Texas is to be divided into four States, and that will be a creation of ten additional senators. The same process may be carried on in all the seceded States, and the President create for himself, or endow creatures of his own with, nearly one-half of the electoral and representative power of the United States. All that is needed is to obtain a military footing in a State, and get together a few dozens of individuals who, under the protection of the Federal guns, will consent to meet and resolve themselves the State, and that forthwith the President and Congress recognize it as a State in the Union, and admit its senators and representatives to their seats. Against this we protest in the name of the Constitution, of legal government, of social order, common honesty, and common sense. But our protest will avail nothing. The House of Representatives has just admitted Western Virginia as a State, after listening to the able and conclusive speech of Mr. Conway, of Kansas, against it.

Yet the error was not so much in admitting the new State, as in the previous recognition of the Pierrepont government as the State of Virginia. That government was not and is not Virginia, and had and has no power to give the consent required by the Constitution for the formation of a new State within the limits of the old State of Virginia. That pretence was well exposed in the debate in the House by Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania. But Mr. Stevens himself erred in contending that Western Virginia could be admitted under the war power. The war power is neither unconstitutional nor revolutionary. Under it the government could take possession of Virginia, and govern it by a military governor, but could not create a State, or admit a State into the Union, for a State in the Union is a part of the



Union, and is not under the government, either civil or military, of the Union. It is, united with the other States, the national sovereign, and governs instead of being governed. But the *State* of Virginia, having seceded, had ceased to exist, and the territory of Virginia had lapsed to the United States, the national sovereign. It was, after secession, simply territory belonging to the Union and under its jurisdiction, and could be dealt with as any other territory belonging to the United States. It was competent for Congress, if it chose, to erect it into two or more Territorial governments, and to admit them, with a republican constitution, *freely adopted by the people of each*, into the Union as States, with or without an enabling act.

The complaint we make of the administration is, not that it establishes in the several seceded States military governments, but that it treats these governments which it creates, and which depend on the Federal Government, as States in the Union. This is revolution and usurpation. It allows them the representative and electoral power of States, to which, being at best nothing but Territorial governments, they are not entitled. It vitiates the national sovereignty itself. We pray Congress, therefore, to refrain from going any farther, and when the respectable gentlemen we hear have been elected by the military government of Louisiana, present themselves with Governor Shepley's credentials, it will permit them to withdraw. This it may do, because it is always lawful to correct our own errors; and because Governor Pierrepont, after all, was chosen by popular election, though illegal, while Governor Shepley was simply appointed by the Federal executive.

Still, we repeat, the administration, in its war policy, must be sustained, if we would sustain the national cause. It is the legal, constitutional government of the country, and cannot, during its term of office, be separated from the country. We have full confidence in its patriotic intentions; we give it credit for a great deal of ability, though not of the highest sort; and we doubt not that it will, after a manner, carry us through our present difficulties, though not precisely in what we regard as the best manner. We dislike all finesse, intrigue, and underground working. We prefer always an open, frank, manly course, and are never willing to gain even a good end by reprehensible means. We would rather fail in the right than succeed in the wrong. We honor only him who seeks noble ends by noble means.

We like and support the end the administration aims at. We do not like all the means it adopts, for some of them seem to us unconstitutional, and fitted only to corrupt public virtue. But while we are writing the decisive battle may be raging, and before we issue from the press, the fate of the Union may be decided. It is an anxious moment for all Americans who love their country. Yet our country's destiny, as our own, is in the hands of God, who rears or overthrows states and empires at his will. In him we put our trust, confident that whatever he does, he does right. Thy will be done.

#### ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *God in his Providence.* By WOODBURY M. FERNALD. Boston: Otis Clapp, 1860. 12mo, pp. 437.

MR. FERNALD was formerly a Universalist minister, and is now, we believe, a Custom House officer under government. He has sent us this book because, in some remarks we made a year and a half ago on future punishment, he fancies he detects in us a tendency to favor the doctrine of universal salvation. But we can assure him we have not, and have not had for over thirty years, any such tendency. We are Catholics, not Universalists; and we believe, though salvation is proffered to all, none but the elect or predestinated will be saved. Salvation is in Christ, and none not regenerated in him, or born again in him, in this life, can enter the kingdom of heaven. And those who can never enter the kingdom of heaven, or be glorified with Christ, must suffer eternally in hell, for hell is the loss of heaven,—eternal and hopeless exclusion from the presence of God.

When, however, Mr. Fernald wrote this book, he was a receiver of the doctrine of Swedenborg, and this book is written from the point of view of that doctrine, which we understand he no longer accepts, at least in what its believers hold to be the orthodox sense. To review the work would be to review Swedenborgianism, the so-called doctrines of the New Jerusalem, which we have, at present, no disposition to undertake. We believe the Catholic Church, as it is, always has been, and always will be, is the New Jerusalem, and we have no temptation to inquire if it be not somewhere else. When one has found the truth he ceases to seek for it; he then seeks only to understand and obey it. We seek only that which we have not or do not know we have. We examined Swedenborgianism, as we did Mormonism and almost every other *ism*, when

we were seeking for the truth. We have for ourselves no occasion and no disposition to re-examine it, and have too much other work on our hands now to undertake its refutation. Mr. Fernald's book, however, is written with ability, and indicates a mind that is accustomed to think.

---

2. *Letter of Robert Dale Owen to Hon. Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury*, Nov. 16, 1862.

THIS letter is republished in pamphlet form from the columns of the New York *Evening Post*. It urges on the government an act of general Emancipation as the condition of ending the war and of restoring peace. It is well written; its tone is calm, its spirit excellent, its calculations just, its reasoning solid, and, to our mind, conclusive. We have all along urged immediate and universal emancipation as the only means of ending the war, restoring peace, and obtaining security for the future. But all we ask of the government just now, is to treat the rebellious States simply as territory and population belonging to the United States, and subject to its authority, as is the real fact in the case; and then to let it be known by proclamation or otherwise that, by law of Congress passed at the last session, the slaves in all the territory of those lapsed States, as in all other territory of the United States, are free, and slavery is forever prohibited therein. If the government will only recognize and publish the truth, the work Mr. Owen proposes is substantially done; and as their practical freedom depends on the success of the Federal arms, the whole African population are at once detached from the rebellion and made friends of the Union.

We have said Mr. Owen's calculations were just: perhaps we are too fast. He rates one negro laborer against one white laborer. But when we consider that in the South women as well as men are employed as field hands, that Southern industry is much more simple and productive than the Northern, and that consumption is in the slave States far less than in the free, we may assume that the productive labor of the three millions and a half of Africans is equal in value, in the rebel States, to the productive labor of three times that number at the North. But the President's gradual emancipation scheme, unless he renders his proclamation of the 22d of September effective—when, except for the loyal slave States, his gradual emancipation falls to the ground,—will not help us to deprive the rebels of any portion of the support they derive from their slaves, or to Unionize the African race. Let the government recognize and proclaim the facts as they are, and turn its whole attention to gaining military success, and nothing more need be done with the slavery or negro question till peace is restored; for the question of slavery in the loyal slave States will soon settle itself, if the



slaves of the rebel States are recognized by the government as free, and no longer legally slaves.

---

### 3. *Mr. Conway's Resolutions.*

THE *New York Times* of the 14th December, 1862, publishes a series of Resolutions which Mr. Conway of Kansas proposes to introduce for the consideration of Congress. Mr. Conway is a young man, not much over thirty, a Marylander, we believe, by birth, but one of the profoundest and most earnest thinkers in Congress, who cannot fail, if he lives, to be a philosophic statesman of the highest order. With two or three exceptions his Resolutions are admirable. We think he recognizes too positively the Rebels as a foreign power. The Rebels are not rebel States, but rebel population inhabiting territory belonging to the United States, and within its sovereign jurisdiction. We think, also, the Resolutions express too absolutely the lack of confidence in the *personnel* of the administration, that is to say, the President, the only administration in the legal sense. We do not believe in the Secretary of State, who is, in our judgment, the chief obstacle in the way of effectually suppressing the Rebellion; and we own we would much rather see Mr. Hamlin, the Vice-President, in the presidential chair than Abraham Lincoln, for we regard him as the abler man, and the superior statesman. But Mr. Lincoln is our legal, constitutional President, and must be respected and supported as such by all real lovers of the Nation. He is not equal to his position; he is not the right man in the right place; but he is our President, and, unless he chooses voluntarily to resign, and give way to Mr. Hamlin, or unless he is impeached by Congress, which he will not be, we must obey him and honor him as our President. It had been better for the nation if a better man had been elected President; but the nation has elected him, and it must do the best it can with him, till the constitutional expiration of his office. To resist him would be to copy the example of the Rebels. We only tell him, we hope that hereafter he will leave strictly military operations to military men. The Resolution that in a given contingency looks to an armistice, or cessation of hostilities, we cannot endorse. We never urged the administration to engage in the effort to subdue the seceders by force, and we would have consented, before the war broke out, to almost any compromise compatible with the existence of the nation and dignity of the government; but the war having been resolved on and commenced, and it being a just and necessary war, we are for prosecuting it to the end; and if it cannot be ended in our day, we would leave it as a legacy to our children, with the injunction to continue it, to consent to no compromise, to no truce, no armistice, till one or the other party gains a complete victory. It is easier for us to conquer now than it will be to recover the se-

cession territory after it has existed for years under a foreign government. It is now or never; a division once acquiesced in, the Southern Republic becomes the great North American State, and the United States falls into the rank of an inferior or secondary State. In other respects we like the Resolutions, and should be glad to see them adopted; but they will not be. The present Congress will adopt no measure seriously opposed by the administration. It may discuss questions, but it is sure to end its action by registering the edicts of the executive. The executive may hesitate, may vacillate, be long in coming to a conclusion; but Mr. Lincoln will knowingly suffer no will or judgment but his own to prevail, although he may in fact be only following the will and judgment of another. Mr. Seward is, in our opinion, really the President of the United States; but Mr. Lincoln does not know it, does not believe it, and if he did, Mr. Seward would not retain his post twenty-four hours. The President loves power, and will willingly share it with Congress, and Congress will persist in no measure he disapproves, or in opposing any policy he resolves to adopt. Yet he is not an Andrew Jackson, and is not a man of large views and heroic temperament. He is the astute attorney rather than the great statesman, and of course we expect no great statesmanship under his administration. The McDowell court of inquiry tells a story, and throws light, as it progresses, on many things. But we boast of our democracy, and must content ourselves with what democracy gives us. If it does not give us great men, we must be content with little men.

- 
4. *Miriam*. By MARION HARLAND. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1862. 12mo, pp. 549.

As a well digested and simply told story, this novel is not entitled to very high praise; but its delineation of character and its detached scenes have merit of the highest order. A large portion of the book can be skipped in the reading, but the portion which *must* be read is of rare interest and beauty. The characters are living and truthful, and any one well acquainted with Kentucky life and society before the present war will find himself at home in its pages, and meet to shake hands with many old friends and acquaintances.

- 
5. *The Florence Stories.—The English Channel*. By JACOB ABBOT. New York: Sheldon & Co.

AN interesting work for very young persons, and as unexceptionable in its morals as any of its class. But of the class of books to which it belongs we do not think much. Books for the young should be positive, not negative, give principles rather than facts, and tend to form the character rather than to store the memory.

Since the age has abandoned religion, and with it principles, the tendency has been to interest children by appealing to their sensibilities on the one hand, and their curiosity on the other. No books ever published have had a more pernicious influence on the English-speaking world than those of the Edgeworth School. To cultivate the sensibility is not to cultivate the heart or moral affections; and to fill the young memory with facts, even scientific facts, geographical facts, or historical facts, is not to cultivate the mind or to form a high intellectual character. To cultivate largely the sensibility is to prepare a people to be weak, effeminate, licentious, and cruel. It is the great fault of our age, and of large portions of our country, as the present civil war proves. Women, when they are cruel, are always much more cruel than men, because their sensibility has been more cultivated, and they are more likely to confound fine sentiments with moral affections, as did that wretched sophist, Jean Jacques Rousseau. Fine sentiments are fine, but they are not moral affections, and do not constitute the moral character. Sensibility is the lowest faculty of our nature, and least removes us from the animal world. Sentiment, which is only internal sensibility, or a sensibility that operates interiorly, not exteriorly, is no nearer an approach to the high moral nature of man. Love as a sentiment has nothing moral in it, though not immoral when licitly indulged. Yet, in an age in which the sensibility is overstimulated, love as a sentiment will be taken for moral duty, and elevated to the dignity of religion, as we find it is by Michelet in his *L'Amour*, and by nearly all who follow the Sentimental School founded by Rousseau and Bernardin Saint Pierre, not excepting the author of *Lady Alice* and *Night and Morning*,—a mistake that creates such a wide-spread revolt at the Christian Law of Marriage, and so much domestic unhappiness. It is this mistake which leads to the very common doctrine that love as a sentiment,—the age understands by love only a sentiment when distinguished from passion,—is the parent of virtue; that it purifies, strengthens, and ennobles character. No such thing. It may stimulate virtue to greater activity in some, but it never creates it where it is not, and it often weakens it where it is. The love that is synonymous with virtue, and which may be termed a religious homage, is the offspring not of sensibility, external or internal, but of free will, and is a rational and never a sentimental act, whether its object be God or man, or God, and man for the sake of God. Religion is in free will, never in sentiment. “My son, give me thy heart,” does not mean your fine sentiments or exquisite sensibilities, but give me your free will, the highest element and the highest act of your rational nature. The age should return to the study of the higher class of Christian Ascetic writers, in whom this subject is discussed so as to leave nothing to desire. The most deleterious and dangerous of all schools is the Sentimental.



Nor safer or more wholesome is the tendency to what is called scientific culture in children. Indeed, we hardly have now in educated society any children. Our young folk are all walking encyclopædias. They never name a flower by its popular and poetic name; its leaves are no longer leaves, they are petals, and we are told of its calix, stamen, and what not. Byron could not endure a woman who studied mathematics, and we can endure just as little one who goes round with a hammer breaking off fragments of rocks here and fragments there, and calls it studying geology. We love and honor all the sciences in their place, but we want children to be children, and women to be women, not prim professors. One great charm of the true woman is that she retains the child through life, and keeps alive in the social circle, even in old age, the light and warmth of childhood. When we meet a child, we want to meet the simplicity, the gayety, the light-heartedness, and the frolicsomeness of the child, to whom we are not afraid to speak in careless, unstudied language. A child that has no prattle, that speaks only in the measured and precise terms of the grave professor giving a lecture to his class, is no child for us—is, in fact, an artificial monster, and to be avoided. Our Catholic schools, perhaps, considering the age, do not sufficiently cultivate the intellect, but they do not fall into the infinitely worse error of our non-Catholic schools, and they do return our young sons and daughters to us still young, and with some touches of nature still left in them.

The right education of children is, in our age, especially in our country, a difficult thing, because the old notions of parental authority and filial obedience have been set aside as obsolete, and parents oftener obey their children than children their parents. But still it is the great thing, and can never be safely neglected. We, however, shall never make much progress in it till we get back to religion, and learn that Christianity is the supreme law, and the only true philosophy of life, whether private or public life, whether the life of individuals or of nations. But how to get back, that is the question. A man who has taken the leap over Niagara Falls cannot easily arrest himself in his descent, and reascend the precipice. The age, especially our country, has taken the leap, and we know nothing, but the interposition of Providence, that can save it. The difficulty lies not in the children, who are born as docile as the children of any other country or generation; but in the parents—in grown-up society. The adult generation has no capacity to form, as it should be formed, the new generation. We have ourselves been perverted, have lost our faith in God, our confidence in truth, our appreciation of the Unseen and Eternal, and come to believe only in matter, and to seek only material goods. Hence that almost universal abasement of characters, that absence of lofty instincts and moral heroism, which we find occasion everywhere to deplore. Our country is in peril, in extreme peril, but

public virtue, generous devotion to its salvation, is woefully deficient. Men who pass for respectable and fill high places are venal, and think more of profiting personally by the national misfortunes than of making sacrifices to relieve them. We seem to be a nation of Jews, and to plunder the public we appear to regard as lawful, almost as laudable. How many among us are amassing fortunes by coining the blood of our soldiers, and the tears of our widows and orphans into money! We have not yet heard in the court or the camp, or the hangers on of either, nor in our wealthy or unwealthy, fashionable or unfashionable society, ring out the unmistakable voice of the true patriot, the Christian hero. Our whole society is venal, selfish, worshipping mammon or shams, the emptiest of all idols, and knows it not, believes it not. American society, from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, is covered all over with wounds, bruises, and putrefying sores; and it exclaims, See how sound I am, how firm and vigorous is my health, how fresh and blooming is my beauty. How can such a society train and bring up its children for a higher, sounder, more moral and more living society? Like begets like in the moral world as in the animal world.

Religion we have abandoned, and have only a miserable counterfeit installed in her throne. We have sects, ministers, meeting-houses in abundance, but what avail these in the absence of living faith, faith that lays hold on the Unseen, and charity which unites us to God? Democracy has given us, as its last word, Abraham Lincoln for President, and William H. Seward for Secretary of State; and our Protestant sects have left us a moral Babel, almost a Sodom and a Gomorrah, a mass of moral and social corruption. Even Catholics have partaken of the prevailing spirit, become corrupt with others, and failed to make, by their deeds, their faith a living and productive faith. Say not that we are croakers, or that we paint our American society in too strong colors. We know there are individual exceptions. In the worst of times, some are found faithful, and God reserves to himself even now, we doubt not, seven thousand in the nation who have not bowed the knee to Baal; but we do not exaggerate the moral abasement of our times and country.

Now, how can a society, so fallen and debased, bring up children as they should be brought up, since no parents, however just their own views, wise and judicious their treatment of their children, can wholly protect them from the evil influences of their times. The spirit of society will infect them more or less, let us do the best we can. That spirit is in the atmosphere, and is inhaled with every breath. There is no human protection against it, and we see no remedy possible save in what we all shrink from, extreme adversity. We have abused our prosperity, and we must expiate the abuse we have been guilty of in extreme adversity,—an adversity which forces us to reflection on the perishableness and worthlessness

of all mere earthly goods, the unreality of all that is merely sensible, and to raise our minds and hearts to the invisible world which lies above the senses, and is intelligible to us only by reason and revelation. We have severed the goods of earth from the goods of heaven, or rather, we have taken the goods of earth to be the goods of heaven, and now they must be taken from us, and we compelled to learn what this means, "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom;" to learn that there are goods in faith, and hope, and charity, which can be possessed even in this life, infinitely surpassing any to be found in the goods of earth, of the senses, or even the sentiments. In other words, we must be chastised till we learn there is a God in heaven, whom we are bound to love and obey; till we return to faith and religion, and become really and truly a Christian people. If our present calamities work this effect for us, we and our children will have abundant reason to thank God for them. A people, so long as it really has Christian faith, has in itself a recuperative energy, for it has in itself the principle of both divine and human life, of religion and civilization, and however low it may have fallen, can rise again, and clothe itself anew with moral dignity and spiritual beauty, the beauty of holiness.

Waiting this result in society itself, we can still do something for our own children; we can let them be children till the age of childhood is past, and instead of cramming them with scientific facts and definitions, which comport with neither their age nor their capacity, we can instill into their minds some correct moral and religious principles, which tradition preserves even to the worst of us; and instead of cultivating their sensibilities, we can cultivate their imagination, their ideality. It is better for the child, not too old to read one of the *Florence Stories*, to read a fairy tale, or a story from the *Arabian Nights' Entertainments*, than it is to read a child's book of natural history, whether the natural history of plants or of animals. We can burn all geographical or historical cards, and dissected charts, and do away with all the modern devices for enticing children to learn "things useful" under the form of amusement. Children, as well as kittens and lambkins, must have play; and when you let them have play, let it be play, innocent of course, but honest, genuine play, with no afterthought or disguise about it. We can be honest with our children, and not invent new methods for cheating them. Guard against your children becoming too knowing, or getting old heads on young shoulders. Keep the child a child as long as you can, and let the child to the last moment revel in the poetry, the sunlight of childhood. Let children enjoy their play, and do not seek too soon to prepare them for the clouds and storms and sober realities of later life.



6. *Pope's Campaign in Virginia. Its Policy and Results. And the Relations of the Army of the Potomac to the Campaign Exposed.* By a GENERAL OFFICER, who served at the Headquarters of the Army of Virginia, from the first to the last of the Campaign. 8vo., pp. 32.
7. *Letter of the Hon. THOMAS EWING, to his Excellency Benjamin Stanton, Lieutenant-Governor of Ohio, in answer to the Charges against our Generals who fought the Battle of Shiloh, April 6, 1862.* Columbus: Nevins. 1862. 8vo, pp. 24.

WE make it a point to enter into no discussions as to the respective merits or demerits of the Generals commanding our Armies, —those now commanding, or those that have, at different times, been relieved from the command of them. If we had, as we have not, the requisite military science and experience to do it, we should still abstain from recording our criticisms; for we have and can get no adequate knowledge of the means at their disposal, the degree of discretion allowed them, of the obstacles they have had to overcome and the forces opposed to them.

The newspaper correspondents are not always, nor generally, military men, able to see the conduct of a campaign, or a battle, with a military eye, and cannot always be relied on; and the government gives us the least possible information, and the information it does give is by no means always exact, or such as we can make the basis of a judgment. The administration rarely deals honestly and frankly with the public, and its bulletins either tell us nothing, or tell us much that is untrue. On the first announcement of the battle at Fredericksburg, 15th December last, very few could gather that General Burnside had met with a disastrous defeat, and, at the time of writing, it is impossible to say whether the defeat is due to the General or to the administration. So far as the case now stands before the public, the General is responsible; and yet there may have been a necessity for making an attack that we are not aware of, as there may, in other cases, have been reasons of delay unknown to us. We have all along thought well of General Burnside, who, we are sure, is a brave, energetic, enterprising, and loyal man. If he has failed through any fault of his own, he is not the right man in the right place.

For our own part, we believe the grand defects of our military operations are, that they have been carried on, not with a view to purely military results, but in subordination to the political and commercial objects of the administration. The war has been conducted, not as war, but as subsidiary to politics, diplomacy, trade, and the pacification of the rebels, without mortifying them by a crushing defeat. The failure of our campaigns in a military point of view we attribute, therefore, to the policy of the administration, rather than to any incompetency or disloyalty in our generals;—

moreover, it is not necessary to conceal the fact that the administration is weak in administrative ability, and that its chief has little faculty of magnetizing the men who come in immediate contact with him, and through them the army and the nation. The President is not a man who inspires you with confidence in his ability to succeed. General Jackson always succeeded, for he always impressed those who approached him with the feeling that he could not fail. Go to Washington now, and you return with a feeling of almost perfect despondency. There is no magnetism in the administration, no heroic fire that kindles up a nation and renders it invincible. It is to the administration, primarily and chiefly, that we ascribe our military as well as our political failures; and till new blood, and heroic blood, is infused into its veins, we do not believe success is to be obtained.

If we could confide in the loyalty of the Democratic leaders, we should not be sorry to see them come into power; but we cannot trust the Woods, the Seymours, the Vallandighams, and men of that sort. If the Democrats would be loyal, if they would be really in earnest to save the integrity of the national territory, they could suppress the rebellion far more speedily and effectually than the Republicans, because they could combat it with an undivided North, which we cannot do. They will not save the Union unless the glory of it shall redound to their party, for with them party holds the place of country; but if Republicans, who prefer country to party, could see them really in earnest to save the country, they would cheerfully render them all the aid in their power. But the Democrats are the peace party, the party of compromise, of separation or reconstruction, and we cannot trust them, and must do the best we can with such men and means as we have. The Democratic party is a pro-slavery party, and there can be no suppression of the rebellion and restoration of peace without the total destruction of slavery. The wish to preserve slavery unharmed has been one of the chief causes of the weakness and failure of the administration. We have never wished the war to be conducted with a view to emancipation, nor would we have it continued one moment for the sake of emancipation; but we do not believe its objects are attainable without emancipation.

But the disaster at Fredricksburg proves that there is something wrong in our method of conducting the war. We have never admired the Boa Constrictor strategy with which we commenced, nor have we believed it of supreme importance to take Richmond. Moreover, we do not believe the best way of taking Richmond is by marching direct upon it from any of the routes attempted or named. You will never take Richmond; at least you will never cripple the rebellion till you get command of the rebel railroad system, and are able to cut the Confederate lines of communication. Our plan appears to have been to operate on the extremities, and to leave the

rebels their internal lines of communication unbroken. Why have we not isolated Richmond from the South by taking and holding Weldon and Goldsborough, in North Carolina; and from the Southwest by getting possession at some point of the Virginia and East Tennessee railroad; and North and South Carolina from Georgia and the Western States, by planting ourselves at Chattanooga, and taking possession of the Savannah River from its mouth to Augusta; and divided the Eastern Gulf States from the Western by clearing out the Mississippi River? We get in sight of a point, and then stop, fall back, or do just enough to stimulate the enemy to guard his weak points. We would take Richmond from North Carolina, East Tennessee, and the Valley of the Shenandoah. Cut off its supplies, leave it only the Peninsula and the country east, north, and west, just around it, and it must fall of itself. Do let us strike blows where they will tell, and aim to get positions that have real strategical importance. We should let the military men have their way, and for the present subordinate our politics and every thing else to the gaining of military success. Not an expedition should be sent out, not a movement should be made, but with express reference to the annihilation of the military forces of the Confederacy. Let our worthy President for a time forego his crotchets about "compensated emancipation" and deportation, and suffer his generals to give us victories that shall not turn out to be barren victories. Let him remember that the public holds him responsible alike for the civil and military administration of the government; and let him also bear in mind that the public will not be satisfied with fatal blunders, and think them no blunders, because he says he is responsible for them. There are some facts coming out in the Courts of Inquiry, that will make the public ask how much is the President's avowal of responsibility worth. If the country is lost under his administration, it will be no great consolation, even if the President should come forth and say, we need not complain; he alone is responsible for the loss. For our part, we have resolved, henceforth, to hold the President to his responsibility, and unless he clears himself, charge to his account all our political, financial, and military disasters. We leave him to deal in his own way with his subordinates; we deal with the principal, not the agent. If his secretaries or generals are not of the right sort, the fault is his, for he has the power of appointment and removal. We will not consent to cast the slightest censure on either General McClellan or General Buel, and we retain our full confidence in General Pope and General Sherman, and look only to the President. If his burden is too great, and his ability unequal to the demands upon it, let him resign and return to private life.

Mr. Ewing in his letter, as far as we can judge, has ably and effectively cleared his son-in-law, General Sherman, from the aspersions cast upon his military character by Mr. Stanton, the Lieutenant Governor of Ohio. The "General Officer" gives us an in-



telligible account of Pope's campaign in Virginia, and restores General Pope to the confidence we had in him before taking command of the Army of Virginia. If the "General Officer" is truthful and correct throughout, and we have no reason to think the contrary, General Pope is an able officer, and deserves great credit for the skill and energy with which he conducted his campaign, which would have terminated most gloriously, if he had had the hearty co-operation of the whole of the forces from the Army of the Potomac sent to reinforce him. As it terminated, General Pope's honor and ability are unimpeached. At any rate, both pamphlets are worth reading, and should admonish us not to be too hasty in judging the commanders of our armies. At present a cloud rests on General Burnside, but, perhaps, the truth will dissipate it. But as a rule, when a general has made an attack when not forced to it, or under circumstances which left him to his choice as to the time and mode of attack, and disastrously failed, relieve him of his command and put another in his place. The nation cannot afford to be sacrificed to the interests or feelings of any individual, however worthy or honorable he may be as a man. There are other men, if a change is needed, who can command the Army of the Potomac.

---

WE enter, in this number, on the twentieth year since the commencement of this Review,—a third part of the time we have lived. We have been in this and other Reviews before the public for nearly the third of a century, and we can well believe that we have, with many, become an old story, and that not a few, who hear much of us and read little, wonder why we still persist in repeating ourselves. A wise and amiable critic says we have written ourselves out, though he adds, he has not read us for the last five years; and we hear from various quarters hints that we are growing old and prosy. Perhaps we have exhausted ourselves and have become a bore; but it is hard to make a bore feel that he is not agreeable and entertaining, or an old man believe that he is not still young, or at least just entering the prime of life. It is true, we must confess to bad eyes and a little stiffening of the joints, but these things happen sometimes to young men, and we by no means admit that we are old. We have had serious thoughts of applying for a commission of Major-General in the army, and would do so, only we have some distrust of our horsemanship, having been out of practice of late, and grown somewhat stout. We think we could make a better Major-General than some in the army, for there is, after all, a good deal of fight in us. Nevertheless, having two sons in the army, either of whom is able to represent us to our satisfaction, we conclude, on the whole, we may be permitted to remain at home.

Now, as to this matter of growing old, we cannot credit that we

are old. Indeed, almost every journal that deigns to notice us, speaks of us as if we were a new writer, a young man seeing his name for the first time in print. We find rarely a critic that remembers that we were an old writer, of some reputation, not unlikely, before he was born, and that what we write to-day must be qualified by what we wrote yesterday, as well as what we wrote yesterday by what we write to-day. We are, therefore, inclined to believe that our fault is that we retain our youth too well, and give to our writings a character of youth and freshness which detracts from their merits. As to repeating ourselves, why, it is possible we do; but what harm in that, when nobody remembers what we have previously said, or is aware that what we publish to-day is not now published for the first time? Then, if we were to retire from the stage, what would become of us? Here, for the best part of a lifetime, we have been writing reviews daily; ask us to desist, is to kill us, or to ask us to kill ourselves. Moreover, we do not think we can be spared just now. We do not feel that our work is yet done, or that we have no further word to utter; so we resolve, if Providence gives us life and strength, and the public will endure us, to continue to jog on in our vocation.

The times have injured the Review a good deal, and the course it has taken for the last two or three years, while it has gained, it has lost it some friends. The friends we have lost, we of course regret, for not a few of them we love and reverence; but they have turned their backs on us, mainly, through misunderstanding and the apprehension of what they feared we might do, rather than for any thing we have actually done. We have lost them only for a time, for their hearts are in the right place, and their fears were always unfounded. We have reason and a conscience, neither of which pride or passion is likely to blind. We are what we have been, what we always shall be,—a bold, rough, independent man, but a sincere, earnest, and devoted Catholic, who believes that he can save his soul only in the Church, and has no wish to lose it. The Church is our mother, and never, knowingly, will we grieve her maternal heart, or, knowingly, have we done so. We have not sought our personal interest or personal glory. We have remained poor when we could easily have made ourselves rich, and received censure when we could with more ease have gained applause. We have labored, in thought, word, and deed, for what we regarded as the true interests of Catholicity in our age and country. We may have erred in judgment; when we are shown or are convinced that we have, we shall confess and make restitution. The best thing is never to err, and the next best is to own and correct the error. We claim not the former, but we shall never shrink from the latter. With this assurance to our friends and un-friends, and at peace in our own heart with both, we wish them both a Happy New-Year.





# BROWNSON'S QUARTERLY REVIEW.

---

This work is devoted to Religion, Philosophy, Politics, and General Literature. It is published by D. & J. SADLER & Co., for the Proprietor, on the first days of January, April, July, and October. Each number contains 128 pages 8vo., and the four numbers make a volume of 512 pages, which is furnished to subscribers at THREE DOLLARS *per annum*.

Agents will be allowed a liberal discount.

Payment in all cases invariably *in advance* by subscribers.

All communications must be addressed, "Brownson's Quarterly Review, New York," or to the subscribers,

D. & J. SADLER & Co.,

31 BARCLAY ST., NEW YORK.

NEW YORK, *January*, 1863.